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By design, climate finance projects have two fundamental features: climate benefits and 
sustainable development benefits. Climate finance is important for cutting emissions, but 
it can also deliver significant additional benefits, often termed “co-benefits.” The concept 
of co-benefits, although lacking a consist definition in the international arena, is so 
important, especially for the audiences from the developing world. Co-benefits are the 
backbone of a green and low-carbon development of these developing countries, where 
promoting high-quality economic development, maintaining economic, financial and 
energy security, protecting environment and controlling carbon emissions should achieved 
together. However, how the climate finance market values co-benefits remains poorly 
understood. By focusing on local co-benefits, this research highlights the importance of 
valuing co-benefits where projects are located, and how these projects deliver impacts for 
local communities. This dissertation looks at the question of co-benefits in three specific 
contexts by using both quantitative and qualitative methods as follows: First, I assess the 
likelihood that project co-benefits encourage buyers to pay more for Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) within the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the major 
international offset mechanism within a broader world of carbon finance. Second, I look at 
potential mechanisms of quality branding associated with the CDM to see whether these 
indicators in fact attract a price premium attributable to co-benefits. Third, I study the role 
of offset co-benefits in corporate behavior and decision-making in voluntary carbon 
markets. 
My research shows that in the CDM context, a project with a likelihood of delivering more 
co-benefits receives a higher CER price from buyers. The price difference between projects 
with the highest co-benefits and lowest co-benefits is $4.9/tCO2e 1  on average or a 
difference of 27.6 percent. The large variability in the price of CER partially comes from 
the locations of the buyer and the project, while CER prices do not differ based on the 
buyer’s profit status, sector, or the number of projects they hosted. In the quality branding 
context, I see that quality control indicators (particularly the independently generated label 
of “Gold Standard”) have a significant effect on CER prices with the price premium is in 
the range of $1.13/tCO2e (6.6% of price increase due to the Gold Standard certification of 
co-benefits) to $4.2/tCO2e (29%). Additionally, I see a strong commitment from public 
finance in delivering local co-benefits through their willingness to pay a price premium. In 
the voluntary carbon markets, I find that corporate motivations show a large degree of 
consistency and orientation, which aligns with the findings on the purchasing behavior for 
offset standards. Companies with a primary motivation to reduce emissions will prioritize 
purchasing cost-effective offset projects. Alternately, companies with primary motivations 
for non-emission impacts (such as company values or market competitiveness) value co-
benefits more, and are willing to pay more to fulfill these goals.  
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We live in a world that is affected by climate change, that has finite resources, and that 
calls for global efforts to achieve a sustainable low-carbon economy. Climate finance is 
crucial to addressing the concern about climate change because of the large-scale 
investments that are needed to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to 
the adverse effects of climate change. Sustainable development is crucial to addressing this 
concern because our current actions will have an impact on future generations. The last 
goal of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) calls for “multi-stakeholder 
partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology, and financial 
resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals in all countries” 
(Ban Ki-moon Centre for Global Citizens, 2018). 
The growing reality of climate change implies the urgency of transitioning to a low-carbon 
economy, which requires significant financial investments in sustainable climate finance 
projects. 
Climate finance with sustainable development benefits plays a significant enabling role in 
solving distinct issues at the convergence of carbon emissions, sustainable development, 
and climate risks. Capital must be drawn into sustainable projects aiming to reduce carbon 
emissions at scale. Thus, at the heart of this transition resides the strategy of integrating 
climate action and sustainability.  
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By design, climate finance projects have two fundamental features: climate benefits and 
sustainable development benefits. The motivation of this dissertation is the question of how 
climate finance can be deployed not only to reduce the emissions that cause climate change, 
but also to serve to improve human well-being and economic development, and be 
deployed in such ways that it can manifest in both advanced and emerging economies. 
These sustainable development benefits, such as improving air quality, empowering 
women, increasing farmers’ livelihood, creating local jobs, etc., can be called co-benefits 
generally. How climate finance and these co-benefits can be best realized to serve the 
broader sustainable development and climate agenda is the primary focus of this 
dissertation. 
Many climate finance projects are already part of broader sustainable infrastructure efforts. 
Research shows that the potential sustainable development benefits from sustainable 
infrastructure can reach $26 trillion by 2030 (New Climate Economy, 2018). Meanwhile, 
infrastructure with a focus on sustainability will be the primary driver to improve quality 
and avoid subsequent costs and the risk of stranded assets. Beyond the urgency of 
transferring investments to sustainable infrastructure, these core questions also arise: How 
can we mobilize finance for emissions reductions while meeting the goal of sustainability? 
How can we understand the role of sustainable development co-benefits in deploying 
finance through sustainable infrastructure?  
2. Background: Sustainable Infrastructure 
Sustainable infrastructure can be defined broadly as socially, economically, and 
environmentally sustainable infrastructure (Bhattacharya et al., 2016). Sustainable 
 3 
infrastructure should be socially inclusive, low carbon, and climate resilient (Bielenberg et 
al., 2016). The category not only includes conventional concepts of infrastructure, such as 
building, transportation, energy, and water systems (The New Climate Economy, 2018), 
but also natural “infrastructure,” such as forests and wetlands, which is the backbone of 
our society.  
The fundamental challenge of investing in sustainable infrastructure is to close the gap 
between the demand for sustainable infrastructure and the supply of capital. On the demand 
side, a tremendous amount of investment is needed. A study conducted by the GCEC 
estimates that about $90 trillion of investments in infrastructure are needed by 2030 (Arezki 
et al., 2016; Bhattacharya et al., 2016; GCEC, 2016). However, we are unable to transform 
the huge needs and opportunities to realize these investments, and too much of what is 
being invested in is not as sustainable as it could be, due to policy gaps and institutional 
weaknesses. On the supply side, a largely untapped pool of global long-term savings— 
around $100 trillion—is under-managed by institutional investors and struggling to find 
suitable projects to invest in (Arezki et al., 2016). These institutional investors, including 
pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, foundations, universities, NGOs, and 
sovereign wealth funds have been investing in infrastructure only on a very limited scale. 
As a result, we are unable to transform the saving pool into the right kind of finance at 
scale because of a lack of proven and standardized financing models to mitigate risks and 
crowd in private capital. 
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Right now, the current scale of infrastructure investments takes up half of the total 
infrastructure spending from private investments ($1 trillion to $1.5 trillion per year).2 
However, only 25 percent of that comes from institutional investors and 75 percent from 
corporate actors (Bielenberg et al., 2016). But we also see that sustainable investing is 
becoming more mainstream, especially in Europe and North America, in the past few years. 
As a result, sustainable infrastructure can make a big impact on local communities. We 
should work on creating infrastructure as a new asset class, by integrating a set of 
sustainability criteria, such as co-benefits, into its core definition, which allows the 
sustainable infrastructure to access the capital markets.  
3. Co-Benefits of Local Communities and Research Challenges 
Current research on integrating sustainability criteria or co-benefits into sustainable 
investing has faced several challenges. First, in the worlds of infrastructure finance and 
climate finance, while it is fairly simple to calculate the cost of these projects, the effect on 
the demand side is much harder to measure or estimate. The key question is: How does a 
change in co-benefits impact a project developer’s climate finance choices? Sustainable 
development benefits normally do not come with a monetary value attached to a climate 
finance project. Thus, it is quite challenging to evaluate its impact and influence on 
investments in adaptation and mitigation. Second, there are undefined standards to measure 
these co-benefits. Third, there is a lack of globally comprehensive integrated assessments 
for all dimensions related to the SDGs. Due to inadequate co-benefit (or ESG) data 
 
2 Current infrastructure spending of $2.5 trillion to $3 trillion a year. While the future demand for infrastructure 
spending is 6 trillion per year. (because we need $90 trillion between 2015-2030, and existing infrastructure is 
$50 trillion).  
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disclosure standards and performance metrics, these scattered and inconsistent datasets 
further prevent researchers from conducting solid research on the impact of co-benefits 
(Lewis et al., 2016).  
Despite these challenges, there has been research in a few areas. The first area of literature 
focuses on the qualitative analysis of climate finance projects. It uses a common 
methodology of multiple-dimension-multiple-indicators to evaluate the co-benefits of 
climate finance projects. The most convenient and generally adopted rule of 
dimension/criteria is based on a three part social-economic-environmental framework. 
These three pillars, with their own sub-level indicators, provide a complex system to 
integrate standardized measures across all projects. The simplest method adopts a check-
list format to conduct project comparisons (Ellis et al., 2007; Sirohi, 2007). A moderately 
more complicated method normally conducts a textual analysis for a number of project 
documents by extracting co-benefit-related information and building up a profile of co-
benefits for each project for comparison (Disch, 2010; Olsen and Fenhann, 2008; Spalding-
Fecher et al., 2012; Subbarao and Lloyd, 2011a; UNFCCC, 2012; Watson and Fankhauser, 
2009). An even more complicated method called Multi-Attributive Assessment is a 
combination of indicators of qualitative, semi-quantitative, and quantitative natures (Sutter, 
2003; Sutter and Parreño, 2007). This method evaluates the contribution of climate finance 
projects to sustainable development for all indicators and aggregates the ratings to the 
project level (Alexeew et al., 2010; Crowe, 2013; Drupp, 2011; Nussbaumer, 2009; Sutter 
and Parreño, 2007). Finally, there is another way to conduct co-benefit analysis in full 
detail, which is conducting case studies for a specific country with detailed information 
(Castro and Michaelowa, 2008; Cole and Roberts, 2011; Sirohi, 2007). However, due to 
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the large scale of projects around the world, conducting detailed country-specific 
evaluations is costly in terms of time and money, and also not necessarily applicable to the 
broader world. Overall, this research group only focuses on the co-benefits of projects per 
se by assigning different scores to projects. But it ignores the interaction between the 
projects and market actors. Thus, we are unable to identify whether market actors value 
projects that have more co-benefits or not. 
The second area of literature analyzes co-benefits quantitatively by limiting co-benefits to 
specific areas, where these co-benefits are easily measured and calculated, such as 
environmental indicators (e.g., CO2, SO2, etc.) or social/economic indicators (e.g., income, 
employment, etc.). However, none of the studies analyze co-benefits from a complex view 
like this dissertation. Literature studying sustainable development benefits in China usually 
identifies a common definition of co-benefits as reductions in SO2, NOx, and particulate 
matter (Murata et al., 2016; Sun et al., 2010; Zhang and Wang, 2011) because the Chinese 
government’s priority of sustainable development is local environmental protection due to 
heavy pollution. Papers focusing on co-benefits in Brazil generally pay attention to the 
income and employment level (Mori-Clement, 2019). However, the consequence of 
limiting the coverage of co-benefits into one or two areas is that we also limit the evaluation 
of co-benefits to the local communities to a restricted scale. Thus, it diverges fundamentally 
from this dissertation’s original motivation, which aims to study as many dimensions of 
co-benefits to the local communities as possible.  
 7 
4. Research Objective and Approach  
To fill the research gap, this dissertation intends to answer the following research questions: 
Are co-benefits from climate finance valued by stakeholders, institutional investors, 
organizations, and private companies? If yes, how are they valued?  
An important step in this section is to define what is meant by local or community co-
benefits in the context of this dissertation. Although the idea of co-benefits has attracted 
increasing attention from governments, NGOs, financial institutions, and academic 
research in recent years, there is no consensus on a concrete definition or agreed list of 
what counts as a co-benefit (Mayrhofer and Gupta, 2016). The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) considers co-benefits as “the positive effects that a policy or 
measure aimed at one objective might have on other objectives, irrespective of the net 
effect on overall social welfare” (IPCC, 2014). In this paper, we focus on a smaller subset 
of co-benefits, particularly on co-benefits to local communities as a result of Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) mitigation actions (carbon projects) that are targeted at 
addressing global climate change. Thus, I  adopted and adjusted the co-benefits description 
from World Bank CDCF 2013 report on key community outcomes, where five broad areas 
are listed (World Bank, 2013). These five areas capture the complex dimensions of co-
benefits. The co-benefits of this dissertation will cover the following five areas:3 Enhanced 
local infrastructure (e.g., roads, health clinics, schools, water, parks, community centers, 
 
3 This has a practical connection to the literature review itself, because most papers included in the dissertation use the 
term or concept “sustainable development” benefits.  Because of our focus on local co-benefits, I reviewed these papers 
to see whether they mentioned it the benefits in local communities. If they did, we treat it as targeting co-benefits to 
local communities, even if they use the word sustainable development as a broad term. The description of local co-
benefits is adopted and adjusted from World Bank CDCF 2013 report on key community outcomes (World Bank, 
2013). 
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etc.); access to cleaner and affordable energy for heating and/or cooking; improved income 
and employment; improved access to electricity and/or energy efficient lighting; and 
improved natural resource and environmental services (e.g. reduced pollution, natural 
resource conservation, forest protection, biodiversity).  
As there is a need and trend to integrate sustainable development benefits into evaluating 
climate finance, there is a necessity to study previous experience and see what we can learn 
from them to inform this process. Additionally, we should also explore how climate finance 
projects contribute to the SDGs and, accordingly, what kind of value people are willing to 
place on these projects that generate significant sustainable development benefits. 
The challenges to studying co-benefits from climate finance projects empirically motivate 
us to find a practical entry point that can provide an approximately consistent historical 
record of both projects and their valuation. As a result, I have chosen carbon offsets as a 
lens to look at the problem. On the basis of carbon offset markets, a feasible approach of 
co-benefit research is to apply an analytical framework to the limited but still valuable data 
sources in this market. In the area of carbon offsets, we have a rich set of experiences and 
dataset to test the market and inform policy. 
A carbon offset, deriving from real-life activities, represents one ton of CO2e4 sequestered 
or prevented from entering the atmosphere (Goldstein, 2016). Thus, by design, carbon 
projects deliver offsets that can be traded based on their climate benefits. Moreover, these 
 
4 Though usually referred to as “carbon offsets”, many projects focus on other GHGs, such as “projects 
based on biomass and industrial methane capture, and emission reductions are measured in carbon dioxide 
equivalent units (CO2e) (Conte and Kotchen, 2010). 
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projects can also host additional benefits besides emission reductions. These benefits are 
called “co-benefits”, which are often in line with many of the aspects of sustainable 
development. Another important layer of promoting sustainable carbon finance projects is 
that through projects, SDGs can be realized.  
Currently, there are two markets for carbon offsets, the compliance and voluntary markets. 
The market settings are different for the two markets. In the compliance (mandatory) 
market, buyers are primarily motivated to purchase offsets that can provide a more 
economic sense to reduce emissions to fulfill their lawful requirements, such as in a cap-
and-trade regime. CDM, as one of the offset mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, is 
responsible for the lion’s share of issued compliance offsets so far (of the 11 considered 
offset programs, CDM and JI Track 1 account for over 90 percent of credits issued, 59 
percent and 33 percent respectively) (World Bank, 2015)5.   
The voluntary carbon market grew later compared to the compliance carbon market. It 
picked up in the late 2000s and kept a relatively stable trend until the year 2017, when the 
issuance and retirement6 of carbon credits reached a record high. While in the voluntary 
markets, buyers (for example, companies) are largely motivated by their social 
responsibility and concerns about climate change to reduce their emissions (Anja, 2007; 
Goldstein, 2016). The bulk of voluntary offset purchases by volume are made by multi-
 
5 Primary market transactions are comprised of offsets sales from project developers to intermediaries or directly to end 
buyers; secondary market transactions are comprised of offset sales among intermediaries or from intermediaries to end 
buyers. In the case of CDM and JI, most of the transactions belong to primary market transactions (Hamrick, 2017).  
6 Issuances reflect the volume of emissions reductions verified under a standard. Normally, issuances represent offsets 
available for sale, and retirements represent offsets that can no longer be resold (Hamrick and Gallant, 2018). 
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national, private, for-profit companies. In 2017, companies are the primary buyers in the 
voluntary markets with a market share of 87 percent by volume.  
Both compliance and voluntary markets remain theoretical opportunities for expansion in 
the future, but their widespread use remains in question due to many challenges. 
Uncertainty about the potential for double counting, historical lack of transparency, and 
other questions have meant that the international community cannot reach an agreement on 
how to perform international cooperation to scale up these actions (Dufrasne, 2018; Evans 
and Timperley, 2018; IETA, 2018). Nevertheless, despite this controversy, studying the 
previous experience and skills of the carbon market mechanism presents us with real 
meaning. Before we have a fully designed new market mechanism, the most common 
practice of integrating sustainable development into carbon offset projects in history is the 
CDM.  
The CDM is the major international offset mechanism within the broader world of carbon 
finance and was designed to lead to significant emission reductions that will help reduce 
the cost of climate mitigation in countries with commitments as well as contribute to 
sustainable development in the host countries. However, there has been significant 
discussion about the degree to which these projects fulfilled their dual mission of emissions 
reductions and sustainable development, particularly with respect to fostering local 
community co-benefits as a part of broader sustainable development outcomes. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study how co-benefits are valued by customers 
(stakeholders, institutional investors, organizations, and private companies) in climate 
finance, how these co-benefits vary based on customers’ attitudes, and to what extent that 
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the co-benefits can maximize customers’ utilities. According to the traditional view, 
customers value climate finance projects with high co-benefits more and are willing to pay 
more. However, as discussed earlier, little research focuses on quantifying these co-
benefits, let alone use econometrics to estimate and measure these co-benefits, and their 
impact on consumers’ decision choice. This dissertation fills that gap. Based on the 
traditional assumption, we hypothesize that customers are willing to pay more to climate 
finance projects associated with co-benefits when they make their decision on purchasing 
carbon credits and evaluate that proposition using diverse methods. 
5. Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation takes a three-paper format. It covers the projects in the carbon markets, 
and customers specifically by examining both the compliance and voluntary carbon 
markets. The first paper tests the market of the CDM and gets an indication of whether or 
not buyers are willing to pay more on projects with better co-benefits. The second paper 
focuses on studying a quality control indicator of carbon offsets by looking at one of the 
standards on the carbon markets, the Gold Standard, and then tests whether this Gold 
Standard attracts a price premium because of these co-benefits. The third paper studies the 
behavior of corporate efforts in purchasing carbon offsets credits on the voluntary market, 






• Q: Does the likelihood of 
getting more co-benefits 
encourage buyers to pay 
more for the CERs?
• Goal: test the CDM market 
and get in indication of  
whether or not buyers are 
willing to pay more on 
projects with better co-
benefits 
• Study domain: CDMs with a 
price tag 
• Method: literature review, 
OLS regression analysis, 
hedonic price model   
• Q: Does Gold Standard 
increase buyers’ willingness 
to pay more for the CERs?
• Goal: test the product and 
get an indication of whether 
or not buyers voluntarily 
purchase carbon credits with 
higher co-benefits, all other 
attributes of the carbon 
projects being equal.  
• Study domain: CDM and 
CDM_Gold standard 
• Method: econometrics 
model (propensity score 
matching plus exact 
matching)
• Q: How do diverse corporate 
motivations to invest in offset 
projects affect their choices 
with respect to co-benefits to 
local communities? 
• Goal: study the role of co-
benefits in company behavior 
and decision-making in the 
voluntary carbon market as 
end buyers, and what drives 
them to purchase carbon 
offsets. 
• Study domain: company 
voluntary carbon credit offsets 
projects 








Chapter 2 Paper One: Do Potential Co-Benefits from Clean 





The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has been the major international offset 
mechanism within the broader world of carbon finance. It was designed to lead to 
significant emission reductions that could reduce the cost of climate mitigation in countries 
with commitments, as well as contribute to sustainable development in host countries. 
However, there has been significant discussion about the degree to which these projects 
fulfilled their dual mission of emissions reductions and sustainable development, 
particularly with respect to fostering local community co-benefits as a part of broader 
sustainable development outcomes. In this paper, I will review the literature on the co-
benefits delivered by the CDM at the local or community level, based on a group of 83 
peer-reviewed articles and other reports. While perspectives on co-benefits are diverse, 
most sources argue or acknowledge that even with more recent procedural improvements, 
the CDM has not consistently delivered significant co-benefits to local communities. It 
appears likely that the situation has improved somewhat in recent years as CDM procedures 
have been refined, and there may be more opportunities for enhancing procedures to favor 
such benefits. My conclusion from the literature is that there is overall variability in 
delivering co-benefits depending on the technology type, design features, and the country 
context. To confirm such observations, this paper takes a further step and conducts an 
econometric analysis of 2,205 projects based on their interactive Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG) scores for the co-benefits in the CDM pipeline to date. Specifically, a 
regression model and a hedonic model is constructed separately to identify the drivers 
behind the prices of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). The empirical analysis shows 
that a project with the likelihood of getting a higher number of co-benefits receives a higher 
CER price from the buyers, statistically controlling for projects’ features and sellers’ 
background. The price difference between projects with the highest number and the lowest 
number of co-benefits is $4.9 /tCO2e on average or a difference of 27.6 percent. These 
results are consistent with earlier hypotheses in the literature but provide an additional 
dimension to study the research question from the dynamic between co-benefits and market 
behavior. 
 
1. Introduction  
The world now has roughly a decade and a half of experience with the carbon offsetting 
programs established in the Kyoto Protocol, which include the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). The experience of these programs can 
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inform the next steps in the evolution of finance to support low-carbon sustainable 
development, including ongoing discussions about possible pathways for implementation 
of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. As of the time of writing,7 there are 7,806 projects 
registered under the CDM with a total of 1.958 billion issued Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) (UNEP DTU Partnership).8 The CDM is probably the most salient 
international offset mechanism within the broader world of carbon finance, and was hoped 
to lead to significant reductions of greenhouse gas emissions at the project level. Initiated 
under the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the CDM was charged with carrying out the goal of 
assisting “Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments” with “real, measurable and additional” 
emission reductions (UNFCCC, Article 12). Importantly, The CDM was explicitly 
designed with a co-equal, second goal, embedded in the Kyoto Protocol, of helping 
developing countries to achieve sustainable development. 9 
This second, sustainable development (SD) goal stemmed from an interest by the parties 
and the international community in ensuring that the carbon finance approach in the CDM 
would not be just to identify low-cost reductions, but also to support broader development 
goals. The co-equal SD goal created challenges in interpreting and implementing the CDM, 
and as a result has been the subject of extensive inquiry. Operationalizing such an 
aspirational goal was always going to be a challenge and has been complicated by the 
 
7 At the time of writing, I used data from UNEP DTU Partnership the by January 10, 2019. 
8 Formerly UNEP Risø Centre (URC) 
9 “The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included in Annex I in 
achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to 
assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and 
reduction commitments under Article 3” (United Nations, 1998). 
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absence of an internationally accepted definition of sustainable development in the context 
of specific projects and national priorities. And because the 2001 Marrakesh Accords 
confirmed that it is the host country’s responsibility to define whether a project contributes 
to the sustainable development or not, the interpretation of sustainable development varies 
from country to country. I would expect the impact of CDM projects on local community 
co-benefits could also differ.  
Nevertheless, the extent to which these programs have supported sustainable development 
goals, and in particular benefits to local communities, has been evaluated by a number of 
research teams over the past decade. Unfortunately, while this literature was able to present 
extensive discussion about co-benefits, there was very little about evaluating the link 
between co-benefits and market behavior. To address this gap, this paper takes a three-part 
approach. First, it studies the existing literature on the area of to which the extent that 
carbon finance projects under the CDM led to significant development co-benefits for local 
communities and what contributed to these outcomes. To do this, I conducted a systematic 
literature review based on a group of 83 peer-reviewed articles and other reports to generate 
hypotheses about the relationship between co-benefits and the carbon markets. Second, 
based on this analysis, I develop a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) interaction score 
system to elucidate the relationship between co-benefits and carbon markets, and create 
eight categories of co-benefits to facilitate the econometric model later. Third, I test the 
hypotheses about whether buyers are willing to pay more on projects with better co-benefits 
based on the SDG scoring system. I do this via an econometric analysis of 2,205 projects 
with a price tag and a contract date for the Emission Reduction Purchased Agreement 
(ERPA) in the CDM pipeline to date. Specifically, a regression and a hedonic model is 
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constructed to identify the drivers behind the prices of CERs and different levels of co-
benefits. 
This remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
research background and objectives, and a discussion on challenges in defining local 
community co-benefits in practice. Section 3 describes the methodological approaches and 
data used for this paper. Section 4 presents the results of the regression analysis. Further 
econometric analysis with sectoral data is discussed in section 5. I present the discussion 
and potential for future research in Section 6. Policy implications and conclusions are 
summarized in section 7.  
2. Define and Operationalize Conceptual Approaches to Co-Benefits  
This paper studies the topic on the sustainable development co-benefits delivered by CDM 
projects, with a focus on the local level. Sustainable development has been broadly 
accepted as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland Commission, 1987). 
However, turning this general definition into a specific application under CDM was a 
challenge. Unlike the additionality goal of the CDM, which is measured and monitored by 
the CDM Executive Board under the UNFCCC, there was no internationally accepted 
standard 10  of sustainable development. The assessment of sustainable development 
benefits including local co-benefits was essentially delegated by the Kyoto Protocol to 
individual nations as a sovereign matter to its state parties, who essentially then developed 
 
10 Although the definition of sustainable development from the Brundtland Commission is broadly 
accepted, there is still missing an operationalizable interpretation of sustainable development, which does 
not have a common standard. 
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guidelines that were applied to each individual proposed project in their respective 
countries. This approach, rooted in the Marrakesh Accords, allowed countries flexibility to 
design their own “menu” of sustainable development options based on their capacities and 
priorities. Functionally, this was done via a specific institutional process. The international 
rules under the UNFCCC required each country to designate an agency within the 
government or other government entity to evaluate and approve CDM projects and oversee 
their implementation. This Designated National Authority (DNA), appointed by countries, 
was then also, by extension, charged with shaping the assessment of sustainable 
development for CDM projects. This assessment usually was rooted in some broader sense 
of priorities generated by the national government and then interpreted via a set of 
guidelines, indicators, or preferred project types (Ellis et al., 2007).  
Broadly speaking, the nature of the CDM thus creates three challenges for delivering 
sustainable development benefits, whether at local or national scales. The first challenge is 
rooted in the diverse interpretations of sustainable development under CDM. As a result of 
the nationally based structure of CDM, there were no standardized assessment criteria or 
monitoring systems. This has meant that many countries have not established strong 
systems for encouraging SD during the project development phase of CDM, or for 
monitoring sustainable development benefits during the implementation phase, potentially 
reducing the quality and quantity of benefits delivered (Dirix et al., 2016). Second, the 
CDM is a market mechanism that is designed to identify low-cost emission reductions. 
Facing possible trade-offs between easily quantified emission reductions and harder-to-
quantify sustainable development benefits, project, developers may favor those things 
more easily counted and more directly profitable. Third, the CDM does not establish any 
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particular institutional or monetary incentives for projects that benefit the local 
communities, thus, these co-benefits are not hard to be recognized in the market.  
In this paper, I focus on only sustainable development at the local level. This focus presents, 
in my view, two additional challenges to interpreting local community co-benefits in 
practice. First, the absence of an internationally accepted definition of sustainable 
development in the context of specific projects and national priorities moreover makes it 
challenging to define a clear and consistent set of criteria to evaluate local co-benefits. I 
address this issue by establishing a set of criteria as detailed in the next section. Second for 
many countries, local co-benefits are only one dimension of their interpretations of 
sustainable development, which could include such other priorities as electricity generated 
for the national grid, enhancement of national income, purchasing of domestically 
produced goods, and others. Since most papers reviewed in this paper somehow invoke the 
term or concept “sustainable development,” I addressed this issue by reviewing all such 
papers to see whether they specifically referenced benefits for local communities. 
An important step in this section is for us to define what is meant by local or community 
co-benefits in the context of this paper. Although the idea of co-benefits attracted 
increasing attention among governments, NGOs, financial institutions, and academic 
research in recent years, there is no consensus on a concrete definition or agreed list of 
what counts as a co-benefit (Mayrhofer and Gupta, 2016). The conventional concept of co-
benefits as referred by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as the “the 
positive effects that a policy or measure aimed at one objective might have on other 
objectives, irrespective of the net effect on overall social welfare” (IPCC, 2014). In this 
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paper, I focus on a smaller subset of co-benefits, particularly on co-benefits to local 
communities as a result of the CDM mitigation actions (carbon projects) that are targeted 
at addressing global climate change. 
By placing my research proposition in the content of local co-benefits, I am emphasizing 
the importance of valuing co-benefits where these projects are located, and how these 
projects deliver impacts on local communities. The motivation of this paper is to illustrate 
the crucial important of rooting local co-benefits with the climate projects.   
Exist literature on how to evaluate co-benefits on carbon offsets projects can be categorized 
into two groups. The first area of literature focuses on looking at multiple dimensions of 
the benefits by using a “multiple-dimension, multiple-indicator” approach to evaluate co-
benefits of carbon offset projects. The most commonly adopted methodology is to 
categorize benefits according to environmental, social, and economic benefits (Alexeew et 
al., 2010; Crowe, 2013; Drupp, 2011; Ellis et al., 2007; Nussbaumer, 2009; Olsen, 2007; 
Sutter, 2003; Sutter and Parreño, 2007). The second area of literature places the focus of 
co-benefits on specific areas in which concrete metrics of co-benefits can be feasibly 
measured or calculated. These include environmental indicators such as emissions (CO2, 
SO2) or social/economic indicators such as income or employment (Mori-Clement, 2019; 
Murata et al., 2016; Sun Life Financial Inc., 2018; Zhang and Wang, 2011). It was my view 
that these broad areas were insufficient to fully describe local community co-benefits. In 
particular, the broad three-part categories lack a focus on specific routes to generating local 
benefits, and the metrics-focused approach may apply an overly narrow lens that might 
leave out meaningful qualitative contributions. Accordingly, I adopted a five-category 
 20 
typology in accordance with the World Bank Community Development Carbon Fund 
(CDCF)’s definition (World Bank, 2017, 2013). These five categories are: 
1. Enhanced local infrastructure (e.g., roads, health clinics, schools, water, parks, 
community centers, etc.) 
2. Access to cleaner and affordable energy for heating and/or cooking 
3. Improved income and employment 
4. Improved access to electricity and/or energy efficient (EE) lighting 
5. Improved natural resource and environmental services (e.g., reduced pollution, 
natural resource conservation, forest protection, biodiversity) 
Relatively limited research has been conducted on the topic of carbon finance and 
community co-benefits. Among this group of literature, most papers are heavily qualitative 
because of innate difficulties to measure and evaluate the co-benefits. Additionally, several 
foundational issues remain unaddressed, especially there is no such research on the topic 
of interplay between CER prices paid by the credit buyers and a broader list of co-benefits. 
Because eventually, my primary interest is to see how co-benefits can be valued and 
monetarized partially under the design of the carbon markets. This study aims to fill these 
gaps in the literature by examining the research question by conducing both qualitative and 
quantitative research.  
The first research question for this paper is:  
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What does the existing literature say about the extent to which carbon finance 
projects under the CDM led to significant development co-benefits for local 
communities and what contributed to these outcomes? 
The second research question for this paper is: 
Does the likelihood of more co-benefits encourage buyers to pay more for the CERs?  
3. Methodological Approach and Data  
To answer these research questions, I divide my methodological approach into two 
components. The first component is using a systematic literature review to answer the first 
research question. The second component adopts econometrics models to solve the second 
research question.  
3.1. Method 1: Systematic Literature Review (Observations and Empirical 
Evidence by Co-Benefit Category) 
Methodologically, I implement the first component using a specific and emerging approach 
called the “systematic literature review.” This process diverges from a more conventional 
literature review in using a transparent and systematic approach to finding, selecting, and 
reviewing literature. More details about systematic literature reviews may be found in 
Petticrew and Roberts, 2008. While traditional literature reviews have many merits, the 
systematic review methodology may reduce the possibility of bias in selecting and 
reviewing papers. For this reason, some organizations, including the World Bank, have 
created policies that encourage the use of systematic literature reviews.  
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3.1.1. Data for the Systematic Literature Review  
The following databases are used to conduct this literature review: Academic Search 
Complete; Web of Science; Scopus; GreenFILE (EBSCO). Google Scholar and Google are 
used to capture additional possible papers. In order to do a systematic backwards citation 
tracking, I use a bibliographic computation software called VOSviewer,11 which can help 
us calculate the total number of cited references from the general search sample. Some 
sources that have not been published in academic, peer-reviewed literature can also 
contribute to our understanding of carbon finance. The special characteristics of the carbon 
markets, as a market mechanism evolved from private and public sectors, multi-level 
international organizations, non-profit organizations, etc., imply that some perspectives 
from organizations and actors with direct experience or other perspectives on the market 
can enhance insight into the questions in this review. This so-called “grey” literature12 is 
included in my study, subject to careful review. A more detailed process of how to conduct 
the systematic literature review can be found in Appendix C. Error! Reference source 
not found. presents the final breakdown of references in my review sample. I also 
summarize a topical breakdown of papers assessed for each local co-benefit area (including 
reginal focus, research methods, project types, project sizes and externalities in Error! 
Reference source not found..  
 
11 VOSviewer is a software tool developed by developed by Nees Jan van Eck and Ludo Waltman at Leiden University's 
Centre for Science and Technology Studies (CWTS). It is a tool used to conduct bibliographic analysis and scientific 
mapping. 
12 I adopted the IPCC’s coverage of grey literature, which are sources have not been published or peer-reviewed (e.g., 
industry journals, internal organizational publications, non-peer reviewed reports or working papers of research 




Table 2-1. Research of applying search protocol. 
Total number of papers included in this literature review: 83 
Pure Policy Survey and Project Analysis CDM-AR* Grey Literature 
11 32 18 22 
*Eventually, I didn’t include CDM-AR projects in my final empirically analysis due to the totally different 
application and evaluation process of CDM-AR projects.  
 
Table 2-2. Typology of co-benefits papers.13 
Co-benefit type Continent Method Project type  Project size  Externality 
• All five goals 
(33) 14 
• Goal 1 (6) 
• Goal 3 (25) 
• Goal 4 (5) 
• Goal 5 (18) 
• Global (40) 
• Africa (8) 





• Economic (5) 
• Science and 
engineering 
(16) 
• Social science 
(33) 
• Other (18) 
• All (39) 
• A/R (19) 
• Biomass (1) 
• Cookstove (2) 
• EE (3) 
• Hydro (5) 
• Landfill (2) 
• Solar (1) 
• Both (53) 
• Large (3) 
• Small (16) 
 
• Positive (72) 
• Negative (14) 
 
3.1.2. Literature Search Result 
3.1.2.1. Co-benefit Variations by Project Type   
The reviewed literature found substantial variation in local co-benefits across different 
project technologies. HFC-23 projects with sizeable potential emission reductions are 
commonly recognized to deliver few tangible local co-benefits (Alexeew et al., 2010; Ellis 
et al., 2007; Olsen and Fenhann, 2008; Schneider, 2007; Subbarao and Lloyd, 2011a; Sutter 
and Parreño, 2007; Watts et al., 2015). While they create large quantities of low-cost 
emissions reductions, these projects have a low impact on generating local employment15 
and no effect on improving local air quality.16 Most of the profits from the destruction of 
 
13 Developed through the hand-coding of papers from the systematic review according to co-benefit type, continent, 
research method, project type, project size and externalities of project impacts.  
14 Numbers in parentheses are counts of papers.  
15 The projects are end-of-the-pipe solutions and do not have a substantial employment effect. 
16 Because industrial gases like HFC-23 are not local air pollutants, the destruction of them does not provide local 
environmental benefits for local communities.  
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HFC-23 in HCFC-22 facilities went to project developers and government.17 However, 
how the government will use this tax revenue and whether this tax revenue can deliver 
indirect local co-benefits is out of the scope of this paper.  
Landfill gas reduction projects also face a similar situation to HFC-23 projects in their 
capacity to deliver high emission reductions but with low co-benefits, and in many cases, 
appear to have engendered opposition from local communities. Such projects are 
associated with few direct employments because the technology they employ does not 
generate significant additional employment. Regarding to co-benefits on the environmental 
dimension, landfill gas projects may have contributed to improved sanitation and water 
quality—with potential health benefits. However, there have also been community 
concerns about negative impacts on local health of methane gas or other non-methane 
landfill gases if a new landfills or composting sites around their areas or an extension of 
the life of an existing site. Two out of five papers expressed the concerns of negative 
impacts of landfill gas projects.18 
Hydropower assessments usually distinguish between large-hydro and small hydro projects. 
Large hydropower projects were broadly criticized in the literatures bringing negative 
impacts to local communities (Haya, 2007; Haya and Parekh, 2011; Rousseau, 2017), while 
these negative impacts were omitted by project developers in the PDDs. Also, compared 
to small hydro, large hydropower plants appear to generate fewer co-benefits to local 
communities (Sutter and Parreño, 2007). A case study in Yunnan Province in China 
 
17 For example, Chinese government tax 65 percent of the CERs of HFC-23 projects. By 2012, the expected tax 
revenue from this project type can be 1.5 billion EUR (Schneider, 2007).  
18 The Bisasar landfill CDM project in South Africa was criticized by local communities, who claim that the CDM 
projects is contributing to postpone the closing down of the waste disposal site, which had a negative impact on 
people’s health (Boyd et al., 2009). 
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revealed that the CDM hydropower project negatively changed local people’s lives. For 
example, local smallholders lost their most important asset, their land, for building the dam. 
Thus, it also changed their livelihood accordingly. As a result, the benefits of the hydro 
project are captured by the wealthy eastern provinces, where they have a high demand for 
electricity, and the local communities experience the negative impacts from the CDM.  
Renewable energy projects, such as small hydropower projects, wind and EE are generally 
recognized as having the potential to generate more co-benefits to local communities. Like 
other types of projects, these projects can provide broad sustainable development benefits 
for the country, such as increasing energy security improving air quality, and achieving 
technology transfer. But in addition, they usually have a high possibility to deliver local 
co-benefits, such as employment generation, income generation, access to energy, 
improved local air quality compared to other technologies (Olsen and Fenhann, 2008). 
Alexeew conducted a study of 40 projects with a diversity of project types in India. By 
looking at their PDDs, he concluded that among the project types, biomass, hydro, and 
wind projects contribute higher SD benefits compared to HFC-23 (Alexeew et al., 2010). 
Additionally, renewable energy projects in rural areas offer local communities a 
sustainable and viable alternative compared to fossil fuels, because expensive and difficult 
to transmit and distribute energy generated from fossil fuel to remote and rural area 
(Subbarao and Lloyd, 2011a).  
Biomass projects have a medium performance on improving local air quality, while also 
good performance on employment generation. Sutter’s study shows that only biomass 
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power project received A rating (which means they can generate more than 300 person 
month per 1000 CER).  
My studies targeted a diversity of technologies and some of the studies addressed the 
question of how the technology choice relates to sustainable development outcomes. At 
one extreme, most studies agree that industrial gas decomposition (HFC) projects have the 
lowest local co-benefits compared to the other project technologies. On the other end, rural 
renewable (Boyd et al., 2009) energy projects tend to have a high impact on local co-
benefits on two levels. First, it has a higher impact on local co-benefits compared to other 
project technologies (Kim et al., 2013). Second, rural renewable energy projects in poorer 
regions tend to yield much higher impacts on poverty and promote local co-benefits (Drupp, 
2011; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011). As one example of this, Borges Da Cunha 
explores the feasibility of CDM projects in isolated Amazon regions to promote local 
access to electricity via renewable energy technologies (RETs). He concludes that not only 
will these RETs will result in emission reductions, but more importantly, it will promote 
universal access to electricity (Borges da Cunha et al., 2007).  
3.1.2.2. Co-benefit Variations by Project Size   
It is generally accepted that small-scale projects tend to deliver a slightly higher number of 
local co-benefits per project than large-scale projects19 (Corbera et al., 2009; Olsen and 
Fenhann, 2008; Spalding-Fecher et al., 2012; Sutter and Parreño, 2007). Olsen and 
Fenhann, for example, found out that small-scale projects deliver a slightly higher number 
 
19 Most of the studies have multiple co-benefits indicators. Each indicator represents one benefits. So, they will look at 
how many indicators one project can get.  
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of SD benefits than large-scale projects (3.2 benefits per project for small vs 2.9 benefit 
per project for large) (Olsen and Fenhann, 2008). On the other hand, large scale projects 
showed outperformance on three indicators: improving air quality, access to water, and 
improved safety conditions.   
Sutter and Parreno rated SD attributes across projects and found that the average SD rating 
was higher for small scale projects (Sutter and Parreño, 2007). Similarly, Spalding-
Fecher’s study of 202 projects, where 79 were small-scale and 123 were large -scale 
projects, indicated that there are more SD benefits for small-scale projects compared to 
large-scale projects; moreover, for five percent of large-scale projects, no other SD benefits 
other than technology transfer was mentioned. Dechezleprêtre’s study agreed with the 
technology transfer conclusion but  reached a differing view on the relationship to size, 
concluding that the larger of the project, the bigger the benefits (Dechezleprêtre et al., 
2008).  
A major limitation of these conclusions, unfortunately, is that most of the studies are 
conducted based on a desk-study of PDDs. This significantly limits their ability to 
understand real impacts on the ground. Subbarao and Lloyd conducted one of the few 
studies using a mixed method of desk-study and case study with five projects. Their results 
nevertheless similarly show that CDM projects failed to deliver significant or substantial 
SD benefits to localities. However, three out of the five cases reveal factors that can 
contribute to the success of the CDM projects (Subbarao and Lloyd, 2011b). 
3.1.2.3. An SDG-interaction Score  
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From my previous systematic literature review, I find that a great deal of variation in co-
benefits existed not only among project types but also within project type. In this section, 
I take one step further to assess the co-benefits of these projects in a more quantified way 
by drawing up studies of scoring exercise at the level of the SDG targets to better 
understanding the interaction between the CDM project technologies and the SDG 
dimensions. The two primary studies on this topic are McCollum et al., 2018 and the IPCC 
special report Global Warming of 1.5° C (IPCC, 2018.) 
Both studies have conducted thorough research on the potential SDG targets from the 
deployment of mitigation options. My paper adopts the structure of integrating the SDG 
targets into the mitigation options from both studies, while adds another layer of five co-
benefit criteria on top of this structure. Thus, the final structure of the assessment is 
presented in Error! Reference source not found..  
 
Figure 2-1. Structure of integrating SDGs into five co-benefit criteria. We have layer 
five categories as the topic level under the co-benefits. Then each category is associated 
with one or more SDG goals. Thus, I am able to cover as many as SDGs as possible.  
I combine the systematic literature review and the technique from McCollum and IPCC 
studies to assess the linkage between the co-benefits and the SDG targets. Under each SDG 
target, I will assign an SDG-interaction score from this specific SDG targets and the project. 
The SDG-interaction score is a seven-point scale score. Interaction between outcomes of 
















interaction, I have “significant impact” “high impact”, “medium impact”, and “limited 
impact” four scales, and for negative interaction, I have “minor damage”, “medium damage” 
and “massive damage”. Additionally, I present the validity of the results in the literature 
by examining the quantity, quality, and consistency of the literature into four scales, limited, 
medium, robust, and extensive. Eventually, I assign the current level of confidence (“low”, 
“medium”, “high”) to each SDG interaction based on the previous two aspects. This 
bottom-up direction of assessing the SDG interaction scores eventually can be aggregated 
at the level of co-benefit criteria. I present the results and the supportive evidence of how 
I obtain the SDG scores20 at the end of this paper in Table 2-10. But a simplified version 
of this table is provided in Error! Reference source not found. to give the audiences an 
overview of the main findings of the SDG-interaction score system in a brief way. 
Error! Reference source not found. only presents the different levels of impacts from the 
CDM projects through the seven-point scale, with dark green color indicating high positive 
impacts, and light green as limited positive impacts. The mustard color points to the 






20 Our implication assumption is that the SDG goals are weighted equally, despite that countries may have 
different focus areas on sustainable development based on their national development priorities.  
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Table 2-3. Simplified version of table 10. This simplified version only contains different 
levels of impacts from the CDM projects. I use three green colors to indicate limited, 
medium, and high positive impacts. The mustard color indicates that the two-way 
interaction from both positive and negative impacts. The cognac color indicates the 

















Figure 2-2 and Error! Reference source not found. are excerpts from Table 2-10 of this 
paper at the end showing that the SDG-interaction scores vary among project technologies 
and between project sizes. These samples illustrate how I assess the 12 SDGs over 12 
project-type-size combinations in a much deeper way.  
In the capacities of creating potential jobs, many studies agree that large wind projects have 
limited impacts on local communities because of temporary jobs created during the 
construction phase. Based on that, I have assigned one SDG-interaction score to the large 
wind projects with high confidence. Large biomass projects can bring more positive 
impacts on the job creation to the local communities. They can generate direct and indirect 
Limited postive impact
Medium positive impact 
High positve impact
Negative and positive impact 
Negative impact
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job opportunities to perpetuate employment at the local level. Thus, I have assigned an 
SDG-interaction of three to the large biomass projects. Large hydro projects have both 
positive and negative impacts on the local job market.  
 
Figure 2-2. An excerpt from table 10 to illustrate variation of co-benefits among 
project technologies. These are three examples excerpted from the original table 
10. These samples illustrate how I assess the 12 SDGs over 12 project-type-size 
combinations. Table 10 is presented at the end of this paper due to its length.  
One of the expectations of CDM is to stimulate the North-South transfer of clean 
technology, which can fit under SDG 9, Industries, Innovation, and Infrastructure. Taking 
wind technology as an example in Error! Reference source not found., the equipment of 
wind power generation is usually imported from developed countries. Especially for these 
projects that have higher capacity, they rely on imported turbines. While local companies 
normally are able to produce small-capacity turbines. Thus, I have assigned a higher SDG-




Figure 2-3. An excerpt from table 10 to illustrate variation of co-benefits between 
large and small project. These are two examples excerpted from the original table 
10. These samples illustrate how I assess the 12 SDGs over 12 project-type-size 
combinations. Table 10 is presented at the end of this paper due to its length. 
The previous analysis delivers the final summaries of the literature review. It helps me to 
build a logical flow by undertaking the literature into a more structured way of 
interpretation of the SDG targets and the CDM outcomes. Thus, I am able to use this 
linkage to implement statistical analysis as follows. 
Combing the overall assessment of local co-benefits from Table 2-10, I am able to 
aggregate their SDG scores of these project horizontally, and finally group them into eight 
50
Large wind Small Wind
SDG-interaction Scores Differ Between Project Size 
Within the Same Project Type
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categories based on their aggregated scores in Error! Reference source not found., with 
their distribution plotted in Error! Reference source not found.. By the order from one 
to eight, thus, co-benefit 1 has the lowest aggregated SDB scores, and is supposed to yield 
the lowest co-benefits.  Co-benefit 8 has the highest aggregated SDG scores, and  is 
supposed to generate the highest co-benefits. Additionally, the ability of the CDM to 
generate local co-benefits varies among countries or even regions in part because of 
different policy approaches of governments. However, I do not consider the impact of 
project location when I create the categorization of co-benefits, because I want to keep my 
categorization simple and efficient. I will consider the effect of project locations in my 
econometric model by controlling for them at the level of country/region later. 
Table 2-4. Categorization of co-benefits of CDM projects 
Ranking of Co-Benefits  




Project Type  Project Size  
Co-benefit 1  Landfill gas All 
680 Methane avoidance  All 
  Hydro Large 
Co-benefit 2 98 EE Industry Large 
Co-benefit 3 69 Biomass energy Large 
Co-benefit 4 843 Wind  Large 




Co-benefit 6  Wind Small 
 55 Solar  Large 
Co-benefit 7 18 Solar Small 





Figure 2-4. Box plot of CERs by co-benefits. Small black dots are observation. 
The eight level of co-benefits are created based on the SDG-interaction score from 
Table 2-10 presented at the end of paper.  
3.2. Method 2: OLS Regression and Data 
3.2.1. ERPA  
The literature indicates that an Emission Reductions Purchase Agreement (ERPA) is 
viewed as positively affecting the price of CERs (Kamel et al., 2007). An ERPA is specially 
developed for contract parties that directly want to deal between project owners and buyers. 
The contract outlines in detail the various steps of the process, starting with getting the 
project idea approved by a validator and the CDM Executive Board and continuing on to 
the actual deliverance of emission reductions and consequent issuance of CERs by the 
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CDM Executive Board. Under the purchase agreement, buyers are required to pay a fixed 
price21 for the CERs to the sellers, usually in U.S. dollars or euros.22  
However, the CDM pipeline does not include the ERPA information, while most of the 
ERPA information is only provided in the project design document (PDDs), which is a 
long PDF document that the original project developer must submitted to the CDM 
Executive Board for project approval. The problem is that locating the dates of ERPA is 
quite time-consuming if it is done manually. As a result, the historical studies of the impact 
of the CERs prices have never controls for the dates of ERPA. Thus, identifying the ERPA 
dates for each project is crucial and the results will influence the impact from the CERs 
fundamentally. To solve the problem and improve the accuracy of statistical analysis in the 
later section, I use Python coding to go over the PDDs and validation reports for all the 
CDM projects with a CER price in the pipeline, and then extract information of ERPA 
dates from these documents.  
To check the accuracy of the ERPA dates extracted by the machine, I adopted two methods 
to validate the data in Appendix A.  
3.2.2. CER Prices 
CER prices fluctuate widely and are not closely correlated with traditional macro-economic 
factors. Although the overall trend of CER prices follows the carbon market, there are also 
certain factors that can shift the CER prices reflected in the ERPA eventually.  The 
 
21 In our paper, I set the assumption is that all the CDM projects in the pipeline are fixed-price contract, 
since it is the most common contract structure based on UNDP. Based on this assumption, information on 
the contract date is required in order to control the time variation of the carbon prices. 
22 In our paper, I unify all the currency to US dollars for the purpose of comparison 
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determinants of the CER prices can be divided into two levels: macro and micro (Kamel et 
al., 2007). The macro-level determinants of CER prices are the carbon market (including 
supply and demand), the implementation structure of the global treaties, the expectation of 
the future market and the whole sector, etc. The micro-level determinants of CER prices 
are mainly a function of concentrated on the buying and selling parties, and also the project 
characteristics, such as project duration, investment cost, location, type, etc.  
The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of co-benefits (represented by achieving the 
Gold Standard certification) on the prices of CERs. The first step requires determining the 
project and extra-project independent variables likely to explain the intrinsic value of the 
CER as exhaustively as possible while ensuring the robustness of the specification. I have 
presented the key factors affecting CER prices along with the supporting literature in Error! 
Reference source not found.. Variables that are included in my analysis also cover the two 
levels of CER price determinants. Buyers, sellers, and project’s characteristics, such as 
duration of the crediting period, project types, project size, project investment, etc. are 
adopted into the model as the micro-level determinants. In order to count towards the 
current and future expectations of the market and international reduction commitment, I 
include the expected CER volume for 2020 and 2030, plus the crediting period. 23 
Additionally, I also use the signed date of ERPA to control for the market spot prices 






23 A CDM project can have either a seven-year crediting period, which can be renewed twice to make a 




Table 2-5. List of key factors affecting CER prices. 




Micro Phase one and phase two prices (Meyrick, 2007) 1st period ktCO2e/yr 
Credit period Macro and 
Micro 
Long-term supply; CDM project can 
have either a seven-year crediting 
period, which can be renewed twice to 
make a total of twenty-one years, or a 
one-off ten-year period 
(Nordseth, et al., 
2007) 






the likelihood that the project will 
generate and deliver CERs  








project size  
Macro and 
Micro 
The likelihood that the project will 
generate and deliver CERs 
(Bishop, 2007; 





Financing Micro Production cost  (Gao and Li Liyan, 
2007) 
Project investment*  
Seller  Macro Carbon-related country risks; host 
country approval risk 
(Ascui and Moura 
Costa, 2007; Bishop, 
2007) 
Project location 
Project type Micro The nature of the project; Specific 
project influences; limited use of large-
scale hydro and exclusion of CERs from 
forest from EU-ETS 
(Bishop, 2007; 
Wilder and Willis, 
2007) 
Project type 
Buyer Macro Buyers' level of sophistication, and the 
extent to which they provide an 
underlying debt or equity investment 
(Palmisano, 2007; 







Contract for CERs are highly 
heterogenous 24 
(Bishop, 2007) Emission Reduction 
Purchase Agreement 
(ERPA) 
Year  Macro General economy variation  (Koch et al., 2014) Year of the ERPA  
Note: *Total investment cost 
 
 
3.2.3. Data for Empirical Analysis 
 
The primary data source is the UNEP DTU CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database 
(CDM/JI Pipeline). Additional information, such as ERPA dates, is extracted by Python 
from CDM documents in PDF format on the UNFCCC CDM projects site. I include 2205 
 
24 Because of the heterogenous of the contract, therefore CER were traded in a wider price range. It is 
important to include the ERPA data in my model to control for the variability.  
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CDM projects in my paper. The dataset covers 20 project types and two project sizes 
(UNFCCC, 2017). I present the statistical summaries in Error! Reference source not found. 
and detailed results of project types and size in Error! Reference source not found.. I also 
plot the distribution of CER prices in Error! Reference source not found.. 
Table 2-6. Statistical summary. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CER price $/CO2e 2,205 11.70592 2.76698 1.31 42.02 
       
Years of projects  2,205 7.454422 1.078723 5 10 
1st period ktCO2e/yr 2,205 124.9621 186.9285 2 3016.7 
Expected accumulated 2020 ktCO2e 2,205 1143.599 1744.64 18 30167 
Expected accumulated 2030 ktCO2e 2,205 2206.96 3250.614 38 54489 
Methodology 2,205 0.2585034 0.4379114 0 1 
ERPA 2,205 2009.222 1.716408 2002 2013 
Project investment (million USD) 2,173 53.15113 72.70766 0 999.1 
Note: The sample includes all 2205 CDM projects up to Jan 10, 2019. I used data from UNEP DTU 
Partnership. Additional information such as ERPA dates are collected by author, and project size 
(methodology) dummy is created by using the UNFCCC CDM Methodology Booklet (UNFCCC, 2017).  
 
 




Figure 2-6. Distribution of CER prices. The blue line indicates the kernel density 
estimation.  
4. Results 
4.1. Main Results: The Effect of CDM Co-benefits 
My main model is expressed in the following regression equation:  
!!" =	$# +	$$%&('( − *+,+-./$%&) + $'1!" +	2! + 3! +	4! + 5" + 6! + 7!"             (1) 
Where, . indicates projects, and / indicates years. In all models, the dependent variable !!" 
is the CERs price for each project. The variables of interest are '( − *+,+-./$%&, with 
their coefficients $$%& indicate the effect of different levels of co-benefits on the CDM 
projects. I also control for a group of other variables listed in Error! Reference source not 
found.,  e.g., project location fixed eff2!)ects (,  credit buyer fixed effects (3!), project type 
fixed effects	(4!), year fixed effects (5"), and project size dummy (6!). Finally, the error 
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term captures unobserved factors affecting our dependent variable that changes over the 
year.  
I conduct the analysis by performing four specifications, and the final results are presented 
in Error! Reference source not found.. Model 1 conducts OLS regression without 
controlling for the project type and project size fixed effect. Model 2 controls for project 
type, and model 3 controls for both project type and project size.25 Model 3 is our preferred 
model. Model 4 uses log-linear specification by taking the natural logarithm of the CER 
prices. I estimate the four multiple specifications to ensure robust results. 
Across the four models, coefficients of co-benefits show an increasing trend. In both model 
3 and model 4, the coefficients of co-benefits are all statistically significant at a 95-percent 
confidence level, except for the co-benefit 5 category, which includes EE households and 
small hydro projects.  There is a clear increasing pattern in all models except for co-benefit 
6 in model 1 and co-benefit 8 in model 4. The overall trend in the four models shows 
consistent, with model 2, model 3 and model 4 presenting more smooth estimates. Model 
3 indicates that statistically controlling for projects’ features and sellers’ background, when 
a project with the likelihood of delivering more co-benefits, it receives a higher CER price 
from the buyers. For example, projects in co-benefits 2 are likely to have an average 
$1.53/tCO2e price premium compared to projects in co-benefits 1, or receive 11 percent 
more in CER prices. Additionally, I plot the point estimates and 95th percentile confidence 
 
25 Because the co-benefits variables are correlated with project type and project size, and project type and 
project size also have an effect on the CER prices. Thus, these co-benefit variables are endogenous 
variables. I have to control for project type and project size in our model, otherwise, I will have the 
problem of endogeneity. 
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intervals of co-benefits of model 3 and model 4 to show the trends visually in Error! 
Reference source not found..  
Coefficients of co-benefit 6 (small wind projects and large solar projects) are higher 
compared to coefficients of co-benefit 7 (small solar), despite that the difference between 
the two sets of coefficients in both model 3 and model 4 is quite small. Although the results 























Co-benefit 1 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
     
Co-benefit 2 0.696** 1.816*** 1.553*** 0.111*** 
 (0.303) (0.439) (0.530) (0.0393) 
     
Co-benefit 3 0.829*** 2.127*** 1.803*** 0.122*** 
 (0.301) (0.472) (0.598) (0.0443) 
     
Co-benefit 4 2.098*** 3.348*** 3.022*** 0.222*** 
 (0.149) (0.402) (0.545) (0.0404) 
     
Co-benefit 5 0.139 0.0161 0.374 0.0346 
 (0.163) (0.168) (0.437) (0.0324) 
     
Co-benefit 6 1.683*** 4.138*** 4.164*** 0.315*** 
 (0.360) (0.665) (0.665) (0.0493) 
     
Co-benefit 7 0.396 3.493*** 3.878*** 0.304*** 
 (0.570) (0.948) (1.043) (0.0773) 
     
Co-benefit 8 3.440*** 4.404*** 4.417*** 0.259*** 
 (0.688) (0.740) (0.740) (0.0549) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project Type FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Project Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Credit buyer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project Size Dummy No No Yes Yes 
Gold Standard 1.906*** 2.128*** 2.127*** 0.111*** 
 (0.406) (0.408) (0.408) (0.0303) 
No. of Observation 2173 2173 2173 2173 
Adjusted R2 0.3073 0.3139 0.3138 0.328 
Note: The dependent variable in all the first three models is CER prices and is natural log of CER prices in 
Model 4. Coefficient estimates are reported in this table. I control for project location fixed effects, credit 
buyer fixed effects, project type fixed effects, and year fixed effects in the model. 





   (a)
 (b) 
Figure 2-7.  Coefficients of co-benefits. Base case in both models is co-benefit 1. (a) linear 
model: point estimates with ninety-fifth percentile confidence intervals of co-benefits. (b) 
log-linear model point estimates. 
4.2. Robustness Check  
Many factors can influence the CER prices as indicated in Error! Reference source not 



























































price drop of CERs in that year. The price decreased by about 50 percent (Koch et al., 
2014). Thus, I dropped the 461 projects with a signed ERPA date of 2008, because I think 
that the year 2008 would have an impact on the CER prices. I re-ran my analysis with the 
remaining 1744 projects. I get very similar results (results are presented in Error! 
Reference source not found.) across all four models compared to the results in Error! 
Reference source not found. and all coefficient estimates of variables of interest deliver a 














Table 2-8. Robustness check: effect of different co-benefits on CDM projects 
Models Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Linear  Linear Linear Log-linear 
Co-benefit 1 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
     
Co-benefit 2 0.705* 2.536*** 2.120*** 0.126** 
 (0.391) (0.549) (0.676) (0.0503) 
     
Co-benefit 3 0.924*** 3.002*** 2.445*** 0.159*** 
 (0.342) (0.549) (0.697) (0.0521) 
     
Co-benefit 4 2.013*** 4.054*** 3.492*** 0.245*** 
 (0.169) (0.473) (0.641) (0.0480) 
     
Co-benefit 5 0.262 0.0956 0.634 0.0566 
 (0.191) (0.197) (0.540) (0.0403) 
     
Co-benefit 6 1.463*** 4.658*** 4.640*** 0.345*** 
 (0.383) (0.745) (0.727) (0.0553) 
     
Co-benefit 7 0.681 4.344*** 4.906*** 0.371*** 
 (0.598) (1.019) (1.156) (0.0862) 
     
Co-benefit 8 3.463*** 4.865*** 4.891*** 0.276*** 
 (0.782) (0.836) (0.836) (0.0618) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project Type FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Project Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Credit buyer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project Size Dummy No No Yes Yes 
Gold Standard 1.284*** 1.627*** 1.631*** 0.0782** 
 (0.470) (0.470) (0.470) (0.0348) 
No. of Observation 1744 1744 1744 1744 
Adjusted R2 0.2887 0.2976 0.2983 0.3309 
Note: The dependent variable in all the first three models is CER price and is natural log of CER price in 
Model 4. Coefficient estimates are reported in this table. I control for project location fixed effects, credit 
buyer fixed effects, project type fixed effects, and year fixed effects in the model. 
* p<0.10    ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01   
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4.3. Project Features  
In this section, I assume that project features, such as types and sizes, will have effects on 
the CER prices, respectively. I further assume that project type has a different effect on the 
CERs depending on the project size. Thus, I introduce an interaction term of project type 
and size into my model. My purpose in conducting this model is to provide another 
robustness check for my primary model (1). 
My secondary model is expressed in the following regression equation:  
!!" =	$# +	$$%$#(('()* ∗ ,-.*)$%$#) + $$$%$&'()*$%& +	$'#0!" +	1! + 2! +3" + 4!"  (2)                        
 
Where, . indicates projects, and / indicates years. The dependent variable !!" is the CERs 
price for each project. The variables of interest are the interaction terms (9:;+ ∗
=.>+)$%$#and 9:;+$%'.	  
The coefficients of the interaction term  $$%$# indicate the effects of different levels of 
small project types on CERs (because large projects are coded as 0, and small projects are 
coded as 1), and the coefficients of 9:;+ indicate the effects of different levels of large 
project types on CERs.  
I have plotted the point estimates and 95th percentile confidence intervals of project types 
between small and large project sizes visually in Error! Reference source not found.. The 
detailed results of the model are presented in Appendix B Table B 2-1. Overall, the model 
indicates that biomass, wind, and solar projects are at the high end of the price scale, while 
methane avoidance, landfill, and hydro projects are at the low end of the price scale, with 
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EE own generation and EE household projects reside in the middle. Additionally, price 
difference exists between large-size projects and small-size projects, but only in biomass 
and coal/mine methane projects with statistical significance. Small-scale biomass projects 
have an average CER price with a $2.25 higher than the large-scale biomass projects. 
  (a) Small project                                                   
 
 (b) Large project 
Figure 2-8. Point estimates of project types on CERs based on project size. Base case in 
(a) and (b) is small biomass and large biomass project. I have added the price difference 
of $2.25 between small-scale and large-scale biomass projects in (a), so the red horizontal 









































































































































5. Sectoral Analysis at the Company Level 
5.1. Credit Buyers   
The CDM mechanism creates CERs as an important share of the global carbon markets. 
Like the regular markets, the demand side of the CERs is from carbon credit buyers. CDM 
credit buyers can be categorized into three groups. The first group called compliance 
buyers who are seeking to buy offsets for compliance in the EU ETS and other regional 
schemes; the second group called sovereign buyers, mainly Annex I parties, who are 
obtaining CERs directly to meet their quantified emission limitation and reductions 
obligations (QELRO) commitments under the Kyoto Protocol; the last groups contains 
multilateral development banks (MDBs) and carbon funds (Global CCS Institute, 2011).  
CER prices vary among countries where these credit buyers reside. It is discussed that not 
all buyers are concerned with the sustainability development quality of CERs, and some of 
the buyers still target cheap credits from projects that can yield the large volumes of CERs, 
such as industrial gas projects (including hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs), and nitrous oxide (N2O) projects) (Parnphumeesup and Kerr, 2011). Error! 
Reference source not found. presents the scale of purchasing CDM projects and the average 
CER prices these buyers paid aggregated at the country level. As a result, buyers are no 
longer view CERs as a homogenous market good. Prices of CERs among countries show 
variation from the average global carbon price. Additionally, buyers differentiate between 
CERs by different types of CDM projects. In this section, I use the aggregated information 
from my dataset to study the credit buyers’ behavior. I have 218 companies across 21 
 49 
countries, most of the companies were located in the EU, with a few in Australia and New 
Zealand, and one in the United States. 
 
Note: the numbers in the labels are the number of projects purchased by each 
country  
Figure 2-9. Average price of CER and total number of projects by buyer's 
location. The average CER price of all countries is US$12.17 t/CO2e. The size of 
the green circle indicates the number of projects hosted by each country.   
Since CER prices are reported at the buyers’ company level in the ERPA. It will be useful 
to study further the question of what explains the price of CERs from the buyers’ 
perspective. In this section, I will focus on explaining whether CER prices differ 
systematically based on credit buyers’ industry, or their profit status, such as for-profit or 
not-for-profit status.  
In order to do so, I further divide credit buyers into different categories by using two 
classification systems. First, credit buyers (company level) are classified by their primary 
business activities using the Bloomberg Industry Classification Systems (BICS). I obtained 















































profit status, e.g., local private companies, global private companies, government entities, 
MDBs, and foundations.  
The model behind this analysis is the hedonic price method (Conte and Kotchen, 2010; 
Freeman et al., 2014), where CER prices can be explained as a function of credit buyers 
and project characteristics. Because I am interested in the general characteristics of credit 
buyers after I run my preliminary model, and also the prices of carbon credits are available 
at the credit buyer level, it makes sense to use the hedonic function to study whether the 
location and profit status of these credit buyers (private, government, MDB) or industries 
of these buyers would systematically have impacts on the CERs prices  I estimated linear 
and log-linear specifications using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
5.2. Results from the Hedonic Model 
My hedonic model is expressed in the following regression equation at credit buyers’ 





Where, . indicates companies. In all models, the dependent variable @()*! 	is the average 
CERs price paid by company . . I also control for a group of variables such as, 
,AB;C(D+E/F!  is the number of offset projects under management; G(EH/.(,!  is a 
categorical variable indicating the country where the credit buyer . is located, I=!is the 
proportion of projects that have Gold Standard certification. I also control for investment 
portfolio in terms of project regions. Thus, HF.EH;HE.-.E! is the proportion of projects that 
@()*! = -(,AB;C(D+E/F! , G(EH/.(,! , .,JAF/C:! , F/H/AF! , I=!+;C(D+E/F.>+! +
;(C/-(G.((HF.EH;HE.-.E, GH/.,HB+C.EH,,B.JJG++HF/, H-C.EH, E+,/CHGAC(;+H,)	!) + 7!        (3) 
 51 
company . invests in Asia and Pacific region, H-C.EH! is the proportion of projects that 
company .  invests in Africa, the same to the GH/.,HB+C.EH! , E+,/CHG+AC(;+H,! , 
B.JJG++HF/! . Finally, 7!is an error term assumed to be normally distributed.  
Model 1 and model 2 in Error! Reference source not found. analyze several expectations 
about how different variables affect CER prices. With increasing bargain power and returns 
to scale, credit buyers with a greater number of projects would obtain lower prices. Given 
that Sub-Saharan Africa is frequently identified as the region benefitting least from the 
CDM even though these regions are also seen to have large potential for CDM to enhance 
local co-benefits (Hultman et al., 2019), one might expect that prices would be higher for 
projects located in Africa compared to projects in other regions.  
Error! Reference source not found. shows the results of all company-level regression 
models. One set of results with statistical significance relates to the location of the projects. 
Credit buyers paid CERs at higher prices if projects are based in Africa than those based 
in the other regions. Results from the linear model suggest that a 10 percent increase in the 
proportion of projects that are located in Asia is associated with a $0.42/tCO2e decrease in 
the CER prices compared if the projects are located in Africa. The corresponding result in 
the log-linear model is that the same 10 percent increase in the proportion of projects in 
Asia is associated with a 1.9 percent decrease in the CER prices. Another result of statistical 
significance relates to the effect of Gold Standards. Based on my linear model, the result 
is interpreted that a 10 percent increase in the proportion of a credit buyer’s projects that 
are Gold Standards certified is associated with a $0.41/tCO2e increase in the CER price. 
The corresponding result in the log-linear model is that the same 10 percent increase in the 
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proportion of certified projects is associated with a 2.5 percent increase in the buyer’s 
purchased CER price.  
I do not find evidence in support of increasing bargain power and returns to scale. The rest 
of the coefficient estimates of interest are not statistically significant. I find no price 



















Number of Projects Purchase -0.00332 (0.0101) 0.0000695 (0.000731) 
Buyer's Profit Status   
Foundation 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Government 4.102 (4.430) 0.304 (0.319) 
MDB 5.713 (4.590) 0.316 (0.331) 
Private Global 1.835 (1.752) 0.0759 (0.126) 
Private Local 1.689 (1.747) 0.0658 (0.126) 
Buyer's Sector   
Business consulting and others   
Consumer Discretionary -0.916 (1.109) -0.0680 (0.0799) 
Consumer Staples -1.612 (1.741) -0.128 (0.125) 
Energy -0.192 (0.920) 0.00337 (0.0662) 
Financials -0.383 (0.633) -0.0357 (0.0456) 
Financials (Special) -0.713 (0.703) -0.0685 (0.0506) 
Foundation 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Government -4.355 (4.017) -0.381(0.289) 
Industrials 0.310 (0.936) 0.0247 (0.0675) 
Materials 0.562 (1.220) 0.0132 (0.0879) 
Utilities -0.00135 (0.754) -0.00683 (0.0544) 
Buyer’s Purchased Project size % -0.448 (0.542) -0.0490 (0.0391) 
Buyer’s Purchased Gold Standard % 4.075*** (0.954) 0.260***(0.0687) 
Buyer’s Project Portfolio    
Asia & Pacific % -4.188** (1.895) -0.327** (0.137) 
Latin America % -5.520** (2.265) -0.502*** (0.163) 
Middle - East % -9.007** (4.400) -0.741** (0.317) 
Europe & Central Asia % -2.641 (4.840) -0.233 (0.349) 
Africa % 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Observations 218 218 
Adjusted R2 0.1894 0.1935 
Note: The dependent variable in both models is CER price and is natural log of CER price. Coefficient 
estimates are reported in this table.  
* p<0.10    ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01 
 
Additionally, I plot the point estimates and 95th percentile confidence intervals of credit 
buyer’s location in Error! Reference source not found.. With Australia as the base case, 14 
out of 20 coefficient estimates are negative and statistically significant. I found that a credit 
buyer’s location affects the CER prices. CERs buyers based in Oceania, specifically, 
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Australia and New Zealand purchase CERs at higher prices than those based in Europe and 
Asia. The largest point estimates are for Luxembourg, suggest a price discount in 
Luxembourg of $12.94 on average or a difference of 89 percent. I found the credit buyers 
located in UK, the country hosts the largest number of projects, purchase the CER at a price 
discount of $8.9 on average or a difference of 55 percent. There is no statistically difference 
between CER buyers located in North America and Australia, or within European.  
The reason of high CER prices paid by credit buyers of Australia can be explained as 
follows. As one of the highest country in term of per capita emissions, Australia established 
its mandatory state-level cap-and-trade program, the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Scheme (NSW GGAS) two years before the first trade ever took place on the 
EU ETS (Bayon et al., 2009)26. Then, a national ETS using the Carbon Pricing Mechanism 
(CPM) came into effect in July 2012, with a fixed price of AUD $24.50/tCO2e in 2013 
(Maraseni and Reardon-Smith, 2019; WWF, 2013).27 In 2014, the Emission Reduction 
Fund (ERF) replaced the CPM. In the ERF, the average price of the auction is AUD 
$11.97/tCO2e over the period of 2015 to 2018. The early movement towards a cap-and-
trade program of Australia with a high fixed price of carbon credits mean that businesses 
in Australia paid more compared to businesses in the EU towards carbon credits. Because 
the trading prices for CERs are around AUD $5.9 in EU in 2013. Even when these 
businesses are allowed to purchase CERs, they might be willing to pay a little bit more due 
to the high domestic carbon prices. 
 
 
26 In the GGAS, the penalty of business exceeds its target is AUD $11.5/tCO2e. 
27 Although at the stage of NSW GGAS, using CERs were not allowed, the CERs can be used in the stage 
of national ETS when a fixed price moved to the flexible price to match EU ETS. 
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Figure 2-10.  Coefficients of buyer’s location fix effect. Base case is Australia. 




One of the robust findings of my analysis is that statistically controlling for projects’ 
features and sellers’ background, when a project with the likelihood of delivering more co-
benefits, it receives a higher CER price from the buyers. The price difference between 
projects with the highest co-benefits and least co-benefits is $4.9 t/CO2e on average or a 
difference of 27.6 percent.   
Another robust finding is that Gold Standard certification delivers a price premium. My 
result indicates that a 10 percent increase in the proportion of a credit buyer’s projects that 
are Gold Standards certified is associated with a $0.41/tCO2e increase or a 2.5 percent 
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increase in the CER prices from credit buyer’s perspective. It fits the literature that buyers 
are willing to pay a price premium for the Gold Standard projects.  
Somewhat more surprising is that there is large variability in the prices of CER partially 
coming from the location of buyers and projects, respectively. When considering these 
projects, I find that projects taking place in Africa region are significantly more expensive 
than those occurring in Asia, Latin America, and Middle East by an average of nearly 45 
percent. When considering credit buyers, I find that companies headquartered in Australia 
and New Zealand significantly pay more than those companies located in European nations 
by an average of 52 percent, if holding other variables constant.  
I based my analysis on projects, buyers, and sellers listed on a refined CDM pipeline 
database, to which I contribute by adding ERPA dates and also the buyers’ sectoral 
information and profit status. It is the most comprehensive listing of buyers and sellers in 
the CDM market. Nevertheless, despite my robust findings, I have to acknowledge some 
limitations of this analysis. First, I have to admit that the SDG interaction scores are based 
on authors’ expert judgement supported by the literature review. To limit the bias of the 
expert judgement, I have added a layer of confidence level to the score. I also adopted a 
strategy to use a second expert to cross-check the score that assigned to the SDG interaction 
to reduce the bias. But still, I cannot eliminate the bias entirely. 
Additionally, a major limitation of the conclusion from the literature is that most of the 
studies are conducted based on a desk-study of PDDs. From the perspective of studying 
the real impacts of these projects on the ground, it is quite difficult to measure and monitor 
the actual co-benefits of these projects based on PDDs. However, it validates my approach 
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of using observations from the systematic literature review as the main factor to explain 
buyers’ willingness to pay in my model. Because buyers’ willingness to pay for a project 
with better co-benefits is largely driven by the description of co-benefits that the project 
would generate in the PDDs. Buyers have to negotiate and finalize the CER prices based 
on the ex-ante information provided by the project developers. Thus, a thorough review 
and understanding of PDDs is the key to study the buyers’ willingness to pay.  
Third, data quality in the original CDM pipeline is poor; although I have manually 
improved it substantially. The consequences of the CDM pipeline being poor is that I had 
to drop half of the projects in the original dataset due to missing information.  Although it 
will not affect my estimates of the impact of co-benefits on CDM projects generally, I 
could get a more accurate estimation if I can use the full dataset.    
Fourth, another potential limitation of using the regression model (1), (2) and hedonic 
model (3) to assess the factors influencing CER prices is the bias from not able to capture 
unobservable variables from both project and company level. Although I tried my best to 
control for as many key factors affecting CER prices identified by the literature in Error! 
Reference source not found., I cannot claim that I control for everything. One factor might 
influence CER prices is the bargaining power of credit buyers in my regression model, 
which I am unable to observe. However, I use the number of projects managed by each 
credit buyer as a proxy to assess the bargaining power partially in my hedonic model (3), 
and I do not get the statistically significant result. Thus, even though I did not control for 
the bargaining power of credit buyers in (1), I am comfortable that this missing variable 
will not have an impact on my final results. 
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7. Conclusion 
The area of local co-benefits analysis has been a topic of great interest, but most of the 
studies focus on evaluate co-benefits on projects per se. The motivation of studying the 
incentive of credit buyers to purchase projects with higher benefits inspires me to look at 
the linkage among projects, co-benefits and credit buyers, and to examine this topic from 
a broader picture.   
The aims of this paper are twofold: first, to investigate what the existing literature tell me 
about the delivery of co-benefits for the local communities from CDM projects; second, to 
examine whether the likelihood of delivering more co-benefits encourages buyers to pay 
more for the CERs.  
What I found is that the delivery of co-benefits from CDM varies across technology types, 
design features, and country context. Noting that broad generalizations are unlikely to be 
true for all project cases in a specific category, there were some trends with respect to 
technologies. Different technologies may be able to deliver different scope and dimensions 
of co-benefits to local communities based on the very nature of the technologies themselves. 
Second, there may exist some patterns observable by the country. 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the global financial flow to projects that 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions has a fundamental tension. What I learned from the study 
is that financial flow can be jointly achieved with projects with better quality, such as to 
deliver on higher co-benefits in local communities. Although these co-benefits are difficult 
to be monetized into every dollar sign, they are the real impact on the local communities. 
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There is a potential to generate even more financial flow into the project level if the co-
benefits can be captured and visualized by the design of the project and monetarized at the 
buyers’ side.   
My review has also demonstrated that, while CDM experience was heterogeneous in its 
ability to deliver community co-benefits, those benefits were more likely to manifest in 
projects following general best practices for finance, including significant community 
consultation and engagement in the planning and implementation process. Discussions on 
any new system focused on sustainable development within respective national systems 
should also address the more specific question of how such a mechanism would support 
local co-benefits. While undoubtedly the challenge of nationally mediated sustainable 
development criteria will remain in some form, opportunities do exist for providing some 
overarching guidelines or encouragements toward how to include these considerations in 
any new approach. 
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Table 2-10. CDM technology and SDG table. 
 




Alexeew et al. 2010; Dechezleprêtre et al., 
2008
Alexeew et al. 2010; UNFCCC 2012, Disch, 
2010




Technical transfers can be a knowledge 
transfer and an equipment transfer or both. 
They create local technological capacity. 
Technology transfers are medium in large EE 
industry projects. additionally, EE industry has 
a low potential in the creation of 
infrastructure.
Has the medium score in the creation of 
education opportunities in MATA-CDM 
research. And also EE deployment creates 
demand for sustainability training. No direct interaction
Lowest impact on halting migration for local 
community.
Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008 UNFCCC 2012 Subbarao and Lloyd 2011
Methan 
avoidance Technical transfers can be a knowledge 
transfer and an equipment transfer or both. 
They create local technological capacity. 
Technology transfers are  high in large landfill 
gas project because the high temperature 
flare, blower, gas analyzer, industrial 
computer are all imported from Europe. 
Has the high score in the creation of education 
opportunities in MATA-CDM research.
No direct interaction
Low-medium impact on halting migration for 
local community.
Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008 Disch, 2010; UNFCCC 2012, IPCC 2018
Enhance Local Infrastructure
Landfill
Technical transfers can be a knowledge 
transfer and an equipment transfer or both. 
They create local technological capacity. 
Technology transfers are  high in large landfill 
gas project because the high temperature 
flare, blower, gas analyzer, industrial 
computer are all imported from Europe. 
Has the medium high score in the creation of 
education opportunities in MATA-CDM 
research. 
No direct interaction No direct interaction
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[+2] [+3] [+2]
[+2] [+2] [+1, -1]
[+1] [+2] [+2]
Sirohi 2007; Cole and Roberts 2011; Alexeew 
et al. 2010; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008
Subbarao and Lloyd 2011; Sirohi 2007; Cole 
and Roberts 2011; Alexeew et al. 2010; Disch, 
2010; UNFCCC
Subbarao and Lloyd 2011; Sirohi 2007; Olsen 
and Fenhann 2008; Cole and Roberts 2011; 
Alexeew et al. 2010
Hydro Small
No direct interaction
Technology transfers are limited in hydro area 
due to the fact that hydro is a local mature 
technology, but road is a part of the project 
construction, if properly designed, has the 
potential to generate the co-benefits. 
Medium impact in terms of quality time spent 
at school by children and turnaround in 
number of children attending school. 
Low-medium impact on halting migration for 
local community.
Sirohi 2007; Alexeew et al. 2010; 
Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008; Nussbaumer 2007
Sirohi 2007; Alexeew et al. 2010; Disch 2010; 
UNFCCC 2012
Rousseau, 2017; Olsen and Fenhann 2008; 
Alexeew et al. 2010
Hydro Large
Technology transfers are limited in hydro area 
due to the fact that hydro is a local mature 
technology, but road is a part of the project 
construction. 
Has the medium score in the creation of 
education opportunities in MATA-CDM 
research. 
No direct interaction
Renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 
employment, welfare, economic growth and 
energy benefits. 
Large hydro benefits affluent areas with a high 
demand on electricity. 
Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008; Nussbaumer 2007 Schomer and van Asselt, 2012; Subbarao and 
Lloyd 2011; UNFCCC 2012




EE household has medium-high impact on 
capacity building with technology transfer.
Small-scaled EE household through POAs can 
build local capacity, and increase institutional 
learning. It has medium impact in terms of 
quality time spent at school by children and 
turnaround in number of children attending 
school
No direct interaction
It reduces household expenditure on fuel, 
reduce the amount of time they spend 
collecting fuelwood, thereby allowing them to 
engage in other activities, which further has a 






Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008; Nussbaumer 2007 UNFCCC 2012; Schomer and van Asselt, 2012 Olsen and Fenhann 2008
Solar Small
Technology transfers are medium in small-
scale solar projects.
Small-scaled EE household through POAs can 
build local capacity, and increase institutional 
learning.
No direct interaction
Renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 
employment, welfare, economic growth and 
energy benefits; Small scale RE deliver a 
slightly higher number of SD benefits than 
large-scale.
Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008; Nussbaumer 2007 UNFCCC 2012 Olsen and Fenhann 2008
Solar Large
Technology transfers are very high in large-
scale solar projects because larger projects are 
better able to exploit economies of scale in 
technology transfer
Has the high score in the creation of education 
opportunities in MATA-CDM research.
No direct interaction
Renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 
employment, welfare, economic growth and 
energy benefits.
Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008; Wood 2011;  Disch 2010, UNFCCC Olsen and Fenhann 2008
Wind Small
Technology transfers are medium in small-
scale wind projects because country like china 
and India are able to produce small-capacity 
turbines. No need to import technology. 
Additionally, it can create co-benefits of the 
improved infrastructure links
Has the low score in the creation of education 
opportunities in MATA research. 
No direct interaction
Renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 
employment, welfare, economic growth and 
energy benefits.
Alexeew et al. 2010; Dechezleprêtre et al., 
2008; Wood 2011; Nussbaumer 2007
Alexeew et al. 2010; Disch 2010, UNFCCC Olsen and Fenhann 2008; Alexeew et al. 2010;
Wind Large
Technology transfers are very high large wind 
projects because country like china and India 
are only able to produce small-capacity 
turbines. So large wind projects heavily rely 
on importing turbines from Europe. 
Additionally, it can create co-benefits of the 
improved infrastructure links
Has the low-medium score in the creation of 
education opportunities in MATA-CDM 
research.
No direct interaction
Renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 





Sirohi 2007; Alexeew et al. 2010; 
Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008;
Subbarao and Lloyd 2011; Alexeew et al. 2010; 
Disch, 2010; UNFCCC2012; Lee and Lazarus, 
2013
Subbarao and Lloyd 2011; Olsen and Fenhann 
2008; Alexeew et al. 2010; 
Biomass Small
Technology transfers are limited in biomass 
area due to the fact that biomass is a local 
mature technology;
Indirect infrastructure development in the 
project area as a result of setting up of rural 
industries.
Biomass that rely on on-farm residues can offer 
the low medium number of benefits. 
Additionally, low impact in terms of quality 
time spent at school by children and 
turnaround in number of children attending 
school
No direct interaction
Renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 
employment, welfare, economic growth and 
energy benefits; Small scale RE deliver a 
slightly higher number of SD benefits than 
large-scale.
Alexeew et al. 2010; Dechezleprêtre et al., 
2008;
Sirohi 2007; Lee and Lazarus, 2013; Alexeew et 
al. 2010; Disch 2010; UNFCCC 2012
Olsen and Fenhann 2008; Alexeew et al. 2010; 
Biomass Large
Technology transfers are limited in biomass 
area due to the fact that biomass is a local 
mature technology;
Indirect infrastructure development in the 
project area as a result of setting up of rural 
industries.
Biomass that rely on on-farm residues can offer 
the low medium number of benefits. 
No direct interaction
Renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 













Alexeew et al. 2010; Disch, 2010; UNFCCC 
2012
Sirohi 2007; Alexeew et al. 2010
No direct interaction
Has a low score in generating employment. 
No direct interaction
Indirectly, the technical transfer from EE 
industry project might have a role in play in 
poverty alleviation. But other research also 
found out that the this type of projects also 
has the lowest score in physical well-being.
Sutter and Parreno 2007; Mori-Clement, 2019 Sutter and Parreno 2007; Mori-Clement, 2019; 
Disch, 2010; UNFCCC 2012
Research shows that little or no impact on 
poverty alleviation.
No direct interaction
Methane avoidance projects have the 
potential to generate employment 
opportunities for semi-skilled and high-skilled 
workers along the different phases of the 
projects. Thus, it is very limited impact on 
generating employment overall. 
No direct interaction
Sutter and Parreno 2007; Mori-Clement, 2019 Sutter and Parreno 2007; Mori-Clement, 2019; 
Disch, 2010; UNFCCC 2012
No direct interaction
Benefits of using landfill gas projects are from 
cost savings associated with using landfill gas 
as a replacement for more expensive fossil 
fuel, thus improving income at the local level. 
However, research shows that little or no 
impact on poverty alleviation.
No direct interaction
Landfill gas projects have the potential to 
generate employment opportunities for semi-
skilled and high-skilled workers along the 
different phases of the projects. Thus, it is very 
limited impact on generating employment 
overall. 
Access to Cleaner and Affordable Energy for 








[+1] [+1, -2] [+1, -1]
[+1] [+2] [+1]
Subbarao and Lloyd 2011; Sirohi 2007; Olsen 
and Fenhann 2008; Cole and Roberts 2011
Subbarao and Lloyd 2011; Sutter and Parreno 
2007;  Sirohi 2007; Olsen and Fenhann 2008; 
Cole and Roberts 2011;  Alexeew et al. 2010
Subbarao and Lloyd 2011; Sutter and Parreno 
2007; Sirohi 2007; Olsen and Fenhann 2008; 
Boyd et al. 2009; Alexeew et al. 2010;  Disch, 
2010; UNFCCC 2012
Renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 
employment, welfare, economic growth and 
energy benefits; Small scale RE deliver a 
slightly higher number of SD benefits than 
large-scale.
No direct interaction
Hydro projects by nature are capital intensive, 
thus might generate only few job 
opportunities mostly for skilled workers 
during construction and operation phase. 
specially for large projects. thus, a significant 
local employment generation is not expected. 
Small scale RE deliver a slightly higher number 
of SD benefits than large-scale.
Renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 
employment, welfare, economic growth and 
energy benefits; Small scale RE deliver a 
slightly higher number of SD benefits than 
large-salce
Sutter and Parreno 2007; Sirohi 2007; Olsen 
and Fenhann 2008; Boyd et al. 2009; Alexeew 
et al. 2010; "Mori-Clement, 2019; Disch, 2010; 
UNFCCC 2012; Smits and Middleton 2014
Olsen and Fenhann 2008 Sutter and Parreno 2007;  Boyd et al. 2009; 
Alexeew et al. 2010; "Mori-Clement, 2019; 
Disch, 2010; Smits and Middleton 2014; 
Rousseau, 2017; Haya 2007; Haya and Parekh 
2011
No direct interaction
Hydro projects by nature are capital intensive, 
thus might generate only few job 
opportunities mostly for skilled workers 
during construction and operation phase. 
Specially for large projects. thus, a significant 
local employment generation is not expected.
Large hydro projects can employ workers by 
the subcontractors, who can hire workers 
outside of the local communities.
Renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 
employment, welfare, economic growth and 
energy benefits.
Renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 
employment, welfare, economic growth and 
energy benefits; has impact on local poverty 
reduction through enhanced energy security;
Negative impact to local communities due to 
wide-ranging livelihood changes triggered by 
dams; Large hydro cause resettlement of 
villages and flooding of their agricultural 
lands.
Ellis el at. 2007; Schomer and van Asselt, 2012 Wood 2011 Subbarao and Lloyd 2011; UNFCCC 2012; Wood 
2011; Nussbaumer 2007
No direct interaction
It reduces household expenditure on fuel, 
reduce the amount of time they spend 
collecting fuelwood, thereby allowing them to 
engage in other activities.
Has limited impact on generating local jobs.Small-scaled EE households (efficient cook-
stoves) through POAs can improve the access 










Olsen and Fenhann 2008; Schomer and van 
Asselt, 2012
Subbarao and Lloyd 2011 Olsen and Fenhann 2008; UNFCCC 2012; 
Nussbaumer 2007
Renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 
employment, welfare, economic growth and 
energy benefits; Small scale RE deliver a 
slightly higher number of SD benefits than 
large-scale.
No direct interaction
Has a medium score in generating 
employment; Small scale RE deliver a slightly 
higher number of SD benefits than large-scale.
Small-scaled technology, such as solar water 
heaters through POAs can improve the access 
to modern energy services in the developing 
world;
Olsen and Fenhann 2008; UNFCCC 2012; 
Nussbaumer 2007
Olsen and Fenhann 2008 Olsen and Fenhann 2008
No direct interaction
Has a medium score in generating 
employment.
Renewables, including biomas, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 
employment, welfare, economic grwoth and 
energy benefits
Renewables, including biomas, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 
employment, welfare, economic grwoth and 
energy benefits
Subbarao and Lloyd 2011; Olsen and Fenhann 
2008
Sutter and Parreno 2007, Olsen and Fenhann 
2008; Alexeew et al. 2010;
Sutter and Parreno 2007, Sorohi 2007, Olsen 
and Fenhann 2008; Alexeew et al. 2010; Disch 
2010; UNFCCC 2012; Wood 2011; 
Renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 
employment, welfare, economic growth and 
energy benefits; Small scale RE deliver a 
slightly higher number of SD benefits than 
large-scale.
Has the medium score in physical well-being, 
and moderate impact of using CERs as income.
No direct interaction
The real co-benefits of wind power projects 
are limited to the temporary jobs created 
during the construction phase 
Small scale RE deliver a slightly higher number 
of SD benefits than large-scale.
Sutter and Parreno 2007, Sorohi 2007, Olsen 
and Fenhann 2008; Alexeew et al. 2010; Disch 
2010; UNFCCC 2012; Wood 2011; 
Olsen and Fenhann 2008 Sutter and Parreno 2007, Olsen and Fenhann 
2008; Alexeew et al. 2010;
No direct interaction
The real co-benefits of wind power projects 
are limited to the temporary jobs created 
during the construction phase. 
Renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar, have a higher socio-economic profile 
with relative many projects contributing with 
employment, welfare, economic growth and 
energy benefits.
Has the medium score in physical well-being, 
and moderate impact of using CERs as income.
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Biomass Small
Biomass Large [+1] [+2] [+3]
[+2] [+3] [+4]
Subbarao and Lloyd 2011; Sirohi 2007; Olsen 
and Fenhann 2008;
Sirohi 2007; Olsen and Fenhann 2008; Boyd et 
al.
2009; Alexeew et al. 2010;Mori-Clement, 
2019; Wood 2011
Sirohi 2007; Sutter and Parreno 2007; Boyd et 
al. 2009; Alexeew et al. 2010; Mori-Clement, 
2019; Wood 2011; UNFCCC; Lee and Lazarus, 
2013;Castro & Michaelowa 2008
Direct: Farmers income from supplying 
biomass material ; Indirect: contribute to 
farmers' livelihood; creation of jobs as 
supplementary source of income to 
conventional farming
Minor impact on poverty alleviation"; It also 
improved the livelihoods of the poor by 
creating a value for previously worthless 
biomass residues. 
No direct interaction
Biomass is a labor-intensive process that could 
represent an important source of primary jobs 
in rural areas. It not only can generate direct 
employment during the construction and 
operation phase. They can generate indirect 
employment and additional employment 
opportunities. It can generate both unskilled 
and skilled job positions during a project's life. 
they may have the potential to perpetuate 
employment at the local level. 
Saving the power at grid that is currently 
used by them to divert it elsewhere; Small 
scale RE deliver a slightly higher number of SD 
benefits than large-scale.
Sirohi 2007; Boyd et al. 2009; Alexeew et al. 
2010; Mori-Clement, 2019; Wood 2011; 
UNFCCC; Lee and Lazarus, 2013
Sirohi 2007; Olsen and Fenhann 2008; Sirohi 2007; Olsen and Fenhann 2008; Boyd et 
al.
2009; Alexeew et al. 2010;Mori-Clement, 
2019; Wood 2011
No direct interaction
Biomass is a labor-intensive process that could 
represent an important source of primary jobs 
in rural areas. It not only can generate direct 
employment during the construction and 
operation phase. They can generate indirect 
employment and additional employment 
opportunities. It can generate both unskilled 
and skilled job positions during a project's life. 
they may have the potential to perpetuate 
employment at the local level. 
Saving the power at grid that is currently 
used by them to divert it elsewhere; for 
country with vast agricultural produce that 
makes available large quantities of 
agricultural residues, Biomass can meet 
energy needs.
Direct: Farmers income from supplying 
biomass material; Indirect: contribute to 
farmers' livelihood; It also improved the 
livelihoods of the poor by creating a value for 
previously worthless biomass residues. 
Biomass fuel not being sourced from 
sustainable sources leads to negative impact 












Alexeew et al. 2010; Nussbaumer 2007; Sirohi 
2007; UNFCCC 2012
Alexeew et al. 2010;
Has the medium-high impact on reducing air 
pollution, and promoting of environmental 
well-being.
A switch to low-carbon fuels can lead to a 
reduction in water demand, but the impact is 
the low in improving water quality.
No direct interaction No direct interaction
No direct interaction
Boyd et al. 2009; Sutter and Parreno 2007; 
Olsen and Fenhann 2008; Sun et al. 2010; 
Disch, 2010; UNFCCC 2012
CH4 reduction projects have a medium green 
profile with many projects contributing to 
environmental benefits such as improved air 
and water quality. 
it is also cheap emission reductions face 
opposition from local communities because it 
might bring negative effects on local health, 
because CDM postponed the closing down of 
the waste disposal site. 
Might contaminate ground water is 
mismanaged.
No direct interaction
Ellis el at. 2005; Boyd et al. 2009; Sutter and 
Parreno 2007; Olsen and Fenhann 2008; Sun et 
al. 2010; Disch, 2010; UNFCCC 2012
No direct interaction No direct interaction
CH4 reduction projects have a medium green 
profile with many projects contributing to 
environmental benefits such as improved air 
and water quality. 
it is also cheap emission reductions face 
opposition from local communities opposed to 
the extension of the life of these sites, or bring 
negative effects on local health, because CDM 
postponed the closing down of the waste 
disposal site. 
Might contaminate ground water is 
mismanaged.
Improved natural Resource and Environmental Services









[+2, -2] [+2, -1] [-1]
[+2] [+2] [+1]
Cole and Roberts 2011; Alexeew et al. 2010, 
IPCC) 2018
Subbarao and Lloyd 2011
Low impact on access to electricity.
Subbarao and Lloyd 2011; Sutter and Parreno 
2007; Sun et al. 2010;  Cole and Roberts 2011; 
Alexeew et al. 2010;  Disch, 2010; UNFCCC 
2012
Hydro projects are the medium contributor to 
co-benefits in terms of pollutants mitigations 
and improving health.
Small hydro reduce water demands to displace 
other water intensive energy processes, it has 
the medium score in improving water quality.
No direct interaction
Sutter and Parreno 2007;  Sun et al. 2010; 
Alexeew et al. 2010; Mori-Clement, 2019; 
Disch, 2010; UNFCCC 2012, Smits and 
Middleton 2014; Rousseau, 2017; Haya 2007; 
Haya and Parekh 2011;  Castro & Michaelowa 
2008; Nussbaumer 2007
Alexeew et al. 2010; Haya 2007; Haya and 
Parekh 2011
Rousseau, 2017; Haya 2007; Haya and Parekh 
2011;  Castro & Michaelowa 2008
Large hydro projects are the medium 
contributor to co-benefits in terms of 
pollutants mitigations and improving health; 
Large hydro might have environmental 
impacts including clearing of the forest and 
pollution(dust) during the construction phase.  
It further impacts local health. 
Has the medium score in improving water 
quality.
Construction will pollute water. While dam 
have major impacts on the physical, chemical 
and geomorphological properties of a river.
Large hydro might have environmental 
impacts including clearing of the forest and 
pollution(dust) during the construction phase.  
It further impacts local health. 
No direct interaction
Ellis el at. 2007; Schomer and van Asselt, 2012
Small-scaled EE households (efficient 
fluorescent lamps) through POAs can improve 
the access to modern energy services in the 
developing world.
Subbarao and Lloyd 2011; UNFCCC 2012; Wood 
2011
it can siginificantly improve the air quality 
within their houses 









IPCC 2018 Schomer and van Asselt, 2012
Small-scaled EE households (efficient 
fluorescent lamps) through POAs can improve 
the access to modern energy services in the 
developing world.
UNFCCC 2012
Has the medium score improve air quality. Solar with very low water requirement leads 
to the high impact in improving water quality.
No direct interaction
UNFCCC 2012 IPCC 2018
Has the medium score improve air quality. Solar with very low water requirement leads 
to the high impact in improving water quality.
No direct interaction No direct interaction
 Alexeew et al. 2010, IPCC 2018 Subbarao and Lloyd 2011
No direct interaction
Low impact on access to electricity.
Subbarao and Lloyd 2011; Sun et at.2010; 
Disch 2010; UNFCCC 2012; Wood 2011
Wind power projects can create co-benefits of 
the absence of any pollution that would have 
been caused by conventional power 
generation.
Wind with very low water requirement leads 
to the high impact in improving water quality.
Sun et at.2010; Alexeew et al. 2010; Disch 
2010; UNFCCC 2012; Wood 2011
 Alexeew et al. 2010, IPCC 2018 Nussbaumer 2007
Wind power projects can create co-benefits of 
the absence of any pollution that would have 
been caused by conventional power 
generation; 
Wind with very low water requirement leads 
to the high impact in improving water quality.





Biomass Large [+2, -1] [+2, -1] [-1]
[+2, -1] [+2] [-1] [+1]
Alexeew et al. 2010 Castro & Michaelowa 2008 Subbarao and Lloyd 2011
Low impact on access to electricity.
Alexeew et al. 2010; Disch 2010; Lee and
Lazarus, 2013; UNFCCC 2012; Wood 11; Castro 
& Michaelowa 2008
Biomass that rely on on-farm residues can offer 
the medium number of benefits. Has the 
medium score improve air quality; it improved 
air quality by reducing the burning of biomass 
in the fields, and supplying villagers with 
organic fertilizer.Biomass fuel not being 
sourced from sustainable sources leads to 
negative impact to poor people in local 
community.
Has the medium score in improving water 
quality.
Biomass fuel not being sourced from 
sustainable sources leads to deforestation and 
affecting poor people that use biomass as 
cooking in local community.
Alexeew et al. 2010; Disch 2010; Lee and
Lazarus, 2013; UNFCCC 2012; Castro & 
Michaelowa 2008
Alexeew et al. 2010, IPCC 2018 Castro & Michaelowa 2008
Biomass that rely on on-farm residues can offer 
the medium number of benefits. Has the 
medium score improve air quality; it improved 
air quality by reducing the burning of biomass 
in the fields, and supplying villagers with 
organic fertilizer. 
Has the medium score in improving water 
quality, meanwhile large biomass could lead 
to increased water stress.
Biomass fuel not being sourced from 
sustainable sources leads to deforestation and 
affecting poor people that use biomass as 
cooking in local community.
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Appendix A Accuracy of the ERPA Dates  
 
To check the accuracy of the ERPA dates extracted by the machine, I adopted two methods 
to validate the data.  
First, I plotted the monthly average CER prices over the period of April 2005 to February 
2013 against the signed date of ERPA, along with two other event dates (the date of getting 
the Letter of Approval (LOA) and the date that a project get registered) in Figure A 2-1. I 
can see that the line of CER prices drawn from the ERPA is quite different from the other 
two lines based on the other two events: LOA date and project registration Date. I expect 
that the date of LOA will be close to the ERPA line, or might be delayed from the timewise 
perspective, compared to the ERPA dates, which is confirmed in the figure.  
 
Data is from the CDM project pipelines, with ERPA dates collected by the author.  
Note: The three lines are calculated based on a five-year moving average in order to smooth out 
dramatic price fluctuation. LOA: Letter of Approval. REG: Project Registration Date. Units: US 
dollar per ton.  
Figure A 2-1. Monthly CER prices based on different event dates. The line of CER 
prices drawn from the ERPA is very different from the other two lines based on the 
other two events. Normally, the date of LOA will be close to the ERPA dates (but 
somewhat delayed), which is confirmed in the figure. The low price at the early 
stage is due to the uncertainty of whether or not the Kyoto Protocol would even 
come into force. Thus, it leads to limited demand for CERs with an understandably 
low price of the CERs (Kamel et al., 2007). The second fall of the CER prices is 
due to the 2008 economic crisis.  
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Second, I compared the overall trend of the monthly average CER prices based on ERPA 
dates with the spot market price trend. I find that among the three lines, the line of ERPA 
date fits the spot market trend best in Figure A 2-2. 
 
 
       Source: Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2012 
Figure A 2-2. EU ETS spot price ("EUA") and price of approved CDM 







Appendix B Supplemental Tables and Figures 
 
  Table B 2-1. Effect of project features on CDM projects. 
Models Model 1 Model 2 
   
type x size (0) 0 (.) -2.253*** (0.743) 
type x size (1) 2.253*** (0.743) 0 (.) 
type x size (3) -1.431 (2.339) -3.684 (2.412) 
type x size (4) -0.470 (0.622) -2.723*** (0.960) 
type x size (5) 0.0130 (0.168) -2.240*** (0.760) 
type x size (6) -0.759 (0.655) -3.011*** (0.980) 
type x size (7) 0.631 (0.893) -1.621 (1.154) 
type x size (8) -0.648 (0.706) -2.901*** (1.025) 
type x size (9) 0.777 (0.554) -1.476 (0.914) 
Biomass energy 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Coal bed/mine methane -0.158 (0.510) -0.158 (0.510) 
EE households 0 (.) 0 (.) 
EE own generation -0.226 (0.437) -0.226 (0.437) 
Hydro -0.705** (0.305) -0.705** (0.305) 
Landfill gas -1.088** (0.458) -1.088** (0.458) 
Methane avoidance -2.719*** (0.948) -2.719*** (0.948) 
Solar 0.0106 (0.523) 0.0106 (0.523) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Project Location FE Yes Yes 
Credit buyer FE Yes Yes 
Wind 1.221*** (0.303) 1.221*** (0.303) 
Gold Standard 2.096*** (0.409) 2.096*** (0.409) 
Years of projects 0.0721 (0.0712) 0.0721 (0.0712) 
Expected accumulated 2020 ktCO2e -0.000130 (0.000222) -0.000130 (0.000222) 
Expected accumulated 2030 ktCO2e -0.0000247 (0.0000775) -0.0000247 (0.0000775) 
Project investment (million USD) 0.00552*** (0.00144) 0.00552*** (0.00144) 
Constant 10.99*** (2.885) 13.24*** (2.890) 
Observations 2173 2173 
Adjusted R2 0.3137 0.3137 
 
Note: The dependent variable in both models is CER price. Coefficient estimates are reported in this table. 
The base case in model 1 is type x size (0), and in model 2 is type x size (1). Size is a dummy variable, with 
large projects coded as 0, and small projects coded as 1. I control for project location fixed effects, credit 
buyer fixed effects, and year fixed effects in the model. 
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Chapter 3 Paper Two: Do Gold-Standard-Certified CDM Projects 
Deliver a Price Premium?  
 
Abstract  
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is probably the most salient international 
offset mechanism within the broader world of carbon finance. It was designed with two 
equally important goals: to lead to significant emission reductions that would help reduce 
the cost of climate mitigation in countries with commitments and to contribute to 
sustainable development in host countries. However, in the carbon markets, the pure 
commodity of CO2 reductions is likely to devolve into simple emissions reductions, and I 
am unable to ensure the sustainable development outcomes. Thus, one of the proposed 
policy strategies is to give these projects quality controls (e.g., the independently generated 
label of "Gold Standard") and to see whether the quality control indicators attract a price 
premium because of these co-benefits. I use the Gold Standard CDM as a case study to see 
whether customers are willing to pay a price premium for the CERs associated with high 
co-benefits.  In this paper, I perform an econometric analysis of a group of projects with 
2,195 regular CDM projects and 64 Gold Standard-certified CDM projects. I selected 
projects for which complete information was available in the CDM pipeline to date. 
Specifically, a combined method of propensity score matching technique and exact 
matching technique is constructed to identify the effect of certification of carbon offsets/or 
higher co-benefits of carbon projects on the buyers’ willingness to pay. I found that quality 
control indicators have a significant effect on CER prices with the price premium is in the 
range of $1.13/tCO2e to $4.2/tCO2e. Additionally, I see a strong commitment from public 
finance in delivering co-benefits in the local commitment by willing to pay a price premium. 
 
1. Introduction 
The world now has roughly a decade and a half of experience with the carbon offsetting 
programs established under the Kyoto Protocol, most notably the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). The experience of these programs can inform the next steps in the 
evolution of climate finance to support low-carbon sustainable development, including 
ongoing discussions about possible pathways for implementation of Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement. As a policy tool with dual goals—stimulating both low-cost emissions 
reductions and sustainable development—the CDM has always had a challenging mandate. 
One fundamental challenge involves the CDM’s ability to deliver local co-benefits via the 
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market mechanism, in that there exists a trade-off between monetized carbon emissions-
reducing activities and non-monetized sustainable development benefits. Thus, the dual 
goals of the CDM create a fundamental tension: the original idea of the CDM is not only 
to look for the cheapest way to reduce GHG emissions, but also to promote sustainable 
development by stimulating investing in projects located in developing countries (Pearson, 
2007).  
This tension leads us to think deeply about how to design a better structure to balance the 
tension while meeting the challenge: investing in emission reduction projects requires more 
than simply increasing financial flows to the green industry. This kind of targeted financial 
flow may not always result in sustainable development, and even when sustainable 
development benefits accrue, the co-benefits may not always flow to the local receiving 
communities. In order to optimize the value of these investment and to achieve real and 
lasting sustainability, project developers and policymakers must place a high strategic 
value on delivering local co-benefits to receiving communities.     
Many researchers have been studying whether the CDM can achieve its dual goals, and 
found that there has often been a trade-off between emission reductions and sustainable 
development (Alexeew et al., 2010; Ellis et al., 2007; Freeman and Zerriffi, 2012; 
Schneider, 2007; Sutter and Parreño, 2007; Torvanger et al., 2013; Watts et al., 2015). This 
limitation could potentially be addressed by policies that favor certain structural features, 
such as technology type, or processes. Thus, an important potential tool for linking these 
goals of emissions reductions and sustainable development is differentiating the quality of 
avoided emissions that earns carbon credits.  
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In the context of CDM, various differentiators and “labels” have been applied, including 
the Gold Standard, as well as others generated under the Community Development Carbon 
Fund (CDCF) and the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standard (CCBS). These 
have been created for the purpose of identifying projects with high quality of Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) by adding an additional guarantee of sustainable 
development benefits. The incentive for using labeling CDM is that under regular CDM, 
there is no momentary value attached to the co-benefits that the CDM projects generate. 
Theoretically, these quality markers can indicate an additional added value for credits 
derived from projects that meet a higher standard for co-benefits. Recognition of this added 
value can incentivize project developers to promote local co-benefits because of additional 
revenues they get from the transactions. But to date, a robust assessment of such outcomes 
has not been undertaken.  
This paper attempts to fill this gap. Through this paper, I examine the carbon markets and 
get an indication of whether buyers voluntarily purchase carbon credit with higher co-
benefits, all other attributes of the carbon projects being equal. Specifically, I am looking 
at one of the quality control indicators, the Gold Standard CDM, see whether customers 
are willing to pay more for the CERs associated with high co-benefits.  
The Gold Standard CDM operates in both compliance and voluntary carbon markets. 
However, customers who purchase Gold Standard-certified credits are voluntarily 
purchasing carbon credits with higher co-benefits. For this study, I focus on the Gold 
Standard projects that have been brought forward in compliance markets. Based on data 
from this market, and comparing the data from the regular CDM market, I analyze whether 
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the prices paid for CERs in the Gold Standard market are significantly higher than those 
paid for CERs in the regular CDM market. Comparing projects with similar features that 
are offered in both markets, (e.g., similar volumes of carbon credits, project types, project 
locations, credit buyers, etc.), I am able to isolate the differences that result solely from the 
inclusion of co-benefits in the valuation of the CERs. In that context, I am able to conclude 
that customers are enjoying a higher utility due to the inclusion of co-benefits that are 
generated from these projects.  
For this study, I perform an econometric analysis of a group of 2,195 regular CDM projects 
and 64 Gold Standard-certified CDM projects. I selected projects for which complete 
information is available in the CDM pipeline to date. Specifically, a combined method of 
propensity score matching technique and exact matching technique is constructed to 
identify the effect of certification of carbon offsets/or higher co-benefits of carbon projects 
on the buyers’ willingness to pay.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a background 
discussion on the Gold Standard and the projects it certifies. It identifies how these projects 
are different from the regular CDM projects with which they will be compared. Section 3 
presents a review of recent literature on the impact of the Gold Standard on the realization 
of co-benefits in CDM projects. Section 4 describes the methodological approaches and 
data used for the analysis summarized in this paper. Section 5 presents the results of the 
econometric analysis. Additional econometric analysis using sectoral data is also discussed 
in this section. I present the discussion and potential for future research in Section 6. Policy 
implications and conclusions are then summarized in section 7. 
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2. Gold Standard CDM  
The Gold Standard initiated by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in 2003, is a certification 
standard for carbon offset projects. Since then, the transacted volume of Gold Standard-
Certified credits has been growing steadily. In total, from 2003 to 2019, the Gold Standard 
has issued more than 98.4 million carbon credits, and 15 million credits have been labeled 
CERs over the entire period (Gold Standard, 2019). A CDM project can use the Gold 
Standard protocol as an add-on methodology to make it a Gold Standard CDM project. It 
“proposed a methodology to develop high-quality emission reduction projects with high 
environmental integrity and secured local, social, environmental and economic benefits” 
(Nussbaumer, 2009). Gold Standard is a voluntary scheme based on the CDM structure, 
with three additional “screens” to filter projects. The first screen is “project type screen,” 
which limits projects only to renewable energy and end-use energy efficiency projects.28 
The “additionality and baselines screen” seeks to ensure projects are truly additional. The 
“sustainable development standards screen” seeks to ensure that projects deliver local, 
social, environmental, and economic benefits (Gold Standard 2002). Once projects have 
passed these screens, they can be labeled as Gold Standard-certified projects. To assess 
CDM projects, the Gold Standard protocol uses the following methods: (1) the sustainable 
development (SD) assessment matrix; 29  (2) a stakeholder consultation; and (3) an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA)  
 
28 Only energy efficiency projects, methane to energy projects and hydro projects of size less than 15 MW 
and other renewable energy projects are eligible. 
29 Gold Standard project developers use a sustainable development matrix to calculate the impact of the 
project with the help of these consultations. Only projects with an overall positive impact on the 
environment, social network and local economy are considered for Gold Standard (Indian Ministry New 
and Renewable Energy). 
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Gold Standard project developers invite local stakeholders to conduct two consultation 
meetings (one in the initial stages of the project and one just before validation) to make 
sure that the project responds to local concerns regarding the environmental and social 
impacts, as well as impacts on the local economy. This is different from CDM, wherein 
only one consultation meeting is required. The CDM project cycle is depicted in               
Figure 3-1, where I can see the first and second stakeholder consultations enter the scene.  
 
 
Source: Indian Ministry New and Renewable Energy, Global CER - VER Market 
              Figure 3-1. CDM project cycle. 
By adopting these safeguards and requirements, the Gold Standard protocol ensures that 
the projects not only achieve the goal of emission reductions, but also can deliver on at 
least two Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that are important to ensuring that the 





Consultation one  
Consultation two  
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estimated that the issued 669 projects have created nearly $5.5 billion of value in benefits 
that go beyond carbon (Gold Standard, 2019, 2014).  
3. Literature Review  
 
The traditional way to study the influence of co-benefits derived from CDM projects is by 
using a Multi-Attributive Assessment of CDM (MATA-CDM) methodology. This 
methodology was introduced by Sutter (2003) to evaluate the contribution of CDM projects 
to sustainable development in host countries (Sutter and Parreño, 2007). It is a combination 
of indicators that are qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative in nature. The ratings 
for all indicators are aggregated to the project level in order to obtain the project’s overall 
contribution to a sustainable development. Later on, Nussbaumer conducted an early study 
comparing the potential local sustainable development benefits of labeled CERs (Gold 
Standard and CDCF) to regular CDM projects using the MATA-CDM method. A total of 
39 CDM projects were evaluated, which includes all Gold Standard and CDCF CDM 
projects at the time of the study. The study finds that the sustainable development profile 
of labeling CDM projects tends to be comparable or slightly higher than similar ordinary 
projects. “Labeled projects do not, however, drastically outperform non-labeled ones” 
(Nussbaumer, 2009). However, Drupp later noted that Nussbaumer’s study was limited by 
the small number of Gold Standard projects available at that point in time. He conducted a 
similar study by using MATA-CDM method, with more Gold Standard certified projects 
in the sample and compared 18 Gold Standard projects with 30 regular CDM projects. He 
finds that: (1) Gold Standard can be associated with distinctly higher potential co-benefits 
to local communities than these 30 unlabeled CDM projects; (2) the impact from Gold 
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Standard is even more pronounced if compared with unlabeled CDM projects whose 
project technologies are unqualified for the Gold Standard requirements; (3) Gold 
Standard’s impact on co-benefits is “inclusive” 30  in a within-project-type comparison 
(Drupp, 2011). The author did not find detectable potential co-benefits surplus generated 
by the “sustainable development standards screen.” However, their analysis did suggest 
that the “project type screen” works, which means renewable energy projects outperform 
non-RE projects on delivering co-benefits. Crowe expands the sample further to consider 
a total of 114 projects, including 17 Gold Standard, 4 CCBS, and 89 regular CDM projects. 
He concludes that regular CDM projects are only “marginally” successful at delivering 
pro-poor benefits, while Gold Standard projects are only slightly better at delivering co-
benefits compared to regular CDM, but that all four CCB projects performed well in 
delivering pro-poor benefits.  
Another small group of literature studies the market segments of credit buyers. In 2003, 
Sutter first suggested differentiating the market for CERs into normal CERs and premium 
CERs, rewarding institutions publicly for good projects (Sutter, 2003). Parnphumeesup and 
Kerr’s study was the first one to validate the buyer’s market and identified that there are 
two separable sub-markets: the premium market and the normal market (Parnphumeesup 
and Kerr, 2011).  
Crowe’s approach also included a market survey to analyze the extent to which carbon 
market participants would be willing to pay higher prices for projects with stronger local 
 
30 Inclusive, means that the author cannot conclude from their analysis that Gold Standard projects can be associated 
with higher co-benefits than similar unlabeled CDM projects.  
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development benefits(Crowe, 2013).31 Additionally, another study of willingness to pay 
for the Gold Standard projects finds that 56 percent of the buyers are willing to pay a price 
premium (Parnphumeesup and Kerr, 2015).  
The third group of literature focused on the impact of third-party labeling on the realization 
of co-benefits. The CCBS was created to foster the development and marketing of projects 
that deliver credible and significant climate, community, and biodiversity benefits in an 
integrated, sustainable manner (CCB Standard version 3). It has a strong focus on 
engagement of local stakeholders, requiring multiple consultations with those stakeholders 
(Wood et al., 2011). 
Additionally, there are some carbon funds initiated by the World Bank Group with the aim 
of utilizing the CDM to promote targeted areas and project types. The CDCF represents a 
specific approach for using a funding mechanism to support projects that bring benefits to 
local communities. Created in 2002, the CDCF’s original goal is to support small-scale 
projects within underprivileged communities 32  and promote the local co-benefits by 
offering the project developers a price premium for their CERs if the projects meet certain 
criteria. By May 2017, by its own assessment, 25 out of 36 registered CDCF CDM projects 
successfully delivered tangible co-benefits “aligned with the SDGs for approximately 17.5 
million people” (World Bank, 2017). In December 2011, the World Bank launched the 
Carbon Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev) to “build capacity and develop tools and 
methodologies to help the world’s poorest countries access carbon finance, mainly in the 
 
31 Of course, as the author also identifies, there might be a response bias in the survey because people tend to gravitate 
toward good behavior by picking better answers (Crowe, 2013) 
32 “Underprivileged communities” described communities that are characterized by low educational attainment and 
income, high rates of substance use, unemployment, crime, and violence (Eloff, 2019).  
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area of energy access” (World Bank, 2015). By June 2016, there were 13 CDM PoAs were 
selected by the Ci-Dev to promote energy access through the implementation of rural 
electrification, energy efficient cookstoves, and low-carbon water filtration (Michaelowa 
et al., 2016). Within these specific targeted areas of energy access, the Ci-Dev has the 
potential to deliver tangible co-benefits to many underprivileged communities. Created in 
2004, the BioCarbon Fund (BioCF) had financed 18 CDM-AR projects by the end of 2012 
and successfully reduced deforestation in over 350,000 hectares of land over the past 
decade (World Bank, 2012). Another study looking at 21 CDM-AR projects shows that the 
co-benefits to the local communities in environmental, social, and economic dimensions 
increased in a significant manner (World Bank, 2011).   










Table 3-1. Literature summaries by 10 studies. 
Author  N. of Project  Detailed projects Assessment  
Nussbaumer 2007 39 Conduct a comparison 
study between regular 
CDM and 6 Gold 
Standard, 10 CDCF. 
 
Labeling CDM is slightly better than 
regular CDM  
 
Drupp 2011 48 Use an increased sample 
of 18 instead of 6 Gold 
Standard projects 
Gold Standard CDM projects are 
better at delivering co-benefits than 
regular CDM projects before 
controlling for project types; but are 
only marginally better after 
controlling for project types.  
 
Crowe 2013  114 89 +17 Gold Standard 
+4CCBs 
CCB all performed well in 
delivering pro-poor benefits 
Wood 2011 161 142 Gold Standard + 19 
CCBs 
Gold Standard and CCB standards 
successfully reward high-quality 
projects which have a demonstrated 
commitment to local co-benefits  
World Bank, 2013  
 
22 CDCF project portfolios, 
interviews and 
consultations, 8 case 
studies 
All CDCF projects directly or 
indirectly benefit local communities  
 
World Bank, 2017 36 36 CDCF projects  25 out of 36 projects have been 
collectively reduced emission 
reductions, while 25 projects have 
created community co-benefits 
aligned with the SDGs for 
approximately 17.5 million people.  
 
Spalding-Fecher et 
al. - 2015 
5 Ci-Dev These five PoAs are focused on the 
area of energy access such as 
improved cookstoves, rural 
electrification, lighting.  
Michaelowa et al. - 
2016 - 
13 Ci-Dev These selected 13 PoAs are focused 
on the areas of energy access to 
sustainable energy including rural 
electrification (grid extension, mini-
grid, solar lighting, and solar home 
systems), low-carbon cooking and 
low-carbon water filtration in Sub-
Saharan African countries. 
  
World Bank, 2011 21 BioCF This experience shows that the 
benefits associated with A/R CDM 
projects support the livelihood 
of rural people and their local 
environment in a significant manner 
across environmental, social and 
economic c0-benefits.   
World Bank, 2012 18 BioCF Over the past decade, the BioCF  
reduced deforestation in over 
350,000 hectares of land.  
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Thus, the broader literature indicates that indicators of quality, such as labeling or 
institutional endorsements, might correlate with higher delivery of intangibles or non-
monetary returns on investments, such as community co-benefits. Unlike the regular CDM, 
which makes no claim to the specific co-benefits that the CDM generates, these labels or 
other indicators can potentially send a signal to CER purchasers that a labeled project has 
higher co-benefits and this might then stimulate higher market prices for the CER prices. 
This could incentivize project developers to promote local co-benefits in a different way 
than just for standard CDM projects (Hultman et al., 2019).  
However, none of these studies analyzes the CDM and Gold Standard CDM markets 
empirically by using a refined dataset, and none of these studies tries to articulate the actual 
price premium a buyer is willing to pay. This study serves the purpose of bridging the 
research gap by using a refined dataset to quantify the price impact of Gold Standard on 
CDM projects.  
4.  Methodological Approach and Data 
4.1. Data  
The primary data source for the present study is the UNEP DTU CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis 
and Database (CDM/JI Pipeline). Additional information such as Emission Reduction 
Purchase Agreement (ERPA) dates, are extracted from CDM documents in PDF format on 
the UNFCCC CDM projects site through Python.  
I include 2,259 CDM projects in this study, where 1,655 are regular CDM projects, and 64 
are Gold Standard CDM projects in our paper. Our dataset covers 20 project types and two 
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project sizes (UNFCCC, 2017). Detailed results segregated by project types and size are 
listed in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2. Projects distribution based on project types and size by Gold Standard and 
regular CDM. 
  Regular CDM   Gold Standard CDM 
 Project Size  Project Size 
Project Type Small Large Total  Small Large Total 
Biomass energy 15 67 82  1 2 3 
Coal bed/mine methane 0 39 39  0 0 0 
EE households 6 0 6  1 0 1 
EE industry 3 2 5  2 0 2 
EE own generation 19 70 89  0 2 2 
EE service 0 0 0  3 0 3 
EE supply side 0 8 8  0 0 0 
Energy distribution 0 3 3  0 0 0 
Fossil fuel switch 1 18 19  0 0 0 
Fugitive 0 4 4  0 0 0 
Geothermal 0 1 1  0 0 0 
Hydro 383 518 901  6 2 8 
Landfill gas 19 48 67  0 2 2 
Methane avoidance 63 8 71  19 1 20 
Mixed renewables 0 1 1  0 0 0 
N2O 0 1 1  0 0 0 
Reforestation 0 2 2  0 0 0 
Solar 13 31 44  5 2 7 
Transport 0 2 2  1 2 3 
Wind 18 832 850  2 11 13 
Total 540 1,655 2,195   40 24 64 
 
As the literature indicates that ERPA is viewed as highly attribute affecting the price of 
CERs (Kamel et al., 2007). ERPA is specially developed for contract parties that directly 
want to deal between project owners and buyers. The contract outlines in detail the various 
steps of the process of starting with getting the project idea approved by a validator and the 
CDM Executive Board and continuing on to the actual deliverance of emission reductions 
and consequent issuance of CERs by the CDM Executive Board. Under the purchase 
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agreement, buyers are required to pay a fixed price 33 for the CERs to the sellers, usually 
in US dollars or Euros.34  
However, the CDM pipeline does not include the ERPA information, while most of the 
ERPA information is only provided in the project design document (PDDs), which is a 
long PDF document that the original project developer must submit to the CDM Executive 
Board for project approval. The problem is that locating the dates of ERPA is quite time-
consuming if it is done manually. As a result, the historical studies of the impact of the 
CERs prices have never controlled for the dates of ERPA. Thus, identifying the ERPA 
dates for each project is crucial and the results will influence the impact from the CERs 
fundamentally. To solve the problem and improve the accuracy of the statistical analysis 
in the later section, I use Python coding to go over the PDDs and validation reports for all 
the CDM projects with a CER price in the pipeline, and then extract information of ERPA 
dates from these documents.  
To check the accuracy of the ERPA dates extracted by Python, I adopted two methods to 
validate the data. First, I plot the monthly average CER prices over the period of April 2005 
to February 2013 against the signed dates of ERPA, along with two other event dates (the 
date of getting the Letter of Approval, and the date that a project get registered) in Figure 
3-2. I can see that the line of CER prices drawn against the ERPA dates is quite different 
from the other two lines based on the other two events: Letter of Approval date and project 
 
33 In our paper, I set the assumption is that all the CDM projects in the pipeline are fixed-price contract, 
since it is the most common contract structure based on UNDP. Based on this assumption, information on 
the contract date is required in order to control the time variation of the carbon prices. 
34 In our paper, I unify all the currency to U.S. dollars for the purpose of comparison 
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registration Date. I expect that the date of LOA will be close to the ERPA line, or might be 
delayed, compared to the ERPA dates, which is confirmed in the figure.   
 
 
Data is from the CDM project pipelines, with ERPA dates collected by the author.  
Note: The three lines are calculated based on a five-year moving average in order to smooth out 
dramatic price fluctuation. LOA: Letter of Approval. REG: Project Registration Date. Units: US 
dollar per ton.  
Figure 3-2. Monthly CER prices based on different event dates. The line of CER 
prices drawn from the ERPA is very different from the other two lines based on the 
other two events. Normally, the date of LOA will be close (but delayed relative) to 
the ERPA dates, which is confirmed in the figure. The low price at the early stage 
is due to the uncertainty of whether or not the Kyoto Protocol would come into 
force. Thus, it leads to limited demand for CERs with an understandably low price 
of the CERs (Kamel et al., 2007). The second fall of the CER prices is due to the 
2008 economic crisis.  
 
Second, I compared the overall trend of the monthly average CER prices based on ERPA 
dates to the spot market price trend. We find that among the three lines, the line of ERPA 




 Source: Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2012 
Figure 3-3. EU ETS Spot price ("EUA") and price of approved CDM allowances 
("CERs") from 1 Januray 2009 to 3 September 2012. Units: EUR per tonne. 
 
4.2. Methodology  
4.2.1. CER prices 
CER prices fluctuate widely and are not closely correlated with traditional macro-economic 
factors. Although the overall trend of CER prices follows the carbon markets, there are 
also certain factors that can make the CER prices off the market prices.  The determinants 
of the CER prices can be divided into two major groups: macro- and micro-level 
determinants (Kamel et al., 2007). The macro-level determinants of CER prices are the 
carbon markets (including supply and demand), the implementation structure of the global 
treaties, the expectation of the future market and the whole sector, etc. The micro-level 
determinants of CER prices are mainly a function of concentrated on the buying and selling 
parties, and also the project characteristics, such as project duration, investment cost, 
location, type, etc.  
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The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of co-benefits (represented by achieving the 
Gold Standard certification) on the prices of CERs. The first step requires determining the 
project and extra-project independent variables likely to explain the intrinsic value of the 
CER as exhaustively as possible while ensuring the robustness of the specifications. I have 
presented the key factors affecting CER prices along with the supporting literature in Error! 
Reference source not found.. Variables also cover the two levels of CER price determinants. 
Buyers, sellers, and project’s characteristics, such as duration of the crediting period, 
project types, project size, project investment, etc. are adopted into the model as the micro-
level determinants. In order to count towards the current and future expectations of the 
market and international reduction commitment, I include the expected CER volum2020 
and 2030, plus the crediting period.35 Additionally, I also use the signed date of ERPA to 







35 A CDM project can have either a seven-year crediting period, which can be renewed twice to make a 




Table 3-3. List of key factors affecting CER prices. 










Long-term supply; CDM project 
can 
have either a seven-year crediting 
period, which can be renewed 
twice to make a total of twenty-one 
years, or a one-off ten-year period 
(Nordseth, et al., 
2007) 






the likelihood that the project will 













The likelihood that the project will 
generate and deliver CERs 
(Bishop, 2007; 





Financing Micro production cost  (Gao and Li 
Liyan, 2007) 
Project investment 
Seller  Macro Carbon-related country risks; host 
country approval risk 




Project type Micro The nature of the project; Specific 
project influences; e.g., limited use 
of large-scale hydro and exclusion 
of CERs from forest projects by 
EU-ETS 
(Bishop, 2007; 
Wilder and Willis, 
2007) 
Project type 
Buyer Macro Buyers' level of sophistication, and 
the extent to which they provide an 
underlying debt or equity 
investment. 
(Palmisano, 2007; 







Contracts for CERs are highly 
heterogenous.36 





Note: *Total investment cost 
 
 
36 Because of the heterogenous of the contract, therefore CER were traded in a wider price range. It is 
important to include the ERPA data in our model to control for the variability.  
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4.2.2. Matching 
The next step is to find a suitable technique to calculate the price premium effect of 
obtaining the Gold Standard. Thus, a combined technique of exact matching, propensity 
score matching, and regression adjustment is applied.  
As the literature suggests that combining exact matching on key covariates, such as project 
types or locations, with propensity score matching is often desirable and possible. 
Especially when these covariates are categorical variables. Including them into the 
propensity score might not lead to the expected result of reducing bias. While, the 
combination of exact matching and propensity score matching can lead to a large reduction 
in bias (Glazerman et al., 2003) and can result in a design analogous to blocking in a 
randomized experiment (Stuart and Rubin, 2008). A detailed balancing test is presented in 
Appendix A Table 3-12. After finding good matches for the treatment group, the 
regression is used to adjust for any small residual biases and to increase efficiency (Stuart 
and Rubin, 2008). In conclusion, the matching method allows me to reduce large covariate 
bias between the treated and control groups, then it can be followed by conducting a 
regression to improve the model accuracy (Glazerman et al., 2003).  
In my study, treatment is if a project receives a Gold Standard certification.37 The control 
group includes all the regular CDM projects. The rationale behind matching is to identify 
(based on the available covariates) a control group of projects with similar characteristics 
to a treated group of projects for comparison. Thus, the selection of covariates should be 
 
37 Since the Gold Standard CDM market and regular CDM market is nonrandomized, so direct comparison 
between these two markets is meaningless and the results will be misleading. In order to compare these two 
markets, I need to introduce the technique of propensity scores, with the combination of exact matching. 
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those variables that thought to be related to the outcome (CER prices), but not the treatment 
(Garrido et al., 2014). With respect to the covariates, a list of variables selected as 
covariates for matching is displayed in Table 3-4.   
Table 3-4. List of covariates. 
Variable Unit  Source  Variable 
type 
1st period ktCO2e/yr ktCO2e/yr; average 
over 7/10 years or 
20/30 years  
CDM/JI Pipeline  continuous 
Years of projects Years  CDM/JI Pipeline  continuous 
Expected accumulated 2020 
ktCO2e 
ktCO2e/ CDM/JI Pipeline  continuous 
Expected accumulated 2030 
ktCO2e 
ktCO2e/ CDM/JI Pipeline  continuous 
Project investment*  million USD CDM/JI Pipeline/ PDDs continuous 
Project region  continent level CDM/JI Pipeline  categorical 
Project type type level CDM/JI Pipeline  categorical 
Project buyer company level CDM/JI Pipeline  categorical 
Emission Reduction Purchase 
Agreement (ERPA) 
year level PDDs and validation 
reports 
categorical 
*Total investment cost  
 
Table 3-5 shows that treated and control groups are very different before matching on the 
CER prices, and a number of covariates, e.g., regions, types, project sizes, years, and even 
the contract dates of the emission reductions purchase. The differences between the two 
groups indicate that I cannot compare them directly to get the treatment effect. I need to 






Table 3-5. Gold Standard and regular CDM summary by treatment.  
  Gold Standard CDM (Treated)    Regular CDM (Control)  
Variable   Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CER price   64 13.26 6.45 5 38.76 
 
2,195 11.66 2.62 1.31 42.02 
        
 
     
Years of projects   64 8.22 1.49 7 10 
 
2,195 7.46 1.18 5 30 
1st period ktCO2e/yr  64 79.48 111.48 6.9 736.6 
 
2,195 133.73 210.64 2 3016.7 
Expected accumulated 
2020 ktCO2e  64 735.58 938.76 60 5612 
 
2,195 1227.70 1995.38 18 30167 
Expected accumulated 
2030 ktCO2e  64 1267.45 2038.33 98 12983 
 
2,195 2342.52 3582.53 38 54489 
Project investment  63 70.85 282.36 1.4 2191 
 
2,188 56.27 84.70 0 1550.5 
Methodology  64 0.63 0.49 0 1 
 
2,195 0.25 0.43 0 1 
ERPA   64 2008 2.04 2002 2013  2,195 2009 1.71 2003 2012 
    
My strategy is to perform a propensity score matching at the level of five continuous 
variables. beyond that, I also conduct the exact matching using two scenarios. Scenario 1 
performs exact matching at the buyers’ country level, and Scenario 2 conducts exact 
matching at both buyers’ country and project location level. After finding good matches 
for the treatment group, the model will be adjusted by running a regression to control for 
the fixed effect from contract year, project type, project location, and buyers’ location.  
Python and Stata are used jointly for data analysis. Figure 3-4 shows that there is overlap 
in the range of propensity scores across the treatment and comparison group, which we 
called the “common support” 38  (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Garrido et al., 2014). 
Additionally, diagnostic tests for balancing of covariates are shown in Figure 3-5. We can 
see that matching did a quite good job at balancing the covariates across the treatment and 
control group, with all (except one) p-values from both the KS-test and the grouped 
permutation of the Chi-Square distance after matching to be > 0.05.  
 
38 Assessing the common support condition ensures that any combination of characteristics observed in the 




Figure 3-4. Distribution of propensity score across treatment and comparison 
groups. This figure shows the “common support” area between the treatment and 































































Figure 3-5. Diagnostic tests for balancing of covariates. Empirical cumulative 
distribution function (ECDF) for test vs ECDF for control **before** matching (left), 





    
    
 
  







5.1. Main Results: The Effect of Gold Standard on CDM Projects 
My main model is expressed in the following regression equation:  
!!" =	$# +	$$('()*+!") + $%-!" +	.! + /! +	0! + 1" + 2!" 
Where, 3 indicates projects, and + indicates years. In all models, the dependent variable !!" 
is the CERs price for each project. The variable of interest is '()*+!", with its coefficient 
$$ indicates the effect of Gold Standard on CDM projects. I also control for a group of 
continuous covariates listed in Table 3-4, project location fixed effects (.!),39 credit buyer 
fixed effects (/!), project type fixed effects	(0!), and year fixed effects (1"). Finally, the 
error term captures unobserved factors affecting our dependent variable that changes over 
the year.  
I conducted the analysis by performing five models, and the final results with absolute 
terms are presented in Table 3-6. I also present CER price premium in relative (as a % of CER price) terms in  
Table 3-7. Model 1 conducted OLS regression using the nine covariates that used to 
estimate the propensity to receive the treatment. That is, model 1 displays the difference in 
being Gold Standard CDM projects and regular CDM projects by controlling for the nine 
covariates. Model 2 through model 5, show results of estimates by using different matching 
techniques. Model 2 and model 3 only used propensity score matching, while model 4 and 
model 5 used the combined exact matching and propensity score matching technique. The 
 
39 Due to the variation of project location and variation of treatment is highly collinear, I do not include 
project location fixed effects in model 2, 3, and 4. 
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difference between model 2 and model 3 is the number of covariates used to obtain the 
results. In model 2, I perform the propensity score technique for all nine covariates, 
including both continuous and categorical covariates. In model 3, I only conduct the 
propensity score with the five continuous covariates. The models of interest are model 4 
and model 5. In model 4, I perform the exact matching at the credit buyers’ country level, 
in order to obtain the impact of Gold Standard on projects within the same buyers. In model 
5, I restricted our model further to conduct exact matching on both credit buyers’ country 
level and also the projects’ location level.40 Model 5 is the most restricted model among 
these five models. I lost some observations due to model restriction in model 5, and I only 
obtained 21 projects in the treatment group.  
Across the five models, coefficients of treatment effect are all statistically significant at a 
90% confidence level. Except the result of model 2, the difference between the CER prices 
of Gold Standard and regular CDM shows consistent, with model 4 and model 5 yield more 
conservative estimates, which are expected. Model 1 indicates that statistically controlling 
for differences in projects’ features and sellers’ background, Gold Standard projects 
received a price premium of $1.9/tCO2e (10.3% of CER price increase due to the Gold 
Standard Certification). Results of model 2 and 3 indicate that when matched on their 
propensity to receive Gold Standard, projects with Gold Standard displayed a higher price 
premium. Compared to matched projects that don’t have the Gold Stand certification, the 
price premium is from $4.21/tCO2e (29%) to $2.58/tCO2e (14%). However, due to the 
 
40 I intended not to perform exact matching on buyers’ company level due to our small sample of the 
treatment group. But I clustered our standard error at the company level.  
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poorly matched results from model 2,41 estimates from model 2 might overestimate the 
impact of Gold Standard. Model 4 displays an estimate of the effect of Gold Standard for 
CDM projects that, within each credit buyer’s country, were predicted to have statistically 
similar propensities of obtaining Gold Standard certification. The price premium from 
model 4 is $2.33/tCO2e (11.2% of CER price increase due to the Gold Standard 
Certification), which is very close to the results from model 3. Model 5 presents an estimate 
of the price premium of Gold Standard for CDM projects that, within a narrower range, 
where each credit buyers’ country and project location (country level) should be exactly 
matched, were predicted to have statistically similar propensities of obtaining Gold 
Standard certification. The price premium from model 5 is $1.13/tCO2e (6.6%), which is 
also expected. In Model 5, due to our limited number of projects in the treatment group, 








41 The diagnostic tests for balancing of covariates are very poor in model 2. I can provide detailed 
information in Appendix.  
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Table 3-6. Treatment effect of Gold Standard on CDM projects. 
Models Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 




all 9 covariates 
Propensity score 






Exact matching on 
the credit buyers 
and project 
location  
TREAT 1.909** 4.210*** 2.581*** 2.338* 1.130*  
(0.858) (1.124) (0.939) (1.180) (0.616)       
Year fixed effects 
(FE) 
yes yes yes yes yes 
Type FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Credit buyer FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Project location FE  yes no no no yes 
  
     























   13.11*** 
(2.436) 
F Joint test 6.0*** 15.1*** 2.9** 5.09*** 2.05* 
No. of Observation 2251 378 378 294 126 
TREAT 64 63 63 49 21 
UNTREAT 2187 315 315 245 105 
R Square 0.3406 0.9521   0.3404 0.2062 0.8327 
Note: The dependent variable in all five models is CER price. Coefficient estimates are reported in this table, with 
standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at credit buyers’ company level. I control for project location 
fixed effects, credit buyer fixed effects, project type fixed effects, and year fixed effects in the model. 
* p<0.10    ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01 
    
 
Table 3-7. Treatment effect of Gold Standard on CDM projects (LOG) 
Models Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 




all 9 covariates 
Propensity score 






Exact matching on 
the credit buyers 
and project 
location  
TREAT 0.1026*** 0.2900*** 0.1424*** 0.1175* 0.0654*  
(0.0288) (0.0708) (0.0553) (0.0680) (0.0407)       
Year fixed effects 
(FE) 
yes yes yes yes yes 
Type FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Credit buyer FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Project location FE  yes no no no yes 
  
     
F joint test 4.14*** 16.55*** 2.9** 5.21*** 3.81** 
No. of Observation 2251 378 378 294 126 
TREAT 64 63 63 49 21 
UNTREAT 2187 315 315 245 105 
R Square 0.3406 0.9521   0.3404 0.2062 0.8327 
Note: The dependent variable in all five models is Log (CER price). Coefficient estimates are reported in this table, with 
standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at credit buyers’ company level. I control for project location 
fixed effects, credit buyer fixed effects, project type fixed effects, and year fixed effects in the model. 
* p<0.10    ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01 
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5.2. Robustness Check and Supplementary Analysis 
First, I replaced the credit buyer’s country information with the indicators representing the 
health of a country’s economy, such as GDP per capita, employment rate, government 
expenditure, and inflation rate. I get very similar results (results are presented in Table 3-8) 
across all five models compared to the results in Table 3-6. All coefficient estimates of 
Gold Standard treatment are statistically significant. This indicates that my models are 
quite robust.  
Table 3-8. Robustness check: treatment effect of Gold Standard on CDM projects. 
 





all 9 covariates 
Propensity score 
matching at 5 
continuous covariates 
Exact matching 
on the credit 
buyers 
Exact matching on the 
credit buyers and 
project location 
TREAT 2.006** 3.697*** 2.713*** 2.338* 1.130*  
(0.847) (1.078) (0.964) (1.180) (0.616)       
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Type FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Credit buyer FE no no no no no 
Project location FE  yes no no no yes 
  
     
No. of Observation 2251 378 378 294 126 
TREAT 64 63 63 49 21 
UNTREAT 2187 315 315 245 105 
R Square 0.3307 0.9160  0.2996 0.2062 0.8327 
Note: The dependent variable in all five models is CER price. Coefficient estimates are reported in this table, with standard 
errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at credit buyers’ company level. I control for project location fixed effects, 
credit buyer fixed effects, project type fixed effects, and year fixed effects in the model.  
* p<0.10    ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01 
   
 
Second, I conducted a “placebo” test by randomly selecting 50 percent of the data from our 
control group and artificially assigning them into the treatment group. By doing that, I 
created a “fake” treatment group, that is, a group that I know was not affected by the Gold 
Standard. I estimated the models by using the “fake” treatment, and the results are 
presented in Table 3-9. All the coefficients of treatment effect are not statistically 
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significant. Since I do not find that there is a difference in the absence of the real treatment, 
Gold Standard certificates, I successfully reject this falsification. This result increases the 
credibility of our research design.  
Table 3-9. Placebo test: treatment effect of Gold Standard on CDM projects. 
Models Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Full regression Propensity score 
matching with 
all 9 covariates 
Propensity score matching 
at 5 continuous covariates, 
combined regression  
Exact matching on 
the credit buyers  
Exact matching on 
the credit buyers 
and project location  
TREAT 0.109 0.0259 -0.0526 -0.0274 -0.0375  
(0.0931) (0.0982) (0.120) (-0.143) (0.144)       
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Type FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Credit buyer 
FE 
yes yes yes yes yes 
Project 
location FE  
yes no no no yes 
            
No. of 
Observation 
2195 378 378 294 126 
TREAT 1098 63 63 49 21 
UNTREAT 1097 315 315 245 105 
R-squared 0.3097 0.3075 0.1863 0.4714 0.4182 
Note: The dependent variable in all five models is CER price. Coefficient estimates are reported in this table, with standard errors 
in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at credit buyers’ company level. I control for project location fixed effects, credit 
buyer fixed effects, project type fixed effects, and year fixed effects in the model  
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
* p<0.10    ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01  
    
5.3. Sectoral Analysis  
CER prices are reported at the buyers’ company level in the ERPA. It will be useful to 
study further the question of what explains the price of CER prices from the buyers’ 
perspective. In this section, I will focus on explaining whether CER prices differ 
systematically based on the credit buyers’ industry, or their profit status, for example, 
whether the reporting entity is considered a for-profit or not-for-profit enterprise.  
In order to do so, I further divide credit buyers into different categories by using different 
classification systems. First, credit buyers (company level) were classified by their primary 
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business activities using the Bloomberg Industry Classification Systems (BICS). I obtained 
11 industries,42 and the CER prices they paid are plotted in Figure 3-6 (a). Second, credit 
buyers are also categorized into five categories of profit status, including local private 
companies, global private companies, government entities, Multilateral Development 
Banks (MDBs), and foundations. Figure 3-6 shows that there is variation among buyers’ 
preference towards paying a price premium for the Gold Standard CDM. To explore the 
variation, I adopt the hedonic price method. The model behind this analysis is the hedonic 
price method (Conte and Kotchen, 2010; Freeman et al., 2014), where CER prices can be 
explained as a function of credit buyer and project characteristics. Because I am interested 
in the general characteristics of credit buyers after I run our preliminary model, and because 
the prices for carbon credits are provided at the credit buyer level, it makes sense to use a 
hedonic function to study whether the location and profit status of these credit buyers 
(private, government, MDB) or industries of these buyers will consistently present a 
different attitude towards the impact of the Gold Standard certification on the CER prices.  
In applying the hedonic function analysis, I estimate linear and log-linear specifications 





42 We later aggregate these 11 industries into 7 industries based on some of their similarity.  
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   (a) 
        (b) 
 
Figure 3-6. Box plot for CER prices based on credit buyers across treatment 
and control group. The left figure(a) is the CER price plot among different 
industries of these companies. Figure (b) is the CER plot by more broad 
classification as their status as for-profit or not-for-profit. 
Model 1 and model 2 in Table 3-10 are conducted to analyze the different preferences over 
Gold Standard-certified CDM projects and regular CDM projects, based on buyers’ 
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industry. Estimates from Table 3-10 show that the results of the analysis comparing the 
Gold Standard CDM projects and regular CDM projects are statistically significant in the 
following industries: industrial and material, carbon-related (including carbon assets 
management, carbon consulting management, etc.), and government and foundation. If 
these buyers operate in the industrial and material sector, the results indicate that the price 
premium of Gold Standard CDM projects paid by credit buyers is $6.5/tCO2e or 32 percent 
more, compared to those regular CDM projects. If business activities of credit buyers are 
primarily focused on carbon-related asset management, the price premium paid was 
$2.9/tCO2e or 14 percent more if the projects obtained Gold Standard certification. Buyers 
from government entities and foundations are willing to pay $1.6/tCO2e or 15 percent more 
if the projects are certified by the Gold Standard. The rest of the coefficient estimates of 
interest are not statistically significant. I find no price difference between Gold Standard 
certified projects and regular CDM projects in other industries, such as utilities, energy, 
financial (except for carbon asset management), and consumer discretion. To our 
standpoint of view, it can be explained that Gold Standard was initiated by the WWF in 
2003. During the time of the CDM, it is still quite a new idea in the market. Only experts 
in the carbon market, such as companies dealing with carbon asset directly are fully aware 





Table 3-10. Company-level regression results A. 
Sectoral Analysis  
  Model 1 (linear) Model 2  (log-linear)   
 
TREAT 0.0262 0.0045 
  -0.588 (0.047) 
TREAT & Financials 0.549 0.0310  
(0.721) (0.058)   
 
TREAT & Consumer discretionary -1.080 -0.0967  
(1.024) (0.0912)   
 
TREAT & Industrial & material 6.496** 0.319*  
(3.261) (0.167)   
 
TREAT & Government Foundation 1.578** 0.150**  
(0.798) (0.061)   
 
TREAT & Carbon related 2.916** 0.141*  
(1.477) (0.083)   
 
TREAT & Utilities -0.643 -0.0273  
(2.329) (0.166)   
 




No. of Observation 2251 2251 
Note: The dependent variable in model 1 is CER price and in model 2 is natural log of CER price. Coefficient estimates 
are reported in this table, with Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at credit buyers’ company 
level.  
* p<0.10    ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01 
 109 
 
Note: Error bars indicate 95-percent confidence interval. 
Figure 3-7. Coefficients of interaction between buyer’s sector and treatment. It 
shows that the treatment effects differ across buyer’s sectors.  
Model 1 and model 2 in Table 3-11 are performed to analyze the different preferences over 
Gold Standard-certified CDM projects and regular CDM projects based on broader buyers’ 
status as for-profit and not-for-profit. The results from the for-profit entities have no 
statistical significance, while the results from non-for-profit (government and MDBs) 
entities continue to have statistical significance. The price premium for Gold Standard 
CDM projects is $2.3/tCO2e or 19 percent more from government entities and is 
$0.6/tCO2e or 7 percent more from MDB respectively. The rest of the coefficient estimates 
of interest are not statistically significant. I find no price difference for local for-profit and 
global for-profit companies in terms of purchasing Gold Standard CDM projects and 
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regular CDM projects. The results deliver an important messages that non-for-profit 
organizations value co-benefits more, and they are pushing the assessment of the co-
benefits in the local communities by purchasing the Gold Standard-certified CERs with a 
price premium. From the climate policy perspective, it is important to set a framework that 
can place a high strategic value on delivering local co-benefits to receiving communities 
through climate investment, where public funding can play an enabling role at the early 
stage. The results show that organizations supported by the public funding are willing to 
pay a price premium for projects with higher co-benefits. However, I do not see the same 
willingness from the private sectors. Thus, I might still face the challenge: How to mobilize 
for-profit entities to engage into the climate finance and optimize the value of climate 
investment and to achieve real and lasting sustainability.   
Table 3-11. Company-level regression results B. 




Model 2  
(log-linear) 
TREAT 0.625*** 0.0661*** 
  (0.176) (0.0141) 
     
TREAT & Private Local 2.687 0.0972 
 (1.809) (0.0957) 
   
TREAT & Private Global 0.909 0.00992 
 (0.960) (0.0552) 
   
TREAT & Government 2.260** 0.191*** 
 (0.919) (0.0571) 
   
TREAT & Foundation 0.613 0.0462 
 (1.140) (0.0789) 
   
TREAT & MDB 0.625*** 0.0661*** 
(Omitted) (0.176) (0.0141) 
No. of Observation 2251 2251 
Note: The dependent variable in model 1 is CER price and is model 2 is natural log of CER price. Coefficient estimates 
are reported in this table, with Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at credit buyers’ company 
level.  




Note: Error bars indicate 95-percent confidence interval. 
Figure 3-8. Coefficients of interaction between buyer’s profit status and 
treatment. It shows that the treatment effects differ across buyer’s Profit status.  
 
6. Discussion   
I base my analysis on projects, buyers and sellers listed on a refined CDM pipeline database, 
to which I contribute by adding ERPA dates and also the buyers’ sectoral information. It 
is the most comprehensive listing of buyers and sellers in the CDM and Gold Standard 
CDM market.  
Among the robust findings of our analysis is that the Gold Standard has a significant effect 
on CER prices. The price premium is in the range of $1.13/tCO2e (6.6% increase in CER 
prices due to the Gold Standard certification) to $4.2/tCO2e (29%) based on the models I 
estimated from. I am comfortable to use the premium of $2.23/tCO2e (11.8%) because this 
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is the most fitted model among the five models I used in this study. The price premium is 
quite sizable because the average CER price is $11.7/tCO2e of 2259 projects.  
Another robust finding is that certain project types affect CER prices, such as wind and 
methane avoidance projects. I find that wind projects overall are significantly more 
expensive than the average price of all the project types. Methane avoidance projects are 
cheaper than the average price of all the project types. Because these two project types 
have a large influence on the treatment group (representing 31 percent and 20 percent of 
the treatment sample respectively), I can conclude that wind projects may be suitable to get 
Gold Standard certificates. By earning a Gold Standard certification for a wind project 
might generate a larger price premium than it would for some other type of project, such 
as a methane-capture project. It implies that the extra money makes it worth the extra effort 
that it takes the CDM project developer to earn Gold Standard Certification.  
Somewhat surprising is that sectors, such as carbon-related asset management, are willing 
to pay more if a CDM project is Gold Standard certified. One possible explanation of 
carbon-related asset management paying more for Gold Standard projects is that they are 
the experts in the carbon market. They are fully aware of the add-on value that the Gold 
Standard provides to the projects. Thus, they are willing to pay a premium at nearly 
$3/tCO2e.  
Despite my robust finding, I have to acknowledge some limitations of this analysis. First, 
I am only able to use a small example of Gold Standard CDM projects due to a lack of 
complete information for the rest of the Gold Standard CDM projects. Small sample size 
leads us to draw the conclusion in a limited way, even though the coefficient of the study 
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of interests is quite sizeable. Second, data quality in the original CDM pipeline is poor, 
although I have manually improved it substantially. The consequences of the CDM pipeline 
being poor is that I have to drop half of the projects in the original dataset due to missing 
information. Although it will not affect my estimates of the impact of treatment in general, 
I can get a more accurate estimation if I can use the full dataset.    
This study also points to some potential area for future research. First, it points to a potential 
value for additional research on the voluntary carbon market. It would be valuable to see 
the impact of the Gold Standard in the voluntary carbon market, where I expect the price 
premium will be higher. Because buyers from the voluntary markets are largely motivated 
to purchase offsets by their social responsibility and concerns about climate change to 
reduce their emission (Anja, 2007; Goldstein, 2016). The Gold Standard is widely used in 
the voluntary carbon market, where its market share is roughly 20 percent (Hamrick and 
Gallant, 2018). Second, it also shows the importance of deeper assessments of diverse 
buyer groups because they might drive premiums differently and show divergent levels of 
willingness to pay a premium price for high-quality CERs. Our findings indicate that the 
majority volume of CER credits were purchased by the for-profit private sectors (96 
percent), and our analysis shows no statistical difference among this group in paying more 
for the Gold Standard projects at the aggregated level. However, if I further break this 
group into the more industries, I see two industrial categories, industrial & material and 
carbon-related management, that represent 31 percent of the total market share, are paying 
a price premium for the Gold Standard CERs. The result indicates that there is a large price 
variability in the CER prices paid by for-profit sectors within and between Gold Standards 
projects and regular CDM projects.  
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7. Conclusion  
The area of local co-benefits analysis has been a topic of great interest, but most of the 
previous studies focused on evaluate co-benefits on projects per se, but not from the market 
segments perspective. The motivation for studying the CER market and the price premium 
earned by projects with higher co-benefits inspires us to look at the market segments for 
different buyers and examine this topic from a broader perspective.   
The primary aim of this paper is to investigate whether there is a price premium delivered 
by the Gold Standard-certified CDM projects compared to the regular CDM projects. Using 
the combined technique of exacting matching and propensity score matching, I am able to 
separate the impact from the co-benefits feature of the Gold Standard. My results show that 
there exists a small, albeit statistically significant premium earned by the Gold Standard 
CERs compared to standard CERs. I estimate that this price premium to be between 
$1.13/tCO2e to $2.58/tCO2e. The finding presented in this paper suggests that the market 
in general recognizes the added value of the Gold Standard CDM certification.  
The secondary aim of this paper is to explore factors that help explain the variation in the 
CER prices from the credit buyers’ perspective. I use the buyer-level characteristics as 
explanatory variables in the hedonic price model, and I find that when I only look at the 
buyers’ for-profit and not-for-profit status, MDBs and government are willing to pay an 
average price premium of $0.63/tCO2e and $2.3/tCO2e for Gold Standard CDM projects, 
By contrast, for-profit companies show no difference in willingness to pay for the Gold 
Standard CDM and the standard CERs produced by regular CDM projects. When I review 
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the buyers’ business activities, industrial & material and carbon-related management 
companies are paying an average price premium of $6.5/tCO2e and $2.9/tCO2e respectively.  
In conclusion, I emphasize that Gold Standard-certified CDM projects are associated with 
guaranteed co-benefits in local communities, and there is a price premium from the buyers’ 
side for these projects. I also emphasize that buyers’ willingness to pay more for projects 
associated with co-benefits can drive the implementation of co-benefits into the local 
communities more effectively and efficiently.   
The case study of Gold Standard demonstrates the value proposition of “branding”, and I 
should recognize that the value proposition is substantiated by the underlying link between 
the Gold Standard brand and higher co-benefits in projects acquired by the buyers, the 
“value”, of the Gold Standard are the benefits beyond emission reductions. Gold Standard 
estimated that the issued 669 projects have created nearly 5.5 billion dollars of value 
benefits beyond carbon (Gold Standard, 2019).  
As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, making the global financial flow to projects 
that reduce greenhouse gas emissions has a foundation tension. What I learned from the 
study is that financial flow can be jointly achieved with projects with better quality, such 
as those that deliver on higher co-benefits in local communities. Although these co-benefits 
are difficult to be monetized into every dollar sign, they are the real impact on the local 
communities. There is a potential to generate even more financial flow into the project 
level if the co-benefits can be captured and visualized by the design of the project and 
monetarized at the buyers’ side.   
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Appendix A Balancing Test  
 
I adopted the standardized differences (SD) technique, which is the standardized difference 
of means, to assess the differences between multiple variables of the treatment and control 
groups (Lunt, 2014). If there is no big difference between these two groups, I can conclude 
that there is adequate balance between these two groups of observations. Before matching 
(a), the treated and untreated groups are unbalanced. When I do propensity score matching 
at both categorical and continuous covariates level (b), I still didn’t get balanced groups. 
However, in the last test (b), when I only conduct propensity score matching at the 
continuous covariates level, I get balanced groups.  
Table 3-12. Covariate balancing check between the control group and the treatment 
group. 
(a) Before matching  
Mean in treated 
(GS projects) 
Mean in Untreated 
(Regular projects) 
Standardized diff. 
1st period ktCO2e/yr 80.28 133.87 -0.317 
Years of projects 8.24 7.45 0.608 
Expected accumulated 2020 ktCO2e 739.63 1228.90 -0.313 
Expected accumulated 2030 ktCO2e 1278.00 2345.72 -0.365 
Project investment 70.85 56.27 0.070 
 
(b) Matching at both categorical and continuous covariates   
Mean in treated Mean in Untreated Standardized diff. 
1st period ktCO2e/yr 80.28 64.13 0.194 
Years of projects 8.24 8.57 -0.223 
Expected accumulated 2020 ktCO2e 739.63 546.63 0.274 
Expected accumulated 2030 ktCO2e 1278.00 961.94 0.206 
Project investment 70.85 26.88 0.219 
 
(c) Matching at continuous covariates  
  Mean in treated Mean in Untreated Standardized diff. 
1st period ktCO2e/yr 80.28 79.88 0.004 ** 
Years of projects 8.24 8.33 -0.064 * 
Expected accumulated 2020 ktCO2e 739.63 742.55 -0.003 *** 
Expected accumulated 2030 ktCO2e 1278.00 1202.95 0.037 ** 
Project investment 70.85 42.38 0.136 
Note: Standardized differences (SD) are the standardized difference of means. *** SD <0.001, **SD<0.05, 
and *SD<0.1 
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Chapter 4 Paper Three: How are Corporate Motivations for 





Companies can prioritize sustainable investment finance flows to reflect their concerns 
about climate change and carbon emissions. One type of climate finance flows is that 
companies decide to invest relevant significant funds in voluntary carbon offset projects. 
Despite growing research into what and how these companies are doing in the voluntary 
carbon offset markets, much remains to be learned about why companies are investing in 
this market. There might be diverse motivations that drive companies to choose what they 
purchase and how they finance in carbon offsets. A mixed-method analysis based on a 
group of 186 companies with 534 carbon offset projects is conducted to explore the 
motivations that drive companies to invest in the offset projects, and how motivations map 
on to specific purchase behavior, such as project types, offset standards. I identified four 
corporate motivations for carbon offset investment and the criteria they use to evaluate 
offset investment. The growing prevalence of companies using carbon offset to realize 
carbon neutrality has been coupled with an increasing number of companies recognizing 
the importance of using offsets to contribute to the so-called “company values” and 
“market competitiveness.” Our study reveals that companies of offset investment 




We are in a world facing a suite of climate-related risks that are not new to the global 
community. The significant and growing risks cause numerous organizations, including 
government, investors, private companies, to think about their strategies to tackle climate 
change issues. Companies, as the major players in this battle, are looking at how they can 
respond to climate change and think about the ways they can invest in specific 
opportunities to offset their emissions.  
Companies pursue these goals in many different ways. One of the strategies that haven 
been used over the past couple of decades is to offset their emissions via purchases of 
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carbon credit certificates in the carbon markets.43 In the carbon markets, a rising number 
of companies take action on supporting sustainable projects. Their efforts cover identifying 
suitable projects, applying sustainability insights, and eventually navigating the flow of 
climate finance. One of the signals of companies directing the climate finance flow as a 
result of concerns about climate change and their carbon emissions is that companies 
decided to invest significant funds in voluntary carbon offset projects.  
This paper focuses on studying several issues at the convergence of corporate decision-
making, co-benefits of climate finance projects, carbon offsets, and sustainability research. 
Moreover, I examine these critical issues through the lens of the voluntary carbon offset 
markets for insight into how they can help inspire and reform corporate practice on climate 
change for a sustainable low-carbon society. The voluntary carbon offsets markets offer an 
interesting lens for me to study corporate social responsibility and the reason why the 
selected companies value the sustainable benefits in their decision-making process. First, 
corporates are the primary buyers in the voluntary markets.44 Secondly, the voluntary 
carbon markets landscape changes rapidly year by year, which reflects buyers’ preference 
among different projects. Over the course of its 13 year history,45 the cumulative volume 
 
43 Currently, there are two markets for carbon offsets to be exchanged on, the compliance and voluntary 
markets. The market settings are different for the two markets.   
44 Individual consumption of carbon offset is very limited compared to the corporate consumption. 
Individuals only made up 5 percent of the voluntary offset consumers while 80% were companies 
(Bergqvist and Lindgren, 2014). 
45 The first market available data for voluntary carbon markets can be traced back to 2006 when the 
Ecosystem Marketplace (EM) teaming up with New Carbon Finance launched the first-ever EM report 
through surveys and interviews in the voluntary carbon markets. 
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of pure46 transacted voluntary carbon offsets has exceeded 1.2 billion metric tons (GtCO2e) 
with a total market value of $5 billion as showed Figure 4-1.  
The bulk of voluntary offset purchases by volume are made by private, for-profit 
companies and multi-national institutions. In 2017, available data shows that private sector 
purchased 88 percent of offsets by volume and 61 percent by count of transactions. A figure 
shows the share of different types of buyers is presented in Figure B 4-1. Especially the 
private companies, encouraged by the Paris Agreement, are more aware of the impacts of 
climate change on their business and increase their commitments to reduce emissions as 
their pressing activities than they were before. In 2017, the number of private companies 
purchasing carbon offsets to reduce their emissions voluntarily was 314, which presents 17 
percent of the total companies that disclosed their information to the Carbon Disclosure 









46 This number excludes these offsets used for the pre-compliance purpose. Pure transacted offsets are 
offsets that not used to fulfill the pre-compliance purpose.  
47 There were 314 corporates purchased carbon offsets voluntarily in 2017, while the total number of 
corporates reporting to the CDP is 1896.  
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Data source: Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace, State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2019 
Figure 4-1. Voluntary carbon markets between 2006-2018. Year 2018 had the 
highest volume ever tracked (98.4 MtCO2e). Although between 2008 and 2012, the 
transacted volumes were high, these included the volume that count towards “pre-
compliance” or transacted under the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), which 
exited the market in 2012. Carbon prices were dropped from 2008 due to reasons 
such as the 2008 global economic recession, oversupply increased in 2014.  
In contrast to the compliance markets, buyers in the voluntary markets are largely 
motivated to purchase offsets by their social responsibility and concerns about climate 
change to reduce their emission (Anja, 2007; Goldstein, 2016). Thus, although companies 
are initially driven to reducing emissions in order to achieve their voluntary commitment, 
their motivations to offset investment evolve over time. During this process, companies 
face a wide variety of choices not only on price but also on technologies, locations, 
standards, and potential social impacts, when facing an offset purchase decision. 
This research serves the purposes of (1) identifying motivation for corporates to purchase 
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projects to invest in/support/purchase; (3) recognizing the role of co-benefits in the 
corporate decision-making process; and (4) gaining a better understanding of how non-
market characteristics like social value are being demanded by these investors. 
Methodologically, this paper used a mixed-method research design, evaluating 534 offset 
projects purchased by 186 companies globally during 2017. Companies have different 
motivations for investing in voluntary carbon offsets. These motivations translate directly 
to their choice of purchase. Through the analysis, I intend to answer the research question: 
how do diverse corporate motivations to invest in offset projects affect their choices with 
respect to co-benefits for local communities?  
To answer the questions, I will take the following three steps. First, I need to understand 
the motivations that drive companies to invest in offset projects. Second, I should have 
these motivations map on to the specific choices of projects and offset standards. Different 
project types and offset standards can generate different levels of co-benefits in the local 
communities, and they are also transacted on the market with different prices. Thus, it 
allows me to elucidate the research question further. Third, I should examine whether 
specific motivation has an impact on corporate preference on bringing co-benefits to local 
communities.  
In 2018, the global market capitalization of listed domestic companies was about $68 
trillion,48 the $3 trillion asset value of 186 corporates represented about 4 percent of the 
market capitalization. This paper believes that channeling available finance to offset 
 
48 World Bank Data, Market capitalization of listed domestic companies (current USD).  
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projects that benefit local communities is a must. I need new courses of action that deliver 
on the ground.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the 
literature on the previous studies on motivations of offset investment. Section 3 describes 
the mythological approaches and data used for this paper. Section 4 presents the Analysis 
of the mixed-method analysis. Discussion and conclusions are summarized in sections 5 
and 6 respectively. 
2. Voluntary Carbon Markets and Corporate Motivations   
This essay is tackling the question of how corporate motivations map on their decision to 
support voluntary carbon offset projects. To better understanding the question, I have to go 
all the way back and answer why companies engage in voluntary initiatives for their 
environmental performance in the first place, including setting voluntary emission 
reductions targets, committing to carbon neutrality, or creating eco-labelling projects, etc.  
Companies use voluntary initiatives to address environmental performance. Voluntary 
programs by definition are initiatives that are not driven by regulatory compliance. They 
are voluntary because they do not need to be ordered by the government in order to be 
undertaken (Gibson, 1999). Voluntary initiatives originate from the limits of regulation and 
the search for alternative political means to improve corporate environmental performance 
(Gibson, 1999; Weizsäcker et al., 2005). Current environmental regulation works 
reasonably well to control harmful behavior, but it is a blunt and imperfect tool when used 
to inspire and motivate creative responses that lead to greener products and processes 
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(Strasser, 2008). Thus, voluntary initiatives are believed to push innovation and fund 
creative solution ahead of regulations (Bayon et al., 2009; Gibson, 1999).  
Voluntary program can be grouped in to three big categories: government-sponsored, 
international voluntary standards, and corporate efforts undertaken by individual 
companies committing themselves to a specific environmental performance target (Strasser, 
2008). Thus, voluntary carbon offsetting can be one of the initiatives to improve corporate 
performance. It touch upon on many dimensions of voluntary initiatives, such as CSR, eco-
labelling, green products, zero emissions, etc.(Lozano, 2012).  
Currently, there are two kinds of markets for carbon offsets, compliance markets and 
voluntary markets. The market settings are different for the two kinds of markets. In 
compliance (mandatory) markets, buyers are primarily motivated to purchase offsets that 
can provide a more cost-effective mechanism to fulfill their lawful requirement, such as in 
a cap-and-trade regime. In a compliance market, assessments of co-benefits are primary 
focused on the outcome of the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) by using a 
common methodology called multiple-dimension-multiple-indicator to evaluate co-
benefits of carbon offset projects. The most convenient and generally adopted rule of 
dimension/criteria is based on a social-economic-environmental framework comparison 
(Disch, 2010; Hultman et al., 2019; Olsen and Fenhann, 2008; Spalding-Fecher et al., 2012; 
Subbarao and Lloyd, 2011a; Sutter, 2003; Sutter and Parreño, 2007; UNFCCC, 2012; 
Watson and Fankhauser, 2009). Most of the studies agreed that the CDM has not 
consistently delivered significant co-benefits to local communities. As a result, the current 
compliance markets still represent a small share of the in terms of combating climate 
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change. The need for increased action should be taken by more institutions and individuals. 
That’s where voluntarily carbon markets enter onto the stage.  
Compared to the regulatory compliance, voluntary carbon markets provide a channel of 
participating in the fight against climate change in a way that the compliance market does 
not (Bayon et al., 2009). Because some companies or individuals are unable to access the 
compliance carbon markets. Second, voluntary carbon markets can be a critical tool for 
education the public about climate change. Third, the voluntary carbon markets do not have 
coercive enforcement, which make it a better indicator to understand the corporate 
motivation. As a result, voluntary carbon markets actually reflect a signal of corporate 
preference to financing for specific types of projects and support specific co-benefits, 
because companies are facing a more complex situation compared to just avoid producing 
carbon.  
In voluntary carbon markets, buyers (for example, companies) are largely motived by their 
social responsibility and concerns about climate change to reduce their emission (Anja, 
2007; Goldstein, 2016). However, there is limited literature addressing corporate 
motivations for investing in offset projects voluntarily or how companies prioritize local 
co-benefits in their decisions to invest in carbon offsets.  
Motivations for offsetting are profiled for collective decisions from companies and 
individual decisions from regular consumers, mainly in the sector of passenger 
transportation, such as airlines. 
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With the potential growth in international aviation in the coming years, studies on co-
benefits and customers’ willingness to pay for these offset carbon credits become urgent 
(Araghi et al., 2016; Blasch, 2013; Hinnen et al., 2017; Jou and Chen, 2015; MacKerron et 
al., 2009). Studies of offset purchases in the aviation sector shows that there may be 
substantial consumer WTP in the aviation sector through revealed and stated choice (Choi 
and Ritchie, 2014; MacKerron et al., 2009; Roberts et al., 2018). Some airline passengers 
are even willing to pay substantially more for certified offsets, which manifests the value 
of certification of these carbon offsets, and underlines the importance of market-existing 
co-benefits standards, such as Gold Standard, Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), etc. 
Research on motivations for offsetting at corporate level can be categories into two groups. 
The first group of studies focus on the motivations for offset investments by major players 
in the voluntary offset markets, such as private companies, governments, offset project 
developers, etc. The most common methodologies used in these studies are surveys and 
interviews. Through market surveys, general motivations for offset investments are 
discussed, and a list of diverse motivations are revealed from the analysis of the survey 
responses.  
There are also two attributes of motivations discussed in aligned with the multi-stage 
decision process. The first attribute of motivations is studied from the perspective of 
reducing GHG emissions and the second attribute of motivations is discussed beyond 
emission reductions. 
Anderson and Bernauer studying corporate motivation through interviews and online 
surveys found that if only from reducing GHG emissions’ perspectives, companies were 
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motivated by the economic efficiency offset projects, which deliver cheaper carbon credits 
at a lower cost (Anderson and Bernauer, 2016). The ecosystem Marketplace conducts an 
annual series market surveys with a focus on corporate voluntary carbon offset activities 
using the CDP database. They found that offsetting investments primarily served the 
purpose of companies choosing to meet a voluntary emission reduction target. Beyond that, 
it could also help companies to derive value from their offset portfolio through offset 
purchases. Especially when companies were looking to bring in “beyond climate” benefits, 
such as co-benefits to the society. (Goldstein, 2016, 2015). 
Lovell et al. identified three narratives to explain why offset organizations purchase 
voluntary offset credits: “quick fix for the planet” is based on the science of climate change, 
“global-local” connections focus on side benefits, and “avoiding the unavoidable” is based 
on drivers of increasing greenhouse gases (Lovell et al., 2009). Two of the three 
motivations are derived from the logic of emission reductions.  
International Carbon Reduction & Offset Alliance (ICROA) also conducted market 
surveys by working with a group of selected universities. They found that 94 percent of 
respondents felt that organizations should voluntarily reduce their GHG emissions. Beyond 
that, they also found that companies engaged in offset investments for a variety of other 
reasons, including sense of responsibility, reputation, market differentiation, and risk 
management. Among all these reasons, “a sense of responsibility” was ranked by most to 
be their primary motivation for offsetting. (ICROA and Imperial College, 2016, 2014; 
ICROA and University of Bristol, 2015) 
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Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace conducted another series of annual surveys, 
collecting data from offset project developers, wholesalers, brokers, and retailers. Over 13 
years, they found that the main motivations for offset purchases are corporate social 
responsibility and combating climate change. Additionally, they agreed that “offset buyers 
have varied motivations and preferences when it comes to choosing the projects or portfolio 
of projects they buy from.” They found these motivations for offsetting were as varied as 
the buyers themselves over the years (Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace, 2019; 
Goldstein and Hamrick, 2015; Hamrick, 2017, 2016; Hamrick and Gallant, 2018). For 
example, the survey conducted right before the Paris Agreement showed that 
“demonstrating climate leadership with industry” ranked as the top reason for offsetting. 
Although, their studies of corporate motivations relied on the secondary information from 
project providers, not from companies directly, they still provide a useful insight into 
corporate motivations.  
Carbon offsetting has the potential to contribute to a range of side benefits that meet the 
demand for corporate social responsibility. A number of studies in the literature have 
investigated companies using voluntary carbon offset projects to deliver certain sustainable 
development benefits, beyond the general motivation. They identified this phenomena as a 
sustainability sweet spot, where business interest overlap with environmental and social 
interests (Bergqvist and Lindgren, 2014; Savitz and Weber, 2014). Co-benefits were used 
to add value in areas such as branding, public relations (Bayon et al., 2009), and corporate 
reputation (Pohl and Tolhurst, 2012; Tolhurst and Embaye, 2010). Additionally, some 
companies were willing to pay an additional premium for independent verification of the 
co-benefits derived from activities generating emissions offsets (ICROA and Imperial 
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College, 2014). Another study conducted interviews among one carbon offset consulting 
firm with four of its customers, and it provided great insights into the “sustainability sweet 
spot”. However, the data limitation constrained them from drawing a broader conclusion 
on the motivations of these corporate buyers (Bergqvist and Lindgren, 2014). 
However, literature derived from market surveys (such as the annual survey conducted by 
the forest trend) has its own limitations. Conclusions from these surveys are very scattered 
and lack a systematical structure due to lack of first-hand responses from companies 
actually purchasing the offsets. There is no research systematically studying corporate 
motivations of offset investment, and deciding across different project options, and no 
evidence can be found in terms of which factors determine corporate willingness to pay for 
carbon offsets. Thus, there is an extensive large gap in what motivates companies to 
purchase offsets.  
To fill the gap in literature, this research on corporate motivations attempts to: (1) Utilize 
secondary data from corporate CSR reports and combine it with data from the CDP Climate 
Change Questionnaire. This study seeks to fill a gap in the corporate responsibility strategy 
research and provide insight into why corporates purchase carbon offset credits voluntarily. 
(2) It looks at the interface between the strategies for reducing emissions that corporates 
emphasize in CSR reports and their carbon offset activities. (3) Using a mixed-method 
approach, contrast to the qualitative method in the conventional studies of motivations.  
Despite limited research from the literature and growing academic and practitioner 
attention to the co-benefits of climate investment, several foundational issues remain 
unaddressed. Challenges include the lack of research on the topic of interplay between 
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motivations and co-benefits. This study aims to fill these gaps in the literature by examining 
our research question.  
Furthermore, emission offsets have two embedded features when they are traded in the 
form of carbon credits. First, carbon offsets are a commercial good that can be purchased 
in the voluntary carbon markets. Consumer behavior can play an important role in the 
purchasing process. Second, carbon offsets are also an uncommon intangible good, which 
means that consumer behavior differs from behavior in relation to conventional goods 
under certain circumstances. Due to the dual features of carbon offsets, I developed our 
hypotheses as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Companies whose primary motivation is to cut emissions will prioritize 
purchasing cost-effective offset projects (cheaper projects at a lower cost).  
Hypothesis 2: Companies whose primary motivations arise from non-emissions-related 
impacts (i.e., company values, company market competitiveness) place a higher value on 
co-benefits, and they are willing to pay a premium on the standard offset price to achieve 
these impacts. 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1. Operationalizing the Research Question. 
Corporate investment decisions on the purchase of emissions offsets from the voluntary 
markets are private and not subject to disclosure to governments or the public. Thus, it is 
always challenging to understand why corporates do what they do. Discussions over the 
decision making are not documented nor are they accessible for public review. Due to 
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privacy considerations, the price information for projects is admittedly a big factor in 
decisions and could be the only determining factor for all we know. It is likely that offset 
purchasing decisions are multi-stage within a corporate entity (Bergqvist and Lindgren, 
2014), involving different levels of hierarchy and different offices. But we don’t have 
visibility into that process. 
However, I do have some options on how to conduct this research. I am able to gain some 
insight via companies’ published CSR reports, and self-reported data (from CDP). Many 
companies publish annual CSR reports in order to communicate the activities and strategies 
being used to address social and environmental issues. These reports are often referred to 
as sustainability reports. They normally serve as a “barometer” of a company’s attitudes 
toward social and environmental responsibility, strategic planning, and the level of 
integration in the corporate’s business strategic plans (Tate et al., 2010). Additionally, CDP, 
acting as a not-for-profit organization, has requested that the largest corporates globally to 
participate an standard annual questionnaire (Ben-Amar and McIlkenny, 2015). 
Companies reported their emissions and strategies to address climate change directly 
through the questionnaire, including the information on offset projects they invested in 
during the reporting year. I believe both pieces of information can provide a practical 
window into studying the interplay between corporate motivations and decisions on offset 
purchases. 
There are many ways of studying corporate motivations, such as interviews, social media, 
or corporate communications. I chose to use corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports 
as my primary research sources for the following reasons. First, CSR reports per se are one 
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kind of corporate communication, where I am able to hear the voice of the companies to 
their internal and external audiences.  Second, purchasing voluntary carbon credits is part 
of corporates’ CSR strategy. As a result, using CSR reports as the secondary sources will 
serve our research interests, since the intention of studying the corporates’ purchasing 
behavior of voluntary carbon credits is their motivation, instead of what have they done. 
Despite interest from both academicians and practitioners, there is limited research to 
understand how corporates communicate carbon offsets and emission reductions through 
CSR reports. Furthermore, there is rarely published research exploring how companies 
position CSR reports as a way to voluntarily commit to reduce carbon emissions. CSR 
reports can be used as a rich source of secondary data to better understand corporate 
motivations, intentions, strategies, and activities of carbon offsets behavior, as well as the 
results of corporate social and environmental responsibility at the corporate level. 
3.2. Data  
As a multi-stage process, studying offset purchasing decisions requires us to have a dataset 
with settings that explain the process. This study has been conducted using a 
comprehensive dataset compiled by the author from different data sources. The dataset 
includes corporate offset investment decisions49 and the offset projects they purchased. I 
constructed the primary dataset using corporate CSR reports and the CDP Climate Change 
 
49 The information I extract from corporate CSR reports describes how and why companies purchase 
offsets, and for what purposes in particular. As a result, this information is not just the outcome of the 
decision process, but actually reflects the actually decision process. 
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Questionnaire. I also put considerable effort into composing data of corporate 
characteristics and sectoral data from the Bloomberg Company Profile. 
Company selection. This research focused on companies that have engaged in carbon 
offsets activities. Companies were first identified from the CDP Climate Change 
Questionnaire 2018, Question C11.2 and C11.2a.50 I got 414 candidates from this effort. I 
then filtered out those companies purchasing offset credits to meet the requirements of a 
compliance regime or acting as the originators51 of carbon offsets. This left me with a group 
of 306 companies total. 
CSR reports. Once the target set of corporates were identified, I verified the availability 
of the CSR reports (free-standing or published jointly with annual reports) using the 
Corporate Register 52  and the Sustainability Disclosure Database. 53  After the list of 
companies was finalized, the most recent CSR report was downloaded from 
corporateregister.com or directly from the companies’ websites. Finally, I obtained 306 
CSR/sustainability reports and corporate annual reports. However, after having reviewed 
all 306 reports, only 186 reports were retained in the final sample. I had to drop 120 
companies from my sample because their CSR report didn’t mention any related 
 
50 C11.2 asks companies to answer the question of “Has your organization originated or purchased any 
project-based carbon credits within the reporting period?”. C11.2a asks companies to provide details of the 
project-based carbon credits originated or purchased by their organization in the reporting period. 
51 Originators of carbon offsets are those companies who produce offset credits.  
52 The Corporate Register is the global online directory of corporate responsibility reports, including tens of 
thousands of reports past and present. More information can be found at: 
https://www.corporateregister.com/. 
53 The Sustainability Disclosure Database is a free online database that provides users with all types of 
sustainability reports. More information can be found at: https://database.globalreporting.org/. 
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information about purchasing carbon offsets. A detailed comparison table between these 
two groups can be found in appendix Table B 4-1. 
Sectoral data: These companies were then classified by industry using the Bloomberg 
Industry Classification Systems (BICS). Additionally, corporate characteristic information, 
such as headquarters location, primary working currency, number of employees, annual 
revenue, net income, total assets, operating, and investing, was also obtained from 
Bloomberg Company Profile 2018. 
Project characteristics: Within 186 corporates, I identified from the CDP data 534 
projects executed in 28 countries, 12 sectors, 39 industries, and 73 sub-industries. I 
presented the distribution of project types aggregated at country or regional level in Figure 
4-2. These 534 projects accounted for 16.2 MtCO2e, which is about one third of the total 






54 In 2017 and 2018 the total volume of transaction in the voluntary market is 46.2 MtCO2e and 98.4 
MtCO2e respectively (Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace, 2019). 
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Figure 4-2. Distribution of project types by project locations. Different project types happen in different place. That tells us that there 
may be gaps in the types of benefits accruing in places that need them. 
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Table 4-1 lists the descriptive statistics of the 186 companies in our dataset. In aggregate, 
these companies represent $3.5 trillion in revenue, and $0.4 trillion in profits, $3.1 trillion 
in total assets, and a workforce of 9 million people worldwide. When I compared the data 
to the list of global Fortune 500,55 these 186 companies represent one third of the value 
created by the Fortune 500 companies in the year of 2018. In conclusion, companies in our 
sample are quite significant offset buyers, and they can be a representative sample to study 
corporate investment decisions.  
Table 4-1. Descriptive statistics of the 186 companies. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
EMPLOYEES 186 48,391.32 76,127.74 0 540,779 
Annual Revenue 186 18,974.62 25,908.28 0 146,537.3 
Net Income 186 2,104.588 4,691.6 -6,837 39,240 
Total Assets 186 17,1053.3 398,532.6 0 2,622,001 
Operating 186 3,100.763 9,636.763 -36,241.36 71,884.71 
Investing 186 -3,501.9 16,270.41 -197,993 12,121.2 
Data source: Bloomberg Company Profile 2018 
Units: USD in millions 
 
3.3. Methods  
3.3.1. “Mixed Methods” Research   
Methodologically, I adopted the mixed-method research design by combining the inputs of 
corporate’s CSR reports, and CDP offsets projects to assess the underlying motivations and 
decisions for corporates to invest in offset projects. “Mixed methods” is a research 
approach of using both quantitative and qualitative data collectively within the same study 
to conduct analysis (Creswell and Clark, 2017; Shorten and Smith, 2017). The essential 
 
55 In 2018, Fortune 500 companies represent two-thirds of the U.S. GDP with $12.8 trillion in revenues, 
$1.0 trillion in profits, $21.6 trillion in market value, and employ 28.2 million people worldwide 
(https://fortune.com/fortune500/2018/).  
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element of this method is data linkage, or data integration at an appropriate stage (Ivankova 
et al., 2006; Shorten and Smith, 2017).  
This paper fulfills the precondition of data linkage and data integration. First, there was a 
natural linkage between the CSR reports and the CDP Climate Change Questionnaire. They 
were the same groups of companies reporting different aspects of the offset investment to 
different audiences and stakeholders. As a result, corporate-level data was constructed from 
the CSR reports studying the motivations of investment behavior through a defined coding 
strategy. Meanwhile, the project-level data was extracted from the self-reported CDP data 
to study the project-specific issues. Second, the two sets of data were integrated into Nvivo 
1256 through the “case” function. In this function, each individual company was treated as 
one “case” in the software. It allows me to study the interaction between the specific 
motivations and specific project characteristics.57  Additionally, sectoral data from the 
Bloomberg Company Profile and the Bloomberg Industry Classification Systems (BICS) 
is applied to study corporate aggregated behavior. In conclusion, qualitative data was 
collected and analyzed first, then quantitative data was collected and used to test findings 
empirically.  
3.3.2. Coding Strategy  
 
The first part of my study focuses on underlying motivations behind corporate offset 
investment behavior, and I have chosen to do a qualitative study using the content analysis. 
 
56 Nvivo is a qualitative data analysis (QDA) computer software package produced by QSR International. 
Primarily, it is designed for qualitative analysis, but the additional “case” function enables researchers to 
conduct mixed-methods research. 
57 In this circumstance, corporate CSR reports act as interviews, and CDP data acts like survey responses. I 
combined these two datasets based on individual corporate. 
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Content analysis is a common method used in qualitative analysis, which comprises a set 
of methods for systematically coding and analyzing qualitative data for examining trends 
and patterns in documents (Goldstein et al., 2019; Stemler, 2001). Originally taken from 
the consumer behavior and marketing field, this approach was later widely adopted in the 
social and anthropology field (Kolbe and Burnett, 1991). Recently, content analysis has 
been used in several studies that examined corporate environmental and social disclosures, 
as well as corporate risk disclosures (Goldstein et al., 2019). 
I conducted the content analysis of the 186 CSR reports by using a coding strategy to 
extract corporate motivations for offset investment. To create the coding strategy, I first 
compiled a wide-ranging set of motivations (I called them metrics in our coding strategy) 
based on the literature. I began with a deductive content analysis of a pilot study of 20 
companies to see whether motivations from the pilot study were closely aligned with those 
from the literature. I found that most of these motivations would fit under the list I compiled, 
whereas one motivation that relates to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) was not on 
the list. I agreed that the motivation of supporting SDGs, although not mentioned in the 
literature, was an essential piece that can perhaps describe the current trend of corporate 
motivations. Thus, I added it to the coding strategy. Later on, when reviewing the CRS 
reports from the pilot sample, I started to see these motivations could be aggregated into 
three main themes to describe the underlying motivations behind corporate investment 
behavior. As a result, I identified three main themes of motivations, namely “company 
carbon management and efficiency,” “company values,” and “company market 
competitiveness.” At this point, the preliminary coding strategy was eventually defined as 
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in Table 4-2. Once the coding strategy was defined, the coding was applied to the full 
sample. I made small revisions during the coding process. 
By using the technique of content analysis, I am able to create a realm of research 
opportunities to access the frequency with which companies undertake different 
motivations and sub-motivations to invest in offset projects. I am also able to understand 
corporate strategies to enhance the quality and impacts of the projects that they have 
invested in.
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Table 4-2. Coding Strategy. 




Carbon management strategy Carbon emission reduction strategy  Offset as one of important pillars of the whole strategy  Tolhurst and Embaye 2010, Goldstein 
2016 
Corporate voluntary mitigation 
commitment  
Carbon neutrality  Offset as one of the strategies for fulfil carbon neutrality Goldstein 2015 
Meeting a voluntarily established 
emissions reductions target/goal 
Corporates aim to cut emissions by a certain percentage 
below a baseline year, or Corporates aim to cut emissions 
per a certain unit of output, such as electricity per kWh 
of generated, or products produced 
Goldstein 2016, 2015 





Unavoidable emissions  The most cost-effective way, because these emissions are 
difficult to reduce (offsets are a way to neutralize the 
carbon footprint of a product after exhausting all other 
means of cutting emissions) 
Anderson and Bernauer 2016, OCROA 
and Imperial College 2014, Goldstein 
2015, Zeppel and Beaumont 2013 
Corporate Market 
Competitiveness 
Global-local connection Key regions for business  Invest in projects in the areas where corporates operate, 
obtain raw material, conduct business or have strategic 
partners.  
Lovell et at. 2009 
Reputation/brand image/Market 
differentiation  
Customer awareness (public-facing 
programs) 
"Linking carbon credits with customer purchase, which 
encourage customer action (Offset buyers commonly 
engage their customers or employees in their programs in 
order to reap the reputational benefits they hope will be 
associated with a proactive stance on climate change.)" 
OCROA and Imperial College 2014, 
Goldstein 2016, 2015 
Reputational risks from customers 
and stakeholders  
Pressure from clients, employees, shareholders, and 
customers to be on the “right side” of climate change and 
to take proactive, voluntary action even in absence of 
carbon regulation. 
Goldstein 2016, 2015 
Uniqueness By offsetting, corporates can differentiate themselves 
from their competitive in this industry as a market 
branding strategy 
Author's own expertise 
Bayon 2009 
Corporate Values Corporate culture Internal and external communication Employee communication and stakeholder engagement Bayon 2009 
Supporting SDG goals   Supporting SDG goals Achieve SDGs along with carbon neutrality Author's own expertise 
Philanthropy Philanthropy Donate carbon credits to other parties or donate money in 
investing carbon offset projects 
OCROA and Imperial College 2014 
Sense of "responsibilities" 
(environmental sustainability) 
Business impact on the local 
community  
Business areas that affect the environment (climate 
risks), Risk mitigation 
OCROA and Imperial College 2016; 
Bergqvist and Lindgren 2014, Zeppel 
and Beaumont 2013 
Supporting vulnerable regions Invest projects that benefit vulnerable populations or 
communities 
OCROA and Imperial College 2016; 
Bergqvist and Lindgren 2014, Zeppel 




4.1. Corporate Motivation Results: Aggregated Results for All Companies  
 
The primary objective of our qualitative analysis is to determine the underlying motivations 
behind corporate offset investment decisions. Through the coding strategy, I am able to 
identify 14 indicators, nine metrics, and three primary motivations. I present the results in 
Figure 4-3. I will go over each motivation in detail in this section.  
Motivation 1: Company carbon management and efficiency. 155 companies investing 
in carbon offsets have treated offsets as an effective way to cut carbon emissions and meet 
their voluntary mitigation commitments. The number of companies acting on this 
motivation was expected to be higher compared to the other two motivations. Because it 
confirms the relevance of motivations for the environmentally responsible actions 
described in the literature (Anderson and Bernauer, 2016; Goldstein, 2016; Goldstein and 
Hamrick, 2015; ICROA and Imperial College, 2016, 2016; ICROA and University of 
Bristol, 2015; Lovell et al., 2009). Although there is large variability in using offset credits 
to neutralize a corporate’s carbon emissions at scale or from the scope, the primary purpose 
is to meet the voluntarily established emission reduction targets set by these companies, 
followed by the purposes of efficiency and carbon management. 
With the recognition that human activities drive global warming, more and more 
companies have pursued a voluntary commitment to curb the carbon emissions that result 
their business activities. A key component of their commitments for most of this period 
has been to become carbon neutral through carbon offset projects. Companies seem to have 
moved beyond the general commitment to cutting emissions into more concrete discussions 
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about how to use carbon management strategies to cut emissions in a more efficient way 
under a given set of technological and resource limitations, as described in many of the 
corporate CSR reports. Carbon offsets normally serve as the last step in the carbon 
management strategy. 
Some issues remain surrounding the corporate commitment of carbon neutrality, such as 
whether they are ambitious enough, or whether they represent real carbon neutrality at the 
company level, value chain level, or just only a very small portion of the total emissions. 
But this kind of discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. The main message from this 
motivation is clear, which is that emissions offsets can be used to cut emissions further 
after cost-effective internal efforts have been exhausted. 
Motivation 2: Company market competitiveness. Approximately 60 companies use 
offset projects as a branding tool to gain a competitive advantage in the market and bring 
their global and local markets into closer alignment. In brief, companies in this group 
invested in carbon offsets as a branding strategy to interact with their customers and as an 
outreach strategy to engage their strategic partners in their value chain. As a branding 
strategy, most of the companies are from the following sectors: consumer discretionary, 
industrials, financials, utilities, and technology. Especially for the companies whose 
primary business activities are passenger transportation, transportation, and logistics, 
followed by retail, software, and home and office products, their investing in offset projects 
can increase their customers’ awareness of the impact of climate change. Thus, shifting 
corporate brand and marketing to climate positive products will engage consumers to be 
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part of the agents of solution actively (New Climate Economy, 2018). The detailed 
distribution based on sector and industry can be found in Figure B 4-3 in Appendix B. 
Advertising the offset activities enabled these companies to be strong competitors by 
introducing a public-facing carbon offset program to their customers or launching an 
ambitious offset purchasing plan in their local market at the upstream or downstream end 
of the value chain. An example of advertising for local markets in the upstream sector of 
the value chain was the Tiffany & Co., an American luxury jewelry and specialty retailer, 
which: 
invested in carbon offsets from Kenya’s Chyulu Hills to help meet our climate goals 
and promote sustainable development in an area of the world where we source 
colored gemstones and where we support wildlife conservation (Tiffany & Co., 
2017).  
Example of both upstream and downstream value chain advertising was Marui Group Co., 
Ltd, a Japanese retail company, indicated that:  
Since 2014, we have been conducting carbon offset initiatives in disaster-stricken 
areas as well as in the areas that produce material for our shoes, the areas in which 
we open new stores, and other areas that benefit local customers”(Marui Group Co., 
Ltd., 2017). 
Motivation 3: Company values. There are 59 companies in our sample that claimed to 
have invested in carbon offsets in order to enhance and live out their corporate values. The 
ability to deliver on company values through offset investment relies on the following four 
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pillars: supporting SDGs, taking the responsibilities, strengthening public relations, and 
committing to philanthropy. The first three of these pillars had 25, 24, and 22 companies 
undertaking the claims, whereas the latter one only had three companies.   
Under the pillar of public relations, companies used carbon offsets to serve the two key 
functions: effective employee communication and stakeholder engagement to raise their 
awareness of the environmental impact within the whole company: 
To raise employee awareness of the environmental impact of business travel, 
Cogeco Connexion voluntarily purchased carbon offsets corresponding to the 
GHG emissions resulting from business travel in fiscal 2016 and 2017—a total of 
584 metric tons.”(Cogeco Inc., 2018) 
The impact of climate change increasingly becomes a clear threat to corporate development 
and their core value of contributing to society and demonstrating corporate social 
responsibility. The pillar of taking “responsibility” through investing in carbon offset 
project, such as supporting vulnerable regions as a result of global climate impact, or local 
communities as a result of corporate local business operations, helping to address the 
aforementioned concerns at scale. Companies became active in identifying offset projects 
for addressing their corporate values and are instrumental in linking co-benefits from 
projects to local communities. Examples can be found: 
The selection of these projects took into account the fact that they were located 
near the Pelotas Road Pole, which was admitted by Ecosul, a major 
concessionaire of the Ecorodovias Group, the main channel for the disposal of 
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commodities produced in Rio Grande do Sul to the port of Rio Grande” 
(EcoRodovias Infraestrutura e Logística SA, 2019). 
Overall, the motivation to engage in carbon management and efficiency is often driven by 
a belief that market-based solutions can be practical in addressing environmental problems. 
The motivations to engage in company values and market competitiveness are often 




Figure 4-3. Three motivations by counts among corporates (based on case). Our data covers a total 186 companies. 155 companies investing 
in carbon offsets have treated offsets as an effective way to cut carbon emissions and meet their voluntary mitigation commitments. 60 
companies using offset projects as a branding tool to gain a competitive advantage in the market and bring their global and local markets 
closer. 59 companies have invested in carbon offsets to enhance and live out their corporate values.
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4.2. Motivations and Purchasing Behaviors are Linked with Local Co-benefits 
Co-benefits can be viewed as the value proposition of offset projects. If motivation 1 for 
investing a carbon offset project is primarily to drive carbon reductions, then motivation 2 
and motivation 3 as the secondary motivations are to finance some form of value creation. 
My strategy to explore the value proposition is a three-fold effort. First, I look at the 
corporate-level data and evaluate how companies committed to contribute to the local 
communities by the realization of a variety of co-benefits indicated in their CSR reports. 
Second, I conduct analytic virtualization to explore the project-level data and examine the 
role of local co-benefits played in this domain. Third, I connect the corporate commitment 
and project-level data to validate the value proposition of offset projects through corporate 
motivations. 
4.2.1. Corporate Commitment  
In this section, my primary goal is to study corporate commitment to delivering on co-
benefits generated from offset projects in local communities. Companies make their offset 
investment decisions and deliver benefits of these projects based through several channels: 
by establishing rigorous criteria for project selection, by choosing the focus of the projects, 
and by looking at specific benefits of that project. 
4.2.1.1. Corporate Criteria for Project Selection 
Figure 4-4 lists the criteria for project selection cited from corporate CSR reports. Among 
all the criteria mentioned by companies, benefitting local communities is ranked as the first 
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criterion, followed by the quality of the offset certificates. Additionality and location got 
the same ranking by counts. Moreover, four companies emphasized their commitment to 
using offset projects to bring a positive impact to poor rural communities.   
Criteria for project selection is used in a targeted manner to spur the offset investment flow 
towards the course as companies expected. It is the first step after the general offset 
decision was made. Figure 4-4 clearly states that the constructive role of local co-benefits 
can play in bringing out the corporate vision towards the offset projects. 
 
 
Figure 4-4. Corporate carbon offset criteria for project selection. Benefitting local 
communities is the most mentioned criterion. (Based on 47 companies) 
4.2.1.2. Focus of Projects (“Local” vs “General”) 
Community-based projects were heavily weighted in the frequency count compared to the 
commercial-based projects when companies described their preferences of project focus. 
37 companies mentioned 43 times that their offset projects were community-based, while 



















4-5). The word “community” was central to the reason companies gave for their preference 
in the focus of investing offset projects. 
 
Figure 4-5. Focus of offset projects. Community-based projects were heavily 
weighted in the frequency count compared to the commercial-based projects when 
companies described their preferences of project focus. 
 
The majority of companies focused on describing specific benefits that offset projects can 
bring into the local communities. A variety of co-benefits were mentioned 103 times by 57 
companies, compared to 27 companies used the general term such as social, economic or 
environmental benefits (see Figure 4-6). Specific benefits, instead of the general benefits, 
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Figure 4-6. Number of companies describing "general" benefits or "specific" 
benefits. The majority of companies were focusing on describing specific benefits 
that offset projects can bring into the local communities. 
4.2.1.3. Preference of Specific Co-benefits  
 
Companies depicted various expected benefits of the project in CSR reports. I plotted the 
results in Figure 4-7. Improved quality of life was the leading descriptor for how 
companies expected their investment of offset projects to contribute to local communities 
and bring real impact to society. Other benefits that were heavily weighted in the frequency 
count included (in order of frequency): improved health, local job creation, improved 
biodiversity, prevention of deforestation, education, access cleaning energy, gender 
equality, cleaner air, etc. This list of specific co-benefits covered a wide range of 










Social, economic and environment
Local communities
Specific co-benefits
General benefits vs specific co-benefits
By Reference By Case
 150 
 
Figure 4-7. Specific benefits mentioned by companies. Improved quality of life 
was the leading descriptor for how companies expected their investment of offset 
projects to contribute to the local communities and brings real impact to society. 
(The total number of companies mentioned specific co-benefits are 57 companies 
with 209 references from NVivo.) 
 
Overall, I noticed that companies mentioned quite frequently the focus on the project with 
its associated benefits in the local dimension. Their perspectives reflected a range of 
consentient from companies being responsive to a positive impact from offset investment. 
These aforementioned findings might be more indicative of the role of co-benefits in 
general within companies. 
4.2.2. Projects’ Perspective of Co-benefits in Local Communities 
In this section, my focus is to explore the interplay of co-benefits and local communities 
by using data from the projects’ level. I adopted two visual analytic approaches in this 
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I enhanced the breadth of our findings by looking at data horizontally. Compared to other 
words used in project narratives, I explored how frequently “local” showed up and at what 
scale using a “word cloud” tool. I further developed the depth of our findings by focusing 
on the content surrounding the “local” and see how “local” penetrated to the project context 
vertically by the “word tree” tool. 
4.2.2.1.  “Local” Showed Up More Than Expected 
I utilized the data visualization tool to help us explore the words most frequently used by 
corporates to report purchased offset projects to the CDP (survey response). A word 
frequency counts documented over 534 project narratives, and the term “local” played a 
relatively big role in narratives about projects,58 as shown in Figure 4-8. This could be 
seen as quite significant relating to the local impact from offset projects because companies 
appeared to be impact-driven decision-makers that outlined the linkage between the project 




58 Although “local” ranked as the 14th among the 100 most frequent words, it is the first adjective word 
showed up in the list.  
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Figure 4-8. Word cloud based on NVivo analysis of CDP project description. 
“Local” plays a big role in narratives about projects. The word “local” was 
mentioned 79 times, ranked as the 14th among the 100 most frequent words.  
 
4.2.2.2. “Local” Context and Dimensions  
I used another data visualization tool, “word tree” to analyze word or word combinations 
in their respective contexts. A full list of the results can be found in Figure B 4-7. The 
results show that “local” had many links to community concepts, with projects described 
many dimensions of “local” benefits. Because a word tree often follows or precedes a target 
word, which is “local” in my study. I summarized the information from the complex figure 
into a three-category table in Table 4-3, with each column to elaborate our main argument 
as below.  
The links to community concepts can be traced through a group of beneficiaries that follow 
our target word. Among all the beneficiaries, community/communities were the two most 
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cited words, accounted for one-third of the group of beneficiaries. Vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups, such as small landholders, farmers, women, etc., were also 
emphasized in the project narrative. This case illustrated the crucial role of rooting projects 
with the local circumstance. 
The dimensions of “local” benefits from the projects were presented directly in the middle 
column of the table. These benefits also followed my targeted word directly. Among these 
benefits, job creation was the most mentioned benefit, followed by an improved 
environment and biodiversity. By closely linking a variety of co-benefits to the local 
circumstance, benefits became self-described as being given the local benefits. 
Finally, benefits should be delivered to the beneficiaries through the action word, which 
normally preceded the targeted word. The right column of the table listed all the words that 
preceded the word “local.” These words factored in the positive effects of the projects and 








Table 4-3. Key summaries of the word tree. Words in the first two columns are sorted 
from largest to smallest based on the counts of how many times that word appears in the 
word tree. While action words are ordered alphabetically. 












































4.2.3. Role of Project Benefits for Serving Specific Corporate Motivations 
The limitation of visualization analysis in the previous section is that it can tell me what 
the projects were relevant for (both from horizontally and vertically) but does not tell me 
about outcomes. Thus, I need to close the gap by linking what the companies committed to 
doing, and whether the intended outcomes resulted from the actions taken.  
One of the advantages of using mixed methods is the embedded linkage between my two 
datasets. By linking corporate commitment from the CSR report, to the projects’ 
characteristics from the CDP data, I can validate the outcome from offset investment to 
some extent. 
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4.2.3.1. Going Beyond SDG 13 
One of the levels of motivation 3 is supporting UN SDGs through offset investments. In 
this level, I found 25 companies made commitments in their CSR reports to support a 
variety of SDGs. I grouped these 25 companies and their supporting SDGs into two figures 
based on the number of SDGs and examined the interplay between the number of SDGs 
and co-benefits. The results are plotted in Figure 4-9.  
In general, the most common SDG that companies used offsets for is SDG 13, “taking 
urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.” With companies committing to 
more SDGs, the benefits of supporting SDGs were increasing from the description of these 
companies. 
The rationale behind the analysis follows a two-pronged approach. In group one Figure 
4-9 (a), I was looking at companies that only supported one or two SDGs, where the 
common SDG was SDG 13. Six out of 12 companies claimed that their purchasing offset 
credits were to support SDG 13, and seven companies supported the other two SDGs, 
which are SDG 7 or SDG 12. The second group Figure 4-9 (b) shows companies that 
hosted a higher number of SDGs than the first group, where SDG 13 worked in unison with 
the other SDGs to develop a joint strategy to generate more co-benefits from offset projects. 
Implementing SDG 13 in concert with contributing to the other SDGs by companies to use 
a specific group SDGs for offset project offered the potential to tap a source of corporates 
for achieving the company values. Taking Koninklijke Philips NV for example, a health 
technology company focusing on improving people’s health used offset investment to 
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support SDG 3 (“Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”) and SDG 
12 (“Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns”): 
In 2017, we kicked off our carbon neutrality program by compensating 220 
kilotonnes of carbon emissions. In 2018, we increased this to 330 kilotonnes, 
equivalent to the annual uptake of approximately 9 million medium-sized oak trees. 
This covers the total emissions of our direct emissions in our sites, all our business 
travel emissions and all our ocean and parcel shipments within logistics. We do so 
by financing carbon reduction projects in emerging regions that have a strong link 
with SDG 3 and SDG 12. (Koninklijke Philips NV, 2019) 
S&P Global used SDGs to accomplish its CR priority, which was women entrepreneurs: 
 
Launched in 2017, the initiative reduces our operational climate footprint while 
funding projects that align with our CR priorities to Promote Sustainability and to 
Support Women Entrepreneurs (S&P Global, 2018). 
Figure 4-9 (b) shows companies from the industrial sector spoke more frequently about 
using the offset investment to contribute to SDG13, while the financial sector had a higher 
number of companies in using offsets to contribute to SDG 13, SDG 12, and SDG 7. 
Sectors, such as technology, consumer discretionary (mainly passenger transportation, 
such as airlines), and consumer staples spoke most frequently about covering multiple 
SDGs from investing offset projects.
 157 
      
                                                  (a)                                                                                                        (b) 
                                     
                                          (c)                                                                                                         (d) 
Figure 4-9. Supporting SDGs through carbon offsets. Corporates use offsets to contribute to the UN SDGs. The most common 
SDG is SDG 13. With corporates contributes more SDGs, the benefits from supporting SDGs are increasing from the description 
of these corporates. 
CTT: Focused on the Eco portfolio by offsets 
the carbon footprint of  Express and “Green” 
Mail offer
WPP Group: We support the 
development of renewable energy 
generation in Brazil, China, India and 
Indonesia through our carbon offset 
projects. 








Ecorodovias Infraestrutura e 
Logística S.A:  acts to cope 
with climate change and 
assume its climate 
responsibility by offsetting its 
GHG emissions.
IGM Financial Inc.: 
Purchasing green fuel and 
carbon offsets, further 
reducing the impact of 
commercial air travel 
Arcadis: Offset projects can 
compensate the remaining 
CO2 emissions to become 
truly carbon neutral and aim 
for reduction 
Aviva plc: Take urgent action to 
combat climate change and its 
impacts through our approach 
to carbon offsetting.
SDG 7, SDG 13 SDG 12, SDG 13
CaixaBank: carbon offsets is one of the 
pillars of environmental responsibility 
which contribute to the two SDGs.
Royal Wessanen NV: >95% of our sales will be 
vegetarian products carbon-neutral by 2025 
State Street Corporation: We have focused on 
five specific SDGs where we believe we can make 
a significant impact, of which two SDGs can be 
realized through the offset projects
Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group: Maintain our net zero carbon 
status through a combination of reduction 




Air France: purchase GS projects, 
because it can make sure 
purchased projects meet at least 
two SDGs, and also local 
communities. 
Eni SpA: The forestry projects will 
create new jobs, favoring local 
development, which in line with 
the national development plans an 
the UN 2030 Agenda
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer: 
We have gone beyond ‘business 
as usual’, using carbon finance 
projects to drive more 
substantial change. 
MetLife: Supports third-party 
certified carbon-reduction 
projects that empower local 
economies and align with the 
United Nations’ Sustainable 
Development Goals
Microsoft:  investing in 
community projects
Natura Cosmeticos SA: A variety 
of projects were selected through 
the initiative which covers 
generating renewable energy, 
promoting conservation in the 
Amazon and the adoption of 
sustainable technologies among 
rural populations
Proximus: These projects were also selected 
because they contribute to several Sustainable 
Development Goals
Bpost: invested in GS 
projects which will 
contribute to these SDGs
Worldline: SDGs provide an 
additional perspective that allows 
Worldline to select projects 
internally or externally taking into 
account these global social, 
economic and environmental 
challenges and evaluating their 
benefits
Koninklijke Philips NV:
financing carbon reduction 
projects in emerging regions 
that have a strong link with 
SDG 3 and SDG 12.
S&P Global: funding 
projects that align with our 
CR priorities to Promote 
Sustainability and to 
Support Women 
Entrepreneurs. 
Hilton Worldwide, Inc.: 
investing in renewables or 
forest preservation across 
the region  to increase the 
share of renewable energy
SDG 7, SDG 15
SGS SA:  investment  in renewable energy 
projects, energy efficiency measures and green 
electricity supply
Two SDGs Four SDGs
Above five SDGs Multiple SDGs
SDG 5, SDG 8SDG 3, SDG 12
SDG 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 17
SDG 3, 7, 9, 12, 14, 15, 17













































































4.2.3.2. “Global-local” Investment Flow  
One of the categories of motivation 2 is supporting key regions for corporate business 
through offset investments. In this global-local investment flow, companies claimed in 
their CSR reports that they have invested in offset projects in the areas where corporates 
operate, obtain raw material, conduct business, or have strategic partners. Detailed 
commitments from these 20 corporates can be found in Appendix B Figure B 4-8. To 
validate these commitments, I draw investment flow maps based on the data from the 
projects’ level. 
Example one: Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, whose operations span 
Australia, New Zealand, and a number of countries in the Asia Pacific region, the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States. The investment flows in (a) showed 
that the location of the projects that matched to the markets of business operation. 
Example two: Enagás, S.A., a Spain Utility Company, invested in emissions reduction 
projects in the countries where it operates. (b) validated the two investment flows from 




                       (b)  
                                                                          
Figure 4-10. Global-to-local offset investment flows.  
 
I plotted the investment flows for all 20 companies, and the full map can be found in 
appendix Figure B 4-8. The finding in Figure B 4-8 mirrors that of corporate commitment 
in their CSR reports. It should be considered as solid evidence that offset investment flows 
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were happening thought the global-local direction. It further emphasizes the impact of 
offset projects in the “local” dimension.  
4.3. Mapping Motivations on to Purchasing Behaviors  
Investment in carbon offset projects in the long- and short-term will be driven by the 
interplay of corporates motivations, project characteristics, such as project types, offset 
standards, and the quality of the projects. These project characteristics are the essential 
determinants of whether co-benefits in the local communities are real or not. In this section, 
our primary objective is to answer the second part of the research question: does the 
specific motivation affect the specific choices for investment? If yes, how specific 
motivation affects purchasing behaviors, including project typed and standards. 
Before I moved into the discussion of results from my analysis, I want to make some 
clarification about the four motivations used in this section. Companies in each motivation 
are mutually exclusive with no overlaps. The final list of motivations is as follows: 
Motivation 1: Company carbon management and efficiency (93 companies) 
Motivation 2: Company market competitiveness (34 companies)  
Motivation 3: Company values (33 companies)  
Motivation 4: Company values and market competitiveness (26 companies) 
Companies in the four motivations add up to 186.  
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4.3.1. Motivations and Project Types 
Regardless of project type, as long as certain projects meet the eligibility requirement of 
offset standards, these projects can create carbon offsets. From the perspective of reducing 
emissions, buyers should be comfortable purchasing offsets from any types of project as 
long as these offsets are verified because there is no difference in using offsets to reduce 
emission reductions. But there still might be some variability in choosing certain project 
types. Especially, some projects have the potential to generate a more positive, immediate 
local sustainable development impact, and buyers would purchase these projects by adding 
a price premium to these offsets. Currently, different project types are sold at different 
prices in the market. The information on the average prices by project type can be found in 
Appendix Figure B 4-5. I am exploring the interaction between the corporate purchasing 
decision and project types to see if there is a trend to indicate buyers’ preferences. 
 











Market  P-Value 
Pearson 
chi2 
Forestry 57 36 32 37 0.000*** 17.958 
Household Devices 9 11 19 17 0.000*** 31.967 
Energy 
Efficiency/Fuel 
Switching 10 1 0 11 0.000*** 26.686 
Waste Disposal 20 10 5 3 0.415 2.851 
s 3 0 0 1 0.515 2.288 
RE (with Hydro) 80 34 35 47 0.001*** 17.425 
RE (without Hydro) 63 27 20 44 0.000*** 28.016 
Wind 30 12 13 16 0.199 4.658 
Solar 15 7 2 7 0.241 4.198 
Hydro 17 7 15 3 0.020*** 9.872 
Biomass 17 8 4 20 0.000*** 30.180 
Note:  
1. The number of corporates in each motivation category is: “company management and efficiency”: 93, 
“company market competitiveness: 34; “company value”: 33; “company value and market: 26.  
2. Overall Pearson chi2(108) = 166.8649   Pr = 0.000*** 
3. ***Significant at 0.1% level 
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The overall relationship among different motivations that taking different project types was 
significant and the p-value of the Pearson correlation was 0.000. To explore where the 
significance came from, either within the motivation or within project types, I further 
conducted Pearson correlations between each project type and motivations. The results are 
listed in Table 4-4. From the results, I can see that the main source of the significance 
stemmed from certain project types, such as forestry, household devices, efficiency/fuel 
switching, and renewable energy. Within these four project types, there were significant 
differences in attitudes towards different project types based on different motivations. Thus, 
I further performed a statistical analysis to see the preference among project types based 
on different motivations, and also preference between projects within the same motivation. 
Detailed results are presented in Figure 4-11. 
 
I acknowledged that corporate features, such as size, revenues, net income, total emission 
status, etc., might have influence in their decision of offset investments. Simply looking at 
the correlation might miss these factors. However, I conducted some tests to assessing 
balance of two different groups of companies (group based on our hypothesis) before I 
further calculate the t-test in Appendix A. I present the results of the standardized 
differences in Table 4-7. Overall, these two groups are quite balanced, especially in the 
following three areas: annual revenue, net income, and operation of year 2018. I can 
conclude that there is adequate balance between these two groups of companies. I also 
conducted a hedonic model with 37 companies who reported the purchased prices of offsets 
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in 2018. I report the results in Table 4-8. I also found that these corporate features do not 














Note: t-test results are from comparing the difference of the average number of projects (number of transactions) within the respective project types, invested by 
companies driven by separate motivation 
Figure 4-11. T-test results of voluntary carbon offset project types and corporate motivations. Green cells indicate that buyers purchase 
more from projects with a higher average price. Rose-colored cells show that the preference over projects fits the assumption that buyers buy more projects due 
to the low price of the products. 
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The comparison results by different motivations over a single project type
The one-tail negative statistically significant difference of results 
between two motivations over the same project type 
The negative one-tail statistically significant difference of results of between 
two project types purchased within the same motivations at 90% confidence intervals
The positive one-tail statistically significant difference of results of between 
two project types purchased from the same motivations at 90% confidence intervals 
The comparison results of two project types within each motivation
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Figure 4-11 delivers three important messages for this study. First, motivations of 
company values and company market competitiveness drove companies to purchase more 
offset projects with a higher offset price, compared to companies under the motivation of 
carbon management and efficiency. In the boxes (yellow) of the four highest priced project 
types (household devices, forestry, chemical process, and energy efficiency), there is a 
statistically significant difference at the number of projects being purchased by motivation-
1 companies and the group of companies from motivation 2, motivation 3, and motivation 
4. When project types moved towards the right corner of the diagonal line (offset credits 
became cheaper), there is no statistically significant difference among these four 
motivations towards project types. 
Second, companies with the motivation of carbon management and efficiency were 
attracted by the low prices of certain project types, and they tended to purchase more 
projects from this group of projects. In the boxes (white) that have only one or two rose-
colored cells,59 at least one of the rose-colored cells resided in the motivation-1 companies. 
Under this circumstance, project type with a lower price had a higher chance to be chosen 
by motivation-1 companies, when motivation-1 companies were facing the investment 
decision between two project types.  
Third, renewable energy projects were favored by all companies except when companies 
compared renewable energy projects with household device projects or forestry. When 
facing the decision of investing between renewable energy projects and projects such as 
 
59 Rose-colored cell indicates that a lower-priced project was chosen; green-colored cell indicates that a 
higher-priced project was chosen. 
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chemical processes, energy efficiency/fuel switching, waste disposal, or transportation, 
companies showed a very strong preference for purchasing renewable energy projects. One 
reason to explain the situation is that the average offset price of renewable energy is the 
lowest as shown in Figure B 4-5. Another possible explanation besides the low price of 
renewable energy offset credits was that there were better co-benefits from renewable 
energy projects compared to projects such as chemical processes, energy efficiency/fuel 
switching, waste disposal, or transportation. Because when corporates facing the 
investment choice between renewable energy projects and forestry, or household device 
projects, the low-priced factor no longer works, and I started to see less impact, or no 
impact. 
In conclusion, there are two opposite trends of offset investment due to the pricing signals. 
One trend is from the high-priced signal. Companies in motivations, such as company value 
and company market competitiveness were willing to invest more in projects with a higher 
offset cost, especially in household device projects and forestry projects, which could 
potentially yield a higher local co-benefit due to the nature of the projects. By contrast, the 
other trend is from the low-priced signal. Companies, especially those inspired by the 
motivation of carbon management and efficiency, intended to invest more in renewable 
energy projects, along with other project types such as chemical processes, energy 
efficiency/fuel switching, waste disposal, or transportation. Not only did these projects 
yield a cheaper carbon offset cost, but potentially some of the project types can also yield 
good local co-benefits, such as renewable energy projects.  
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4.3.2. Motivations and Voluntary Carbon Offsets Standards and Registry 
Infrastructure 
In this section, I explore the interaction between corporate purchasing decisions and offset 
standards. The standards and registry infrastructure are an essential piece of voluntary 
offset markets in standardizing carbon credits and proving the legitimacy of these credits 
by third-party verification. Additionality has been an ongoing concern from 
environmentalists and some buyers who hold skeptical attitudes towards carbon offsetting. 
To address the concerns, companies purchase the carbon offsets that meet the highest 
possible standards to avoid criticism from the media and environmentalists (Bayon et al., 
2009).  
Currently, there are five common voluntary carbon offsets standards in the market, where 
the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) and the Gold Standard got the lion’s share of the 
market by taking roughly 66 percent and 20 percent (Figure 4-12) of the transacted offset 
volumes respectively based on a market survey (Hamrick and Gallant, 2018). Standards 
serve the purpose of issuing offsets to a voluntary carbon offset project if the general 
criteria set by the standards are met, mainly refer to the qualification of validation and 
verification. On top of these two-primary qualifications, a few standards will issue add-on 
certification to offer buyers “charismatic” offsets that emphasize co-benefits (Conte and 
Kotchen, 2010). For example, Gold Standard certifies positive co-benefits, and the Climate, 
Community & Biodiversity Standard (CCBS) certifies positive social and biodiversity 
impacts. Additionally, the American Carbon Registry (ACR), listed as the highest priced 
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standard, is recognized for environmental integrity and innovation (Forest Trends’ 
Ecosystem Marketplace, 2019).   
As a result, I have standards that only focus on GHG reduction attributes, which do not 
require additional environmental or social benefits, such as VCS (Dhanda and Hartman, 
2011; Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace, 2019). I also have standards that focus on 
demonstrating social and environmental benefits, such as the Gold Standard, and CCBS, 
Plan Vivo. By mapping the motivations on to these standards, I can identify some trends. 
 
Note: 1. Average Price is calculated based on transactions between January-March 2018 2. Source: 
Voluntary Carbon Markets Insights: 2018 Outlook and First-Quarter Trends 
















Gold Standard, 3.13, 20%
Aggregated, 3.23, 7%
ACR, 4.87, 2%






















Average Price of Voluntary Offset Credit on Standards, and their Market Share 
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Market  P-Value 
Pearson 
chi2 
       
ACR 3 2 1 4 0.112 5.998 
CAR 11 5 2 4 0.695 1.444 
CCBS 0 3 13 3 0.000*** 37.114 
CDM 25 12 21 4 0.005** 12.804 
Gold Standard 46 28 32 37 0.000*** 25.435 
Miscellaneous standards 24 10 4 27 0.000*** 42.760 
Not yet verified 6 5 1 3 0.310 3.586 
VCS 64 38 28 44 0.000*** 23.473 
VER+ (TÜV SÜD 
standards) 13 0 1 0 0.014* 10.545 
Total Observation 192 103 103 126   
Note:  
1. The number of corporates in each motivation category is: “company value”: 33; “company market 
competitiveness: 34; “company management and efficiency: 93; “company value and market: 26.  
2. Pearson chi2(24) =  89.8673   Pr = 0.000*** 
3. *Significant at 5% level, **Significant at 1% level, ***Significant at 0.1% level 
 
The overall relationship among different motivations that purchase different offset 
standards is significant with the p-value of the Pearson Chi-Squared Test was 0.000. In 
order to explore where the significance comes from, either within the motivation or within 
offset standards, I further conducted the chi-squared test between each offset standard and 
motivations.  














Table 4-5 shows that that significance is primarily from the variation in attitudes towards 
a few offset standards due to different motivations of purchasing offset credits. These offset 
standards are Gold Standard, CCBS, CDM, VCS, etc. Taking the Gold Standard as an 
example, there are statistically significant differences in attitudes towards purchasing Gold 
Standards among the four groups of companies. I further performed a statistical analysis to 
explore the variation in purchasing motivation towards the same offset standards, and the 
preference between offset standards within the same motivation. Detailed results are 













Note: t-test results are from comparing the difference of the average number of projects (number of transactions) within the respective project offset standards, 
invested by companies driven by separate motivations. 
Figure 4-13. T-test results of voluntary carbon offset standards and corporate motivations.  When we compare the differences of 
standards purchased, I always subtract the lower-priced offset standard from the higher-priced standard. Green cells indicate that 
corporates purchase more from offset standards with a higher average price. Rose-colored cells show that the preference over offset 
standards fits the assumption that buyers buy more offset standards due to the low price of the standards.  
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offset standards purchased from the same motivation at 90% confidence intervals
two offset standards purchased from the same motivation at 90% confidence intervals 
The comparison results of two offset standards within each motivation
The comparison results by different motivations over one single offset standard
The one-tail negative statistically significant difference of 
The  negative statistically significant difference of results between 
The positive one-tail statistically significant difference of results between 
results between two motivations over the same offset standards
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Figure 4-13, again with similar trends as in the previous section, delivers four important 
messages for our paper.  
First, motivations of company values and company market competitiveness drove 
companies to invest in offset standards either with a higher offset price or having more 
“charismatic” features, compared to companies with the motivation of carbon management 
and efficiency. In the boxes (yellow) of the three highest-priced offset standards with add-
on co-benefits (Gold Standard, CCBS and ACR), there is a statistically significant 
difference at the number of offset standards being purchased by motivation-1 companies 
and motivation-2, motivation-3, motivation-4 companies. Companies were indifference in 
preference for offset standards when moving towards the right corner of the diagonal line 
(offset credit became cheaper with no add-on features are attached, and there is no 
statistically significant difference among these four motivations towards offset standards.) 
Second, companies with the motivation of carbon management and efficiency were 
attracted by the low-priced offset standards, and they tended to purchase more offsets from 
this group of standards, namely VCS, CAR, and CDM. The average price of offset credits 
from this group is below $2/tCO2e. In the boxes (white) that only one or two rose-colored 
cells,60 at least one of the rose-colored cells resided in the motivation-1 companies. Thus, 
when motivation-1 companies faced the investment decision between two offset standards, 
the one with a lower price had a higher chance to be chosen by motivation-1 companies. 
 
60 Rose-colored cell indicated that the lower-priced standard was chosen. 
 173 
 
Third, Gold Standard offset credits were favored over other standards by all types of 
companies, with only one exception, when Gold Standard was compared to VCS by 
motivation-1 companies. There were two explanations. First, VCS is the most common 
standard in the voluntary carbon markets with a market share of 66 percent of total 
transacted credit volumes. Second, lower-priced VCS credits were favored by motivation-
1 companies, and they intended to make a significant purchase. 
Fourth, ACR, offering offset credits with environmental integrity and innovation at a 
higher price in the voluntary carbon markets, had an advantage in offset project investing, 
except when competing against more market-recognized standards, namely the Gold 
Standard and VCS. 
Generally, corporate motivations show a large degree of consistency and orientation, which 
was aligned with the findings of the purchasing behavior on offset standards. Motivation-
2, motivation-3, and motivation-4 companies were willing to invest more on offset projects 
with better add-on features, and willing to pay these offset credits at a higher price. While 
the investment decision of the motivation-1 companies was driven primarily by the low-
priced factor. However, when facing the choice of a specific project type, they intend to 
invest in renewable energy projects, which are not only cheap but also can deliver on 
potential local co-benefits. Based on the observations from this sector, I believe that co-
benefits might be woven into the fabric of corporate social responsibility and the decision-





Table 4-6. Summary of findings.  
Methods Topic Key finding  
Qualitative  Motivation Through the coding strategy, I was able to identify three primary motivations: 
Motivation 1: Company carbon management and efficiency (155 companies):  




Corporates made their offset investment decisions and delivered benefits of 
these projects based through several channels: by establishing rigorous criteria 
for project selection, by choosing the focus of the projects, and by looking at 
specific benefits of that project. in these channels, a wide range of dimensions 
of the conceptualization of well-being and well-being outcomes are captured in 
local communities. 
Projects' Prospects In the project narratives, "local" plays an essential role both from the breadth 
and depth of our findings. 
Role of project 
benefits for serving 
specific corporate 
motivations 
I am able to close the gap by linking what the companies committed to doing, 
and whether it turned out to be the outcomes by how they support SDGs and 
how to make the global-to-local offset investment flows.  
Quantitative Motivation and 
project types 
There are two opposite trends of offset investment due to the pricing signals. 
One trend is from the high-priced signal. By contrast, the other trend is from the 
low-priced signal. Corporate motivations show a large degree of consistency 
and orientation, which was aligned with the findings of the purchasing behavior 
on offset standards. Motivation-2, motivation-3, and motivation-4 companies 
were willing to invest more on offset projects with better add-on features, and 
willing to pay these offset credits at a higher price. While the investment 
decision of the motivation-1 companies was driven primarily by the low-priced 
factor. However, when facing the decision of choosing a specific project type, 
they tend to invest in renewable energy projects, which are not only cheap but 
also can deliver on potential local co-benefits.  
Motivation and 
project standards  
 
I have summarized our key findings in Table 4-6. 
At the core of this analysis lies concerns of whether the offset investment will result in real 
and impactful co-benefits as companies claims in their CSR reports. The validation process 
made the flow from the claim-outcome possible. Results of corporate preference towards 
project types such as household device and forests, and offset certificates such as Gold 
Standard, were consistent with the literature.  
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However, it is somewhat surprising that renewable energy projects were not the favored 
when counting towards improving corporate values and market competitiveness. 
Additionally, the “local” dimension shows up in many aspects, both from corporate reports 
and CDP surveys. While it could be considered as an unexpected finding, I do not consider 
this finding conflicted with our main argument. On the contrary, the unexpected finding 
help perfecting our storytelling from different perspectives, and making the story with a 
strong, dynamic, three-dimensional feature. 
Co-benefits of the offset investment have come to the fore as a key sustainable 
development topic. Looking forward, there are several trends and unresolved questions that 
will impact the investment decisions in the voluntary offset markets.  
The findings from this study have some implications for corporate decision-makers, 
practitioners, and academicians. So far as I know, there is no known published research 
specifically studying the corporate motivation on offset investment through a deep-dive 
readout of CSR reports, and validating their behavior through the self-report CDP survey. 
Nevertheless, my study has several limitations due to data constraints. My qualitative 
approach of the mixed method relied solely on corporate CSR reports. Although I used the 
project-level data to validate the quality of information companies have claimed in CSR 
reports on certain aspects, I have to acknowledge that the results from this study could be 
biased. It cannot deliver a full picture of the corporate offset investment decision. This is 
because our assessment only relied on the self-reported information provided by companies. 
For those companies that chose not to provide information on their offset purchases, I was 
not able to access and evaluate their motivations. Additionally, there is no standardized 
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format for CSR reports, which might cause some assessment errors during the coding 
process. However, regardless of these aforementioned limitations, I am confident that the 
findings are still rigorous and generalizable to the offset investment market. 
Findings from this study show several focal areas for future research and benefit corporate 
decision-makers and academicians. Studies on corporate motivations can be conducted 
through interviews with a group of targeted companies from our three motivation 
categories will reveal insights into their behavior directly. Or a study of those companies 
who didn’t mention their offset investment in their CSR reports might add some new 
information that I am not able to identify from my studies. Additional research can study 
corporate choices through a choice model to generalize the traditional used discrete choice 
model, with quantitative statistical models employed to explain corporate offset investment 
decisions 
For corporate CSR strategists, there may be gaps in the types of benefits accruing in places 
that need them. Figure 4-2 shows the global distribution of project types, which tells us 
that regions such as Africa, might need a diversity of project types to further assist their 
sustainable development. Regardless of how household device projects can bring better co-
benefits to local communities, projects such as renewable energy projects are still needed 
in this region. With the willingness to pay from companies towards projects with higher 
co-benefits, and lower prices of offset credits from renewable energy projects, companies 
can shift the courses of their investment strategy but still obtaining a similar positive impact 
contributing company values and market competitiveness. 
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6. Conclusion  
In this paper, I presented a full set of motivations for corporate offset project investments. 
All of the four motivations revolve around their underlying desire to receive both financial 
and social returns on their investments. The findings from our paper confirmed the two 
hypotheses at the beginning of this paper. Companies with incentive simply to cut emission 
reductions are motivated to purchase cost-effective offset projects. While companies with 
motivations from non-emission impacts value co-benefits more, and they are willing to pay 
more to fulfill these impacts. Additionally, this paper demonstrates that companies with 
additional motivations (motivation 2, 3, 4) placed a high value on offset projects or offset 
certificates with more co-benefits in local communities.  
The mixed-method approach provides a valid tool to study the motivations for corporate 
offset investment decisions and interaction between motivations and specific 
characteristics of purchasing behaviors. The results from our analysis further accomplish 
our original assumption that corporates with motivations from non-emission impact values 
co-benefits more, and they are willing to pay more for certain project types or offset 
certificates. 
Another theme of this paper touches on many aspects of corporate investment behavior 
towards project benefits and is significant for the incorporation of co-benefits in local 
communities into the offset investment strategy. Given the huge amount of finance 
available, this study shows that understanding how corporate motivations could potentially 
support better policy design is a useful approach to encouraging additional investment in 
those kinds of areas.  
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Appendix A Assessing Balance of Two Different Groups of Companies  
Group 1: Motivation 1 
Group 2: Motivation 2, 3, and 4 
I adopted the standardized differences technique, which is the difference in terms of 
standard deviations (SD), to assess the difference between these two groups (Lunt, 2014). 
if there is no big difference between these two groups, I can conclude that there is 
adequate balance between these two groups of companies.  
Table 4-7. Checking balance of confounders between group 1 and group 2 (year of 
2018).  
 Mean in Group 1 Mean in Group 2 Standardized diff. 
    
Employees 36356.97 60816.61 -0.325 
Total Assets 243376.22 101344.96 0.360 
Annual Revenue 19087.94 19063.61 0.001* 
Net Income 2310.24 1923.35 0.082* 
Operation 3088.30 3145.80 -0.006* 
Credits (sum) 44562.79 193160.56 -0.323 
Target dummy 0.92 0.96 -0.139 
Carbon pricing dummy 0.41 0.56 -0.294 
Number of Projects 2.10 3.40 -0.545 
Investing -5049.74 -2008.19 -0.186 
Total emission* 1561738.95 4530981.14 -0.315 
*Standardized differences < 0.1 indicate adequate balance. Standardized differences are 
the standardized difference of means. 
     
I ran the standardized differences test and present the results in Table 4-7. The test results 
show us that group 1 and group 2 differ by less than 0.1 SD in Annual Revenue, Net 




Table 4-8. Regression results of offset prices.  
Regression results: Internal Carbon Price for Offsets of 2018 
   
 Model 1 (Linear) Model 2 (Log) 
   
Number of Projects -1.071 -0.243 
 (0.612) (0.172) 
Total Assets -0.00000176 -0.000000619 
 (0.00000601) (0.00000169)    
EMPLOYEES -0.0000372 -0.0000101 
 (0.0000376) (0.0000106) 
Annual Revenue -0.0000688 -0.00000542 
 (0.000149) (0.0000420) 
Net Income 0.000100 0.0000674 
 (0.000769) (0.000217) 
Operating -0.000149 -0.0000271 
 (0.000153) (0.0000431) 
Investing -0.000258 -0.0000421 
 (0.000215) (0.0000605) 
Credits Purchased -0.00000221 -0.000000828 
 (0.00000316) (0.000000892) 
Total Emission 0.000000212 1.60e-08 
 (0.000000370) (0.000000104) 
Country FE Yes yes 
Sector FE Yes  yes 
Observations 37 37 
R-Square 0.2482 0.2149 
Note: The dependent variable in is Offset price in Model 1 and is natural log of offset price in Model 2. 
Offset prices are available at the corporate level. They are average offset prices of different projects in each 
company. Coefficient estimates are reported in this table. I control for company location fixed effects, 
company sector fixed effects. 
* p<0.10    ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01   
 
 
Table 4-9. Summary of offset price and shadow price of carbon. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Offset price ($US) 37 4.085115 2.95946 .304 13.1307 















Appendix B Supporting Material  
 
 
Source: State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2017 Buyers Analysis 




Table B 4-1. Comparison of the purchased offset volumes between the final sample and 
deleted sample. 
Corporate Number  186 (sample of interest) 120 (deleted) 
 Mean                       32,798.66                     9,932.23  
 Standard Error                          3,969.20                     2,245.83  
 Median                          8,204.00                          629.65  
 Standard Deviation                       88,309.18                  26,477.91  
 Sample Variance     7,798,510,594.72     701,079,680.54  
 Minimum                                            -                                  0.30  
 Maximum                1,269,582.00               167,097.00  
 Sum             16,235,337.22           1,380,579.62  
 Projects                                534.00                          139.00  










Figure B 4-2. Content analysis approach for evaluation of CSR carbon offset.  
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Data:  
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to local co-benefits) 
 
• Project selection  
• Project investment flow 
• Legitimacy of offset projects  
• Ownership  
Data:  
• Corporates’ annual CSR 
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• CDP Climate Change 
Questionnaire 2018, 2019 
• GS, VCS project registry  




Figure B 4-3. Taking voluntary offset programs as corporate branding strategy (by sector and by industry). Different industries brand 
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                             Source: Voluntary Carbon Markets Insights: 2018 Outlook and First-Quarter Trends 




Sources: Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace, State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2019 
Figure B 4-5. Offset prices vary among project types. 
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Figure B 4-6. Distribution of voluntary carbon offset standards by motivations. 
Gold Standard (certifies positive co-benefits) and CCBS (certifies positive social 
and biodiversity impacts) appear more in the motivation of “company value”, while 


























Figure B 4-7. Tree map of “local”. “Local” places a big role in narratives about 
projects. 
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Table B 4-2. Corporate commitment of global-to-local offset investment. 
Corporate Commitment Area 
Atos SE The investments made by Atos every year since 2014 contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gases emissions from the electricity mix in 
India, a key region for Atos.  






We continue to invest in carbon offset projects which deliver meaningful and positive environmental and social impacts and improve the lives 
of people living in communities across the markets in which we operate.  





In 2018, we offset the impact of the emissions generated by our operations in Colombia, through the purchase of carbon credits, involving 
certified high impact social and environmental investment projects in the country.  
Key region (Colombia) 
Delta Air 
Lines 
For our carbon offset portfolio, we ensure that these offsets not only have verified emissions reduction, but also advance the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals in areas that Delta serves.  
Areas that Delta serves 
Desjardins 
Group 
We’ve been carbon neutral since 2017, through our purchase of carbon offset credits in several provinces. These carbon credits have been 
verified by a third party. We carefully vetted these offsets to make sure that they benefit the environment, local communities, young people, as 
well as our members and clients.  
Members and clients 
ENAGAS For the first time, Enagás has offset part of its 2017 footprint emissions with credits generated by emissions reduction projects developed in the 
countries where it operates, Peru and Chile, which also involve an improvement of environmental and social impact on local communities.  
Countries where it 





In 2018, we again achieved our carbon neutrality commitment through the implementation of our Carbon Reduction Framework, …high-quality 
certified carbon offsets that support the growth of renewable energy markets where we operate.  





We remain carbon neutral by purchasing offsets from projects in our markets that help us make communities safer and more resilient. 
Information is available on our website.  
Projects in our markets  
Lenovo 
Group 
In FY 2017/18, Lenovo partnered with ClimeCo and purchased 10,000 MT CO2 e of carbon offsets, 35,000 MWh of Green-e Energy certified 
RECs, 45,000 MWh of I-RECs and 6,500 MWh of GOs, which supported 100 percent renewable energy projects in China (wind), Europe 
(wind) and the U.S. (wind). These renewable commodities were in addition to local purchases by Lenovo’s sites.  




Since 2014, we have been conducting carbon offset initiatives in disaster-stricken areas as well as in the areas that produce material for our 
shoes, the areas in which we open new stores, and other areas that benefit local customers.  
Areas that provide raw 
material  
MetLife To offset the greenhouse gas emissions that we cannot reduce in the short term, we support a diverse portfolio of emissions-reduction and 
renewable energy generation projects in countries where we operate around the world.  
Countries where it 
operates  
Microsoft Carbon offset community project investment criteria: Geographical coverage—We prioritize investments in projects with local proximity to our 
datacenter.  





Six calls for proposal were issued from 2007 to 2018, resulting in the contracting of 38 projects, of which 32 were in Brazil and six in the 
countries in which we operate in Latin America: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.  




We seek to offset the remaining carbon through carbon credits from projects that demonstrate the biggest potential to benefit the natural 
heritage and social structure of Africa.  
Africa 
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S&P Global Through a new program to offset our GHG emissions, S&P Global is supporting these efforts toward a low-carbon economy in emerging 
countries where we do significant business. Channeling renewable energy into India’s vast national grid. Replacing traditional cook stoves to 
improve living conditions in Kenya. 
Countries where we do 
significant business 
SGS SA The associated economic benefit of our carbon neutrality approach. Any carbon that we cannot eliminate from our operations is offset through 
investments in clean energy projects that deliver both social and environmental benefits in communities where SGS operates.  
Communities where 
SGS operates 
Sthree Plc Through carbon offsetting we have a positive environmental, economic, health and education impact in a community where we are already 
empowering change through STEM education. We have offset our 2018 carbon emissions with two projects, one of which is in Ghana close to 




In 2017, we invested in carbon offsets from Kenya’s Chyulu Hills to help meet our climate goals and promote sustainable development in an 
area of the world where we source colored gemstones and where we support wildlife conservation.  





Verisk’s greenhouse gas emissions were balanced 100 percent by our purchase of renewable energy certificates (RECs) and carbon offsets. We 
support renewable energy projects in almost every country or region where we have offices.  
Local offices 
Worldline Through this program, in 2016 Worldline financed the installation of 200 wind turbines and thus supported the development of a wind farm in 
India, home to 6% of the company’s employees. 









Chapter 5 Conclusion 
The pathway of low-carbon development present both challenges and opportunities for the 
developing world. Unlike the developed world, these developing countries are facing 
multiple challenges in the new course. They must prioritize promoting high-quality 
economic development, maintaining economic, financial and energy security, protecting 
environment and controlling carbon emissions, while facing limited sources. As a result, 
many of these priorities, yet could play an important role in long-term development 
strategies, are competing with each other in the short-term with resources. This limits their 
capacity today and create uncertainly about viability in the long run. On the other hand, the 
low-carbon development pathway could help the developing world to create real 
opportunities to achieve real sustainable growth and reduce emissions at a lower cost and 
in a shorter period of time. 
Co-benefits of climate finance are the backbone of a green and low-carbon development 
of the developing world, which serves as a solution to fix those aforementioned challenges 
and accelerate the low-carbon transition. As a result, concerted international efforts, 
national policies, and individual actions are urgently needed to be on the ground.  However, 
how the climate finance market values co-benefits remains poorly understood. By focusing 
on local co-benefits, this research highlights the importance of valuing co-benefits where 
projects are located, and how these projects deliver impacts for local communities. 
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In 2018, global market capitalization was about $68 trillion,61  and the $3 trillion asset value 
of 186 corporates represented about 4 percent of market capitalization. Channeling 
available finance to offset projects that benefit local communities is a must.  
However, we need new courses of action that deliver on the ground. 
My research shows that in the CDM context, a project with a likelihood of delivering more 
co-benefits receives a higher CER price from the buyer. The price differences between 
projects with the highest co-benefits and lowest co-benefits is $4.9 /tCO2e on average or a 
difference of 27.6 percent. The large variability in the price of CERs partially comes from 
the buyer’s location. and project location, while prices of CERs do not differ based on 
buyers’ profit status, sectors, or number of projects they hosted. In the quality branding 
context, I see that quality control indicators (particularly, the independently generated label 
of “Gold Standard”) have a significant effect on CER prices with a price premium in the 
range of $1.13/tCO2e to $4.2/tCO2e. Additionally, I see a strong commitment from public 
finance in delivering co-benefits in the local commitment by paying a price premium to 
projects with a Gold Standard certification. In the voluntary carbon markets, I find that 
corporate motivations show a large degree of consistency and orientation, which was 
aligned with the findings of the purchasing behavior on offset standards. Companies with 
a primary motivation to reduce emissions will prioritize purchasing cost-effective offset 
projects. While companies with primary motivations from non-emission impacts (such as 
company values or company market competitiveness) value co-benefits more, they are 
willing to pay more to fulfill these impacts.  
 
61 World Bank Data, Market capitalization of listed domestic companies (current USD).  
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From the results of my three essays, I see a transition in the private sector. A transition 
from compliance carbon markets to voluntary carbon markets, a transition from public 
finance to private finance, and a transition from pure emission reductions to sustainable 
investments. I see that the private sector is to ready to advance on this new course. I see 
that co-benefits, although still are under-estimated, play a critical role in delivering a better 
growth and a better climate into reality.  
Our contribution is that I find that buyers are willing to pay a price premium of projects 
with higher co-benefits in the market. Previous research focus on emphasizing the 
importance of integrating sustainable development elements into the infrastructure 
investment, but none of the previous research actually using the market itself to study 
whether these co-benefits are valued by market actors or not. If market actors value the co-
benefits, and willing to pay the price premium for these co-benefits. It in turn can encourage 
project developers to integrating co-benefits at the project design stage. This dissertation 
contributes to the research community by bringing together empirical evidence and 
qualitative analysis, learning from the real-world experiences from both the public and 
private sectors.  
By using the carbon markets as a case study, I do find that market behavior in the areas of 
carbon finance do value co-benefits. In the compliance carbon markets, public actors are 
more responsive to projects with more benefits by paying a price premium. While in the 
voluntary carbon markets, although at a small scale, private actors with primary 
motivations from company value and market competitiveness intend to value co-benefits 
more, and they are willing to pay more to fulfill these impacts. However, some private 
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actors with a primary motivation to cut emission reductions still prioritize purchasing cost-
effective offset projects at a lower cost.  
More importantly, these three essays can contribute to the original research motivation of 
this dissertation, sustainable infrastructure, in the following three ways: 
First, by creating the SDG-interaction score system, using this system in one specific 
context (carbon markets), and validating the legitimate and effectiveness of the scoring 
system empirically, I think we are able to apply this system into a broader climate finance 
world, and also in sustainable infrastructure investments. 
Second, by identify the market value of one policy mechanism, quality branding in both 
the compliance and voluntary markets, I think it is possible to transfer this mechanism of 
quality branding to sustainable infrastructure investment. Using public finance, such as 
support from the development bank platforms, we can create a similar mechanism to 
showcase the idea of integrating sustainable development benefits into the infrastructure in 
the real world. If the concept of the sustainable infrastructure in real project development 
can be approved, we believe it can give the institutional investors the real exposure to this 
new asset class.  
Third, by differentiating corporate motivations into different levels and linking these 
motivations to their decision-making process. We are able to mobilize private sector 
financing for sustainable infrastructure more specifically. Additionally, we should create a 
similar motivation mapping exercise for institutional investors and using motivations to 
mobilize them to invest in sustainable infrastructure strategically.  
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This dissertation seeks to inform policy decision-makers in the public sector and corporate 
decision-makers in the private sector, many of whom recognize the envisaged transition 
towards a sustainable low-carbon society necessitates the deployment of climate finance 
and realization of sustainability goals simultaneously in the effort of combating the climate 
change.  
By placing my research proposition in the content of local co-benefits, I am emphasizing 
the importance of valuing co-benefits where these projects are located, and how these 
projects deliver impacts on local communities. Thus, residents from local communities can 
co-live with these sustainable infrastructure for years. 
Empowering the local communities through generating co-benefits that closely related to 
the households, that have a direct positive impact on them, and that enable the fundamental 
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